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iii Abstract 
The  arm's-length  principle  (ALP),  the  transactions  taken  place  between  unrelated 
parties  acting  at  an  arm's  length  in  competitive  markets,  is  used  by  income  tax 
authorities  to  determine  transfer  pricing,  the  pricing  of  goods,  services  and  intangibles 
transferred  between  affiliates  of  a  multinational  enterprise  (MNE),  and  is  an  important 
international  tax  issue  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  globalization  creates  integrated 
businesses  with  enormous  cross-border  transfers  whilst  corporate  income  tax  systems 
remain  nationally  based.  Second,  governments  insist  that  globalization  provides 
MNEs  with  more  opportunities  to  manipulate  transfer  prices  and  reduce  taxes  than  in 
the  past,  thus  the  need  for  tighter  regulation.  Third,  there  is  an  increased  desire 
amongst  tax  authorities  faced  with  tight  fiscal  situations,  to  protect  and  enhance  their 
revenue  base  encouraging  stricter  regulation  of  MNEs. 
Profit  is  seen  as  only  one  of  the  many  goals  that  motivate  the  behaviour  of  MNEs  and 
the  newly  introduced  profit  based  methods  of  transfer  pricing  has  increased  the 
reliance  on  comparables  significantly.  As  the  number  of  specified  methods  was 
increased  and  the  hierarchy  of  acceptable  methods  was  replaced  by  either  the  best 
method  rule  or  the  method  of  last  resort,  taxpayers  are  expected  to  document  their 
transfer  pricing  policies.  The  documentation  has  to  be  contemporaneous  and 
available  upon  request.  The  methods  newly  introduced  by  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development's  (OECD,  1995),  Transaction  Net  Margin 
Method  (TNMM),  and  US  Internal  Revenue  Service's  (IRS,  1994)  Comparable  Profit 
Method  (CPM),  vary  in  relation  to  their  application  and  views  in  controlling  for 
function  and  risk  when  developing  comparables.  This  suggests  a  degree  of  discretion 
may  be  exercised  under  different  regulations  that  may  be  detected  through  ownership 
and  tax.  This  study  attempts  to  identify  the  level  of  discretion  provided  under  both 
OECD  (TNMM)  and  US  IRS  (CPM)  methods.  It  is  also  tests  the  scope  of  ownership 
effect  on  the  reported  profit  of  Japanese-owned  companies  and  US-owned  companies 
compared  to  their  UK  counterparts.  Finally  this  study  examines  whether  the  reported 
tax  expense  has  changed  subsequent  to  tax  policy  changes,  specifically  the  latest  UK 
transfer  pricing  regulations  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment. 
The  empirical  analysis  confirms  differences  between  OECD  and  US  IRS  profit  ranges 
and  variations  between  different  profit  level  indicators  (PLIs).  Foreign-owned 
iv Japanese  and  US  companies  are  also  found  to  exhibit  low  profitability  compared  to 
UK  companies.  This  research  discovered  low  performance  among  a  high  number  of 
the  Japanese-owned  companies  with  operating  losses  when  compared  to  their  UK 
counterparts  and  offers  evidence  of  the  low  tax  expenses  reported  by  foreign-owned 
Japanese  companies. 
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xl« Chapter  1 
Introduction  and  Research  Question 1.1  Significance  of  the  Issues 
The  arm's-length  principle  (ALP)  that  is,  the  transactions  taken  place  between 
unrelated'  parties  acting  at  an  arm's  length  in  competitive  markets,  is  used  by  income 
tax  authorities  to  determine  the  international  transfer  pricing  (ITP),  the  pricing  of 
goods,  services  and  intangibles  transferred  between  affiliates  of  a  multinational 
enterprise  (MNE).  This  is  the  single  "most  difficult  area  of  international  taxation"  and 
"the  biggest  international  tax  issue  MNEs  will  face  over  the  next  two  years", 
according  to  a  survey  of  more  than  450  multinational  parent  and  subsidiaries  (Ernst  & 
Young,  1997).  There  are  three  reasons  why  transfer  pricing  has  become  such  an 
important  international  tax  issue. 
First,  globalization  is  creating  integrated  businesses  with  enormous  cross-border 
transfers  while  corporate  income  tax  systems  remain  nationally  based.  According  to 
Minister  Miyazawa,  Japan's  Minister  of  Finance,  (1998),  the  size  of  world  trade  for 
one  year  as  a  whole  is  $11  trillion  and  in  the  early  1990s,  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  estimated  that  more  than  60 
percent  of  world  trade  took  place  within  MNEs.  That  proportion  is  likely  to  increase 
with  the  large  number  of  cross-border  consolidations.  As  MNEs  globalize  and  create 
elaborate  commercial  partnerships,  governments  and  fiscal  authorities  must  create  a 
new  global  framework  and  tools  for  managing  this  vast  world  commerce.  The  subject 
of  transfer  pricing  has  therefore  gained  increasing  importance. 
Second,  governments  argue  that  globalization  provides  MNEs  with  more 
opportunities  to  manipulate  transfer  prices  and  reduce  taxes  than  in  the  past  thus  the 
need  for  tighter  regulation.  New  legislation  has  been  passed  in  many  countries 
including  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Korea,  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  focus  in  most  of  these  countries  is  on  the  need  to  document  adherence 
to  the  arm's  length  principle  and  the  threat  of  large  penalties  for  failing  to  do  so.  This 
is  particularly  true  in  the  UK  where  Inland  Revenue  (IR)  introduced  legislation  in 
1998  to  level  the  playing  field  through  a  new  requirement  to  return  profits  calculated 
in  accordance  with  the  arm's  length  principle  and  with  a  penalty  regime  for  those 
1  Under  the  1998  UK  new  rules,  any  joint  venture  (related  parties)  in  which  the  parties  each  have  a 
minimum  40  percent  of  the  relevant  interests,  rights,  and  powers  in  or  over  the  joint  venture  will  now 
have  to  ensure  that  all  their  dealings  with  the  joint  venture  are  at  arm's  length. 
i taxpayers  that  had  been  neglectful  in  doing  so.  The  burden  of  proof  of  complying  is 
finally  on  the  taxpayer. 
Third,  the  increased  desire  of  tax  authorities,  faced  with  tight  fiscal  situations,  to 
protect  and  enhance  their  revenue  base  also  encourages  stricter  regulation  of  MNEs. 
Thus,  transfer  pricing  is  a  prime  area  for  international  conflict,  which  is  only  partially 
mitigated  by  double  taxation  agreements  between  jurisdictions. 
The  rationale  for  transfer  pricing  regulation  derives  from  the  fact  that  multinational 
enterprises  are  integrated  businesses.  The  primary  objective  of  most  MNEs  (and 
possibly  the  reason  for  their  existence  as  detailed  in  Chapter  2)  remains  profit 
maximization  which  can  be  achieved  through  their  internal  advantages,  assets 
specificity,  and  cost  advantages.  Profit  is  seen  as  only  one  of  the  many  goals  that 
motivate  the  behaviour  of  companies  and  the  aim  to  minimize  global  tax  liability  may 
not  be  a  prime  corporate  objective.  This  study  attempts  to  contribute  to  the  debate  on 
the  objectives  MNEs  may  follow. 
The  typical  MNE  consists  of  several  affiliated  firms  that  are  located  in  different 
countries,  under  common  control  of  the  parent  firm  and  sharing  common  resources 
and  goals.  Each  multinational  must  declare  income  and  pay  taxes  in  the  various 
countries  where  its  affiliates  do  business.  The  need  to  declare  taxable  income  means 
that  the  MNE  must  allocate  its  expenditures  and  revenues  among  its  various  affiliates 
and  set  transfer  prices  for  all  intra-firm  transactions  in  goods,  services  and  intangibles. 
Since  governments  have  the  authority  to  tax  entities  on  both  the  source  principle  (i.  e., 
all  income  earned  within  a  country's  borders  is  taxable  regardless  of  ownership)  and 
the  residence  principle  (i.  e.,  all  income  earned  by  a  country's  residents  is  taxable 
regardless  of  where  the  income  was  earned),  multinationals  must  follow  the  different 
and,  most  likely,  conflicting  corporate  tax  rules  set  down  by  both  home  and  host 
governments.  Thus,  double  taxation  of  MNE  income  is  a  real  possibility.  At  the  same 
time,  MNEs  can  arbitrage  the  differences  in  national  tax  systems,  through  transfer 
price  manipulation,  to  reduce  their  overall  taxation  burden.  In  order  to  prevent  both 
double  taxation  and  under-taxation  of  MNE  income,  tax  authorities  have  developed 
2 sophisticated  transfer  pricing  and  income  allocation  rules  and  procedures  as  part  of 
their  corporate  income  tax  systems. 
The  most  common  solution  that  national  tax  authorities  have  adopted  to  reduce 
transfer  price  manipulation  is  to  develop  specific  legislation  as  part  of  the  income  tax 
regulations.  Tax  authorities  require  transfer  prices  to  be  set  according  to  the  arm's 
length  principle.  The  OECD  defines  the  arm's  length  principle; 
"Where  conditions  are  made  or  imposed  between  the  two  enterprises  in  regard 
to  their  commercial  relations,  which  cause  those  relations  to  differ  from  those 
which  would,  but  for  those  conditions,  have  benefited/accrued  to  one  of  the 
enterprises,  but,  by  reason  of  those  conditions,  the  enterprise  has  not  so 
benefited,  then  the  outcome  of  those  relations  may  be  included  in  the  profits  of 
that  enterprise  and  taxed  accordingly"  (OECD,  1995,  para.  1.6). 
Essentially,  the  ALP  asks  an  MNE  the  question  as  to  what  would  the  parties  have 
done  if  they  were  unrelated.  The  answer  can  only  be  hypothetical  since  the  affiliates 
of  an  MNE  are  by  definition  related  to  each  other.  The  most  feasible  measure  is  a 
proxy  done  in  either  of  two  ways.  The  first  approach  is  to  make  reference  to  a  price 
for  the  same  or  similar  product  negotiated  by  two  other  unrelated  parties  under  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances  (External  Comparable).  The  second  approach  is  to  use 
the  price  for  the  same  or  similar  product  traded  between  one  of  the  related  parties  and 
an  unrelated  third  party  under  the  same  or  comparable  circumstances  (Internal 
Comparable).  Both  approaches  together  are  called  the  comparable  uncontrolled  price 
(CUP)  method;  mentioned  in  detail  in  Chapter  5,  this  is  the  method  most  highly 
recommended  by  tax  officials.  The  problem  is  that  often  neither  approach  can  be  used 
in  practice  because  there  are  often  specific  services  and  unique  goods  where  no  real 
comparable  transactions  are  available.  In  these  cases,  tax  authorities  must  rely  on 
other  methods  to  determine  the  arm's  length  price  such  as  the  latest  profit  based 
methods  as  explained  in  Chapter  5. 
As  comparables  can  be  either  comparable  transactions  or  comparable  companies,  the 
reliance  on  comparable  companies  has  increased  significantly  due  to  the  introduction 
of  profit  based  methods.  The  introduction  of  profit  based  methods  in  the  US  was 
mainly  due  to  the  increase  in  the  number  of  transactions  amongst  national  affiliates  of 
MNEs  which  typically  involve  pricing  unique  products  or  services,  thus  rendering 
arm's  length  transactions  unidentifiable.  By  default,  "fourth"  methods  were  widely 
3 applied  in  actual  cases,  but  with  no  regulatory  guidance  as  to  which  specific  methods 
were  or  were  not  appropriate  (Cole,  1999). 
In  1994,  the  US  Treasury  was  the  world's  most  active  innovator  and  developer  of 
transfer  pricing  policy  (Eden,  2001),  and  introduced  the  Comparable  Profits  Method 
(CPM).  In  the  final  1994  Section  482  regulations,  the  numbers  of  specified  methods 
were  increased  and  the  earlier  hierarchy  of  acceptable  methods  was  replaced  by  the 
best  method  rule,  requiring  the  taxpayer  to  select  the  best  method  based  on  the  facts 
and  circumstances  of  the  case.  Taxpayers  are  expected  to  document  their  transfer 
pricing  policies;  the  documentation  has  to  be  contemporaneous  and  available  to  the 
Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  upon  request.  The  final  IRS  regulations,  when 
compared  with  the  earlier  proposed  and  temporary  regulations,  are  seen  as  a 
substantial  retreat  by  the  United  States  from  any  potential  departure  from  ALP  (Eden, 
2001).  Across  the  Atlantic,  the  OECD  after  twice  criticizing  the  US  changes,  spent 
three  years  rewriting  its  own  transfer  pricing  guidelines.  The  new  guidelines  (OECD, 
1995)  clearly  show  the  stamp  of  the  US  482  regulations;  for  example,  they  include  a 
version  of  CPM  called  the  Transactional  Net  Margin  Method  (TNMM).  This  major 
change  is  referred  to  as  "transactional  profit  methods".  OECD  Guidelines  recognize 
that,  "The  transactional  net  margin  method  may  afford  a  practical  solution  to 
otherwise  insoluble  transfer  pricing  problems  if  it  is  used  sensibly  and  with 
appropriate  adjustments  to  account  for  differences"  (OECD,  1995,  para.  3.39). 
OECD  Guidelines  recognize  the  following  transfer  pricing  methods  as  potentially 
consistent  with  the  arm's-length  principle:  the  CUP  method,  the  resale  price  method, 
the  cost  plus  method,  the  profit  split  method,  and  the  transactional  net  margin  method. 
Under  OECD  guidelines,  profit  based  methods  are  to  be  applied  only  if  the  traditional 
methods  can  not  be  used.  Although  this  priority  of  methods  was  abandoned  in  US 
regulations,  it  is  preserved  in  the  Guidelines  which  describe  the  profit  methods  as 
methods  "of  last  resort",  to  be  applied  only  when  the  complexities  of  real  life  business 
situations  place  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  application  of  the  traditional 
transaction  methods  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  II,  para.  2.49;  Chap.  III,  3.1). 
In  spite  of  the  cautions  on  the  application  of  CPM  set  forth  in  the  1994  US  IRS 
Regulations  and  the  practical  benefits  in  determining  arm's  length  transfer  prices  in 
4 actual  cases,  CPM  has  received  a  hostile  response  according  to  Horst  (Cole,  1999) 
from  many  MNEs  and  foreign  governments.  Their  objections  to  CPM  reflect  a 
perception  that  the  US  systematically  uses  Section  482  to  overreach  and  subject  to  US 
tax  income  which  belongs  in  other  countries.  On  a  theoretical  level,  they  argue  that 
CPM  does  not  address  transfer  prices.  Profitability  is  affected  by  many  factors  aside 
from  transfer  pricing  and,  therefore,  CPM  is  out  of  place  as  a  transfer  pricing  method. 
On  a  practical  level,  MNEs  and  foreign  governments  accuse  CPM  of  permitting  the 
use  of  comparables  with  only  limited  comparability  to  the  tested  party  and  being  less 
than  rigorous  in  requiring  adjustments  that  could  increase  comparability. 
In  October  1997,  the  UK's  IR  issued  a  consultative  document,  Modernization  of  the 
TP  Legislation,  which  served  as  a  basis  for  revamping  the  UK's  cumbersome  transfer 
pricing  legislation.  The  document,  which  includes  draft  rules,  applied  from  1999,  and 
was  necessitated  by  the  need  to  reform  the  system  to  fit  into  the  new  self-assessment 
regime  operating  for  UK  taxpayers  and  the  increased  level  of  cross-border  intra-group 
trading  by  MNEs  (Rolfe,  1997).  In  1998  the  Finance  Act  introduced  a  comprehensive 
modernization  of  the  United  Kingdom's  transfer  pricing  legislation.  These  changes 
were  part  of  a  wider  reform  of  the  Corporation  Tax  regime,  which  included  the 
introduction  of  self-assessment  for  companies.  The  document  proposed  to  bring 
OECD  Transfer  Pricing  Guidelines  and  Article  9  of  the  OECD  Model  Tax 
Convention  directly  into  UK  statutory  rules.  Thus,  this  research  examines  the  profit 
based  methods  through  OECD  guidelines  (adopted  by  the  UK)  and  US  IRS 
regulations.  More  analysis  of  the  regulations  is  detailed  in  chapter  4. 
This  research  tests  the  degree  of  discretion  provided  under  different  regulations 
through  the  assessment  of  comparables  relative  to  a  sample  of  UK  based  enterprises. 
The  introduction  of  profit  based  methods  by  the  OECD  and  US  IRS  as  well  as  the 
ownership  effect  on  the  reported  profit  level  indicators  (PLIs)  and  the  latest  UK 
regulatory  requirements  introduced  as  a  part  of  corporation  tax  self-assessment  (with 
contemporaneous  documentation,  burden  on  proof,  and  penalties)  are  examined  to 
assist  the  search  for  comparables. 
The  UK  was  chosen  to  investigate  the  application  of  transfer  pricing  regulations  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  As  most  ITP  studies  are  conducted  in  the  US,  there  remains  a 
5 need  for  empirical  studies  to  be  conducted  outside  the  US  to  expand  current  research 
since  transfer  pricing  remains  the  most  important  international  tax  issue  facing  global 
companies  (Ernst  &  Young,  1999).  The  UK  is  the  focus  of  this  research  as  it  is  an 
example  of  a  country  adopting  OECD  guidelines  and  therefore,  provides  a  sound 
basis  for  evaluating  OECD's  TNMM.  US  IRS  regulations  are  selected  due  to  the  lead 
of  the  US  transfer  pricing  regulations  model  with  its  documentation  requirements  and 
penalties  which  have  been  adopted  strictly  by  other  tax  authorities  in  the  world 
economy  (Ernst  and  Young,  2001).  Studying  the  gap  between  the  two  major 
regulatory  bodies  (OECD's  TNMM  vs.  US  IRS'  CPM)  in  relation  to  profit-based 
methods  not  only  provides  an  evaluation  and  increased  awareness  of  the  actual 
differences  but  also  prevents  future  conflicts  as  the  EU  Commission  announces  the 
establishment  of  EU  Joint  Transfer  Pricing  Forum  which  is  based  on  OECD 
guidelines  (Tax  Analysts,  2002).  Providing  an  assessment  of  these  differences  might 
open  new  avenues  towards  a  universal  transfer  pricing  regulation  structure  or 
increased  harmonisation. 
"This  gesture  toward  the  United  States  and  international  transfer  pricing 
harmony  was  considerably  weakened  by  designating  TNMM  last  resort.  " 
(Cole,  1999,  pg.  9-32) 
1.2  The  Comparables  Focus 
This  research  focuses  on  both  TNMM,  adopted  by  OECD  guidelines  in  1995  and 
CPM,  the  US  IRS  transfer  pricing  methodology  that  approximates  arm's  length 
conditions  when  traditional  transaction  methods  cannot  be  reliably  applied.  Since 
profit-based  methods  have  been  newly  introduced  as  part  of  the  acceptable  transfer 
pricing  methods,  the  relevance  of  testing  the  validity  and  reliability  of  these  methods 
is  essential  if  MNE  discretion  is  to  be  curbed. 
"In  early  1999  more  foreign  countries  appear  to  be  willing  to  use 
CPMlINMM  than  in  1995  when  the  OECD  Guidelines  were  issued"  (Cole, 
1999  pg.  9-37). 
The  two  methods  of  regulating  transfer  price  are  the  OECD's  TNMM  and  the  US 
IRS's  CPM.  The  OECD  describes  TNMM  as  computing  the  appropriate  net  profit  on 
particular  transactions  or  groups  of  transactions.  TNMM  is  usually  applied  when 
comparing  the  net  margin  resulting  from  a  group  of  related  party  transactions  with  the 
6 net  profit  margins  of  independent  companies  that  are  engaged  in  broadly  comparable 
transactions.  Under  CPM,  the  profitability  of  the  user  affiliate's  closest  competitor  is 
used  to  compute  a  "normal"  profit  for  the  user  affiliate.  Essentially  the  principle 
underlying  this  arm's  length  return  concept  is  that  a  user  affiliate  may  earn  the  same 
return  (or  profitability)  as  a  competitor. 
Due  to  the  importance  of  1995  OECD  guidelines  and  1994  US  IRS  regulations,  this 
research  highlights  the  major  discrepancies  in  terms  of  acceptable  ranges  of  ITP 
between  the  main  regulatory  bodies.  By  closely  examining  these  two  methods,  this 
study  attempts  to  answer  several  issues  that  arise  as  a  result  of  the  OECD's  adoption 
of  TNMM  and  the  US  IRS'  adoption  of  CPM  including,  whether  there  are,  in  fact, 
substantial  differences  between  TNMM  and  CPM;  how  TNMM  and  CPM  is  applied 
in  practical  situations;  the  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  TNMM  and  CPM; 
and,  whether  either  or  both  "control"  transfer  pricing  abuse  and  curb  MNE  discretion 
to  a  similar  degree.  This  research  stresses  the  importance  of  understanding  and 
evaluating  the  applications  of  transfer  pricing  regulations,  resulting  in  increased 
compliance  on  the  part  of  MNEs  and  awareness  by  regulatory  bodies. 
1.3  The  Ownership  Focus 
The  growing  internationalization  of  the  world  economy,  spurred  by  the  growth  in 
numbers  and  size  of  domestic  and  foreign  MNEs  and  in  their  intra-firm  trade 
activities  with  their  increased  amount  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  worldwide 
and  especially  in  the  United  States  during  the  mid-1980s,  was  a  cause  of  concern  for 
the  US  Treasury  in  relation  to  transfer  price  manipulation.  The  new  fear  was  that 
foreign  MNEs,  especially  Japanese  MNEs,  were  overinvoicing  inbound  transfers  to 
their  US  affiliates  and  not  paying  US  taxes  (Eden,  1998).  In  response,  US  Congress 
passed  several  pieces  of  legislation  setting  out  new  procedures  for  ensuring 
compliance  with  the  ALP.  These  included  a  variety  of  information  and  reporting 
requirements,  an  accuracy-related  tax  penalty  for  transfer  pricing  mis-valuations,  and 
an  Advance  Pricing  Agreement  (APA)  procedure  (a  mechanism  whereby  a  taxpayer 
and  the  US  IRS  can  voluntarily  negotiate  an  agreed  transfer  pricing  methodology  that 
is  binding  on  both  parties  for  three  years).  The  transfer  pricing  penalty  (Section  6662) 
provoked  the  most  negative  response  from  business  and  other  tax  authorities;  it  was 
7 widely  perceived  as  a  "big  stick"  designed  to  shift  tax  revenues  from  foreign  tax 
authorities  and  MNEs  to  the  IRS  (Eden,  1998). 
The  theories  of  MNEs  (reviewed  in  Chapter  2)  suggest  that  the  main  pre-condition  for 
the  spread  of  FDI  is  the  ability  of  a  company  to  internalize  certain  advantage(s),  carry 
them  across  national  borders  and  transfer  them  into  profits  that  are  over  and  above 
those  indigenous  companies  in  the  host  country  can  make.  This  higher  return  is 
necessary  to  compensate  the  foreign  MNE  for  developing,  internalizing  and 
transporting  the  advantage(s).  The  theory  therefore  supports  higher  levels  of 
performance  by  foreign-owned  subsidiaries  in  their  foreign  operations.  Previous 
research  (detailed  in  Chapter  3)  suggests  that  non-compliance  with  the  regulations 
exists  among  MNEs,  particularly  on  the  part  of  foreign  companies  and  in  the  US.  For 
example,  the  return  on  assets  ratio  of  domestic-owned  companies  is  six  times  larger 
than  those  of  foreign-owned  companies  (Wheeler,  1988)  and  profits  of  foreign-owned 
companies  are  significantly  lower  than  domestic-owned  companies  (Crain  and  Stiffs, 
1994).  Thus,  the  second  part  of  this  research  attempts  to  examine  whether  behaviours 
of  foreign-owned  companies  differ  from  domestic  companies.  Previous  research 
undertaken  by  academics  (Harris,  1993)  and  practitioners  (Ernst  &  Young,  2001) 
confirm  that  the  majority  of  MNEs  fear  ITP  audits,  possibly  due  to  non-compliance  of 
arm's  length  pricing. 
This  research  also  examines  the  extent  to  which  ownership  affects  reported  profit  of 
foreign-owned  companies  in  the  UK.  The  research  uses  a  representative  sample  of 
Japanese-owned  companies  and  US-owned  companies  operating  in  the  UK  in  order  to 
test  whether  superior  performance  exists  among  foreign  companies  in  the  UK  relative 
to  UK  indigenous  companies.  This  provides  an  alternative  empirical  study  to  the  US 
studies  in  the  areas  of  income  shifting  and  performance  evaluation  of  foreign 
companies. 
Japanese-owned  companies  were  selected  as  representative  of  foreign-owned 
companies  operating  in  the  UK  as  they  play  a  leading  role  in  international  trade,  and 
previous  findings  have  suggested  that  Japanese-owned  companies  operating  in  the  UK 
have  lower  profit  performance  (Munday  and  Peel,  1997).  In  addition,  press  reports 
have  alleged  the  misuse  of  transfer  pricing  mechanisms  by  Japanese  MNEs  (Sunday 
8 Times,  1992).  Transfer  pricing  regulations  used  in  Japan  (issued  in  1986  with  minor 
updates  in  2000)  have  not  expressly  adopted  the  arm's-length  principle  and  have  not 
been  updated  relative  to  the  OECD  or  US  IRS,  thus,  making  Japanese-owned 
companies  a  good  set  for  comparison  due  to  their  practices.  In  addition,  Japan's 
unique  business  culture  suggests  preference  in  reporting  profits  and  taxes  from 
overseas  operations  in  Japan  (Buckley  and  Hughes,  1996). 
On  the  other  hand,  US-owned  companies  were  chosen  as  representative  of  foreign- 
owned  companies  to  provide  another  matched  sample  for  UK-owned  companies  and 
to  increase  the  validity  of  the  comparison  by  comparing  two  sets  rather  than  one  as 
Japanese-owned  and  US-owned  companies  are  capable  of  similar  performance 
relative  to  the  UK  indigenous  companies.  US-owned  companies  were  selected  as  the 
US  IRS  leads  in  transfer  pricing  regulation  in  the  global  market  thereby  possibly 
influencing  the  behavior  of  US-owned  companies.  Additionally,  US  MNEs  are 
considered  to  be  the  most  experienced  in  terms  of  compliance  with  current  regulations 
(Section  482,1994). 
"Foreign  authorities  observing  the  United  States  enlarge  its  transfer  pricing 
requirements  and  enforcement  efforts  are  increasingly  concerned  that 
multinationals  will  overcorrect  in  favor  of  the  United  States.  More  generally, 
they  are  concerned  about  protecting  their  tax  bases  whether  the  related  party  is 
located  in  a  low-tax  or  a  high-tax  jurisdiction.  Hence,  these  countries  are  also 
strengthening  their  transfer  pricing  rules  and  stepping  up  their  transfer  pricing 
enforcement.  Indeed,  for  many  multinational  groups,  foreign  transfer  pricing 
enforcement  has  become  more  of  a  problem  than  US  transfer  pricing 
enforcement"  (Cole,  1999  pg.  1-6). 
This  research  also  examines  the  effect  of  the  form  of  investment  as  an  organizational 
factor  influencing  MNEs  transfer  pricing  policies.  Several  empirical  studies  (Kim  and 
Miller,  1979;  Tang  and  Chan,  1979:  Tang,  1981)  rank  the  interests  of  local  partners  of 
a  foreign  subsidiary  as  an  important  variable  in  the  non-abuse  of  transfer  pricing.  A 
local  partner  in  a  joint  venture  plays  a  monitoring  role  which  might  restrict  the 
latitude  of  transfer  pricing  strategy  practiced  by  the  foreign  investor  (Lecraw,  1985; 
Emmanuel  and  Mehafdi,  1994).  The  influence  of  a  local  partner  as  a  factor  on  transfer 
pricing  decisions  remains  inconclusive  and  is  difficult  to  generalize  as  it  depends 
upon  the  management  role  of  a  local  partner  in  the  joint  venture.  Since  the  presence  of 
local  partners  may  motivate  foreign  investors  to  use  transfer  pricing  to  reduce  IT? 
9 abuse  (reported  profits)  of  the  joint  venture  (Lall,  1973;  Lyn  et  al.,  1993;  Emmanuel 
and  Mehafdi,  1994),  this  research  used  a  sample  of  Japanese-owned  companies  with  a 
UK  partner  and  US-owned  companies  with  a  UK  partner  compared  with  the  UK 
companies  with  foreign  partners. 
This  research  attempts  to  compare  the  performance  of  loss-making  foreign-owned 
companies  (companies  with  average  operating  losses)  with  domestic  loss-making  UK- 
companies.  The  shortage  of  loss-making  company  studies  in  the  transfer  pricing 
literature,  the  high  number  of  loss  making  companies  in  the  UK  (especially  Japanese 
-owned  companies),  and  the  elimination  of  loss-making  companies  in  developing 
comparables  by  the  regulatory  bodies  provides  the  impetus  for  this  comparison. 
It  was  noted  from  the  ITP  literature  that  there  were  no  studies  that  address  the  effects 
of  the  final  UK  tax  regulations  on  transfer  pricing  and  income  shifting.  One  of  the 
most  important  environmental  factors  on  a  company's  transfer  pricing  policies  is  the 
tax  and  accounting  rules  changes  (Business  International  Corporations  and  Ernst 
&Young,  1991).  UK  international  tax  rules  are  complex  and  this  study  supplements 
the  body  of  knowledge  in  the  area  of  international  taxation.  It  attempts  to  identify 
changes  in  the  patterns  of  reported  tax  by  foreign-owned  companies  and  UK-owned 
companies  and  to  further  establish  if  these  changes  can  be  attributed  to  transfer 
pricing  strategies  aimed  to  shift  income  out  of  the  UK. 
This  research  examines  whether  the  reported  tax  expense  has  changed  subsequent  to 
tax  policy  changes,  specifically  the  UK  1998  transfer  pricing  regulatory  requirements 
introduced  as  part  of  the  corporation  tax  self-assessment.  This  research  utilized  the 
most  recent  data  available  to  assess  the  effects  of  the  1998  UK  transfer  pricing 
regulations  on  foreign-owned  companies.  As  the  financial  year  ended  2000  was  the 
most  up-to-date  for  the  sample  data  during  the  data  collection  period,  the  sample  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  and  domestic  UK  companies 
are  obtained  using  the  years  ended  1999  and  2000  to  represent  the  period  subsequent 
to  the  1998  UK  regulations  and  the  years  ended  1996  and  1997  to  represent  an 
equivalent  two-year  period  prior  to  the  1998  UK  regulations. 
The  final  portion  of  this  research  uses  a  sample  of  foreign-owned  (Japanese-  and  US- 
10 owned)  and  UK-owned  companies  to  test  the  relative  reported  tax  in  order  to  obtain 
evidence,  of  the  misuse  of  transfer  pricing.  This  research  endeavors  to  determine  the 
impact,  if  any,  of  the  latest  1998  UK  corporation  tax  self-assessment  on  the  tax 
expenses  of  both  foreign-owned  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  and  UK-owned 
companies. 
While  the  first  research  question  tests  comparables  in  relation  to  profit-based  TNMM 
and  CPM  methods,  the  remaining  questions  of  this  research  investigate  the 
comparability  (differences,  if  any)  between  foreign-owned  Japanese  and  US 
companies  compared  to  their  UK  counterparts.  With  the  existence  of  joint  ventures 
and  the  large  number  of  loss  making  companies  among  foreign-owned  companies,  it 
was  necessary  for  this  study  to  fill  the  gap  in  the  literature  and  test  the  performance 
and  comparability  of  entities  with  these  features.  The  investigation  of  the  latest  1998 
UK  regulations  and  the  tax  expenses  of  foreign-owned  companies  was  central  to  this 
research  in  order  to  explain  the  effects  of  the  regulations  on  the  profitability  and 
comparability,  and  supply  evidence  (if  any)  of  the  reported  tax. 
1.4  Research  Questions 
Due  to  strict  tax  regulations  which  may  adversely  affect  world  trade,  as  well  as 
uncertain  and  unclear  ITP  regulations  which  may  reduce  FDI's  growth,  the  following 
research  questions  are  stated  as  follows: 
Do  OECD  (TNMM)  and  US  IRS  (CPM)  international  transfer  pricing  (ITP) 
regulations,  where  applied,  determine  comparable  sets  of  companies  that  justify  the 
arm's  length  principle?  Do  companies  (both  profit-  and  loss-making)  of  different 
countries  of  ownership  display  different  patterns  of  performance  as  measured  by  a 
wide  range  of  profit  level  indicators?  Do  companies  of  different  countries  of 
ownership  report  different  amounts  of  tax  and,  if  so,  what  are  the  effects  of  the  1998 
UK  transfer  pricing  regulations  (corporation  tax  self-assessment)  on  the  patterns  of 
reported  tax  by  companies  of  different  ownership? 
1.5  Structure  of  the  Dissertation 
The  following  chapter  of  this  dissertation  covers  the  theories  of  FDI  and  MNEs  in 
order  to  highlight  the  link  between  FDI  theories  and  the  performance  of  foreign 
11 subsidiaries.  In  addition,  Chapter  2  also  provides  a  theoretical  understanding  of 
comparables.  Chapter  3  presents  the  literature  review  as  well  as  income  shifting 
studies  in  order  to  note  scarcity  of  similar  studies,  limitations  of  previous  empirical 
studies,  and  the  various  focuses  of  previous  work.  Chapter  4  of  this  dissertation 
discusses  the  importance  of  ITP  and  ITP  regulations  and  summarizes  the  methods 
adopted  by  different  countries.  Chapter  5  focuses  on  whether  different  comparable 
methods  (TNMM  and  CPM)  reflect  functions  and  risks  differences,  stressing  the 
importance  of  research  design.  Chapters  6  and  7  dealing  with  methodology  and 
analysis  highlight  the  research  design  used  by  this  research,  the  method  adopted,  and 
the  various  stages  of  the  analysis  that  satisfy  the  research  questions.  Finally,  Chapter  8 
summarizes  the  findings,  results,  and  possible  areas  of  future  research,  as  well  as 
discuses  the  limitations  and  the  implications  of  this  study. 
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FDI  and  Multinationals  Theories 2.1  Introduction 
It  is  commonly  observed  that  as  companies  grow  in  size  and  complexity,  they  tend 
towards  a  decentralized  organization  comprising  several  divisions.  As  the  volume  of 
divisionalized  global  trade  expands  and  these  companies  increasingly  dominate  the 
world  economy,  the  importance  of  transfer  pricing  increases.  An  examination  of 
some  of  the  existing  theories  of  the  growth  of  the  MNE  may  help  to  clarify  the 
important  areas  of  choice  of  asset  utilization,  location  of  operations,  and  cost 
allocation  policies.  These  theories  suggest  that  FDI  is  motivated  by  internal 
economies  and  resources  plus  highly  imperfect  external  markets.  Hence,  foreign 
comparable  companies,  according  to  the  FDI  theories,  expect  to  report  greater 
performance  (profits)  compared  to  their  indigenous  counterparts. 
Although  the  primary  objective  of  most  companies  remains  profit  maximization,  a 
criticism  of  this  objective  is  that  the  centrality  of  emphasis  on  profit  maximization 
makes  it  deficient  and  unrealistic.  Profit  is  seen  as  only  one  of  the  many  goals  that 
motivate  the  behavior  of  companies. 
The  importance  of  these  theories  was  furthered  when  regulators  realized  the  typical 
difficulties  of  obtaining  an  arm's  length  transaction  and  introduced  the  latest  profit 
based  methods  as  an  acceptable  method  of  determining  transfer  pricing.  The  latest 
profit  based  methods  allows  the  use  of  comparables  profit  to  limit  corporate 
discretion. 
Decentralization  of  operations  and  associated  transfer  prices  and  cost  allocations  has 
complicated  the  search  for  a  theory  of  why  companies  expand  to  become  MNEs.  The 
trend  toward  decentralization  within  business  organizations  has  increased  the 
importance  of  appropriate  accounting  for  internal  transfers  of  goods  and  services,  in 
part,  to  measure  how  well  individual  responsibility  centers  contribute  to  the  goals  of 
the  company.  On  the  other  hand,  literature  suggested  the  contrary  (Chapter  Three 
provides  a  review  of  the  evidence  of  low  performance  among  MNEs). 
This  chapter  explains  how  MNEs  are  coordinated  businesses  engaged  in  formulating 
and  implementing  strategies  at  the  global  level  and  provides  the  theoretical 
justification  for  their  existence.  It  is  necessary  to  conclude  from  the  following  MNE 
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2.2  Definitions 
The  key  concept  in  terms  of  understanding  what  MNEs  are  and  why  they  exist  is  that 
the  MNE  is  a  multidivisional  business.  By  definition,  an  MNE  consists  of  two  or  more 
firms  under  common  control,  with  a  common  pool  of  resources  and  common  goals, 
where  the  units  of  the  enterprise  are  located  in  more  than  one  country  (Eden,  1994). 
Other  definitions  have  described  MNEs  as  "a  company  that  has  at  least  one  division  in 
a  foreign  country"  (Tang,  1981,  pg.  7),  and  "any  firm  which  performs  its  main 
operations,  either  manufacture  or  the  production  of  service,  in  at  least  two  countries" 
(Brooke  and  Remmer,  1970,  pg.  5)  to  "firms  with  manufacturing  subsidiaries  in  six  or 
more  nations"  (Vernon,  1971).  Disagreements  abound  over  the  exact  number  of 
foreign  locations  of  operation  that  will  qualify  a  firm  to  be  referred  to  as  an  MNE. 
Buckley  and  Casson  (1976)  avoided  this  debate  by  defining  an  MNE  as  "an  enterprise 
which  owns  and  controls  activities  in  different  countries"  (pg.  1).  The  definition  of  an 
MNE  cannot,  however,  be  reduced  to  the  location  of  its  production  facilities  alone. 
According  to  Holland  (1993),  the  MNE: 
1.  operates  within  and  between  a  spectra  of  differing  political,  legal, 
economic,  social  and  cultural  systems; 
2.  trades  within  and  across  a  number  of  product  and  factor  markets,  each 
displaying  differing  levels  of  efficiency  and  competition; 
3.  resorts  frequently  to  foreign  exchange  markets  for  a  wide  range  of 
different  currencies;  and, 
4.  accesses  a  broad  range  of  regulated  and  unregulated  domestic  and 
international  capital  markets  which  display  different  levels  of  efficiency 
and  integration  (pg.  3). 
A  definition  of  an  MNE  that  involves  three  variables  is  as  follows, 
1.  location  of  production  facilities  -  which  should  "be  restricted  to  firms 
which  operate  in  six  or  more  foreign  nations"; 
2.  the  foreign  to  total  operations  (FIT)  ratio  -  which  attempts  to  categorize 
firms  by  comparing  the  percentage  of  their  sales  or  profits  generated  in,  or 
assets  or  employees  located  on,  foreign  sites  to  the  totals;  and, 
15 3.  attitude  of  management  -  Perlmutter  (1969)  classified  management  views 
into:  ethnocentric  (portraying  a  home-country  orientation  by 
management);  polycentric  (reflecting  an  international  outlook  which 
however  lacks  systematic  global  integration);  and  geocentric  (which  not 
only  thinks  and  operates  on  a  worldwide  basis,  but  also  operationalizes  a 
globally-integrated  planning  strategy)  (Rugman  et  al,  1985). 
The  definition  of  an  MNE  will,  in  most  circumstances,  depend  on  which  of  these  three 
variables  warrants  greatest  importance.  By  considering  all  variables,  a  more  well 
rounded  definition  is  attained. 
It  is  important  to  be  able  to  distinguish  the  MNE  from  a  number  of  similar  looking 
forms  of  investment  which  include  pure  portfolio  investments;  multi-plant  domestic 
operations;  exporting  and  importing;  licensing  and  technical  agreements;  and, 
uncontrolled  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI). 
Hood  and  Young  (1979)  provided  descriptions  on  each  of  these  close  relations  of  the 
MNE.  They  appropriately  concluded  that: 
"The  MNC  represents  the  outworking  of  the  FDI  process  ...  (and)  as  with  the 
multi-plant  domestic  operation...  owns  and  controls  production  units  in  more 
than  one  location.  On  the  other  hand,  the  MNC's  production  units  are 
operated  in  different  nation  states.  Secondly,  as  with  an  exporting  firm,  the 
MNC  sells  goods  across  national  boundaries.  Conversely,  unlike  the 
exporting  firm,  the  MNC  also  produces  these  goods  outside  its  domestic 
location  and  moreover  a  large  part  of  MNC  exports  may  represent  intra-group 
trade.  Thirdly,  like  the  national  firm  licensing  foreign  manufacturers,  the 
MNC  is  involved  in  foreign  production.  But  the  multinational  company  owns 
and  controls  its  manufacturing  units  located  abroad,  and  this  characteristic  also 
clearly  distinguishes  the  MNC  from  a  basically  national  company  with  foreign 
portfolio  holdings"  (pg.  29). 
FDI  involves  the  ownership  (in  part  or  whole)  and  management  of  a  foreign  operation 
established  through  the  wholesale  transfer  of  a  package  of  production  resources 
abroad.  These  transferred  resources  translate  into  foreign  subsidiaries  and  may  be 
formed  either  through  the  acquisition  of  existing  local  companies  or  in  the  form  of 
new  ventures.  Whether  a  company  is  determined  an  MNE  is  dependent  on  its  ability 
to  originate  and  continuously  perpetuate  FDI.  Various  pieces  of  literature  that  discuss 
16 FDI  theories  are  equated  to,  and  viewed  as  MNE  theories  (Rugman,  1980).  A  wide 
range  of  existing  FDI  and  ITP  theories  are  examined  in  the  next  section. 
2.3  FDI  Theories 
2.3.1  Internalization  Theory 
Internalization  has  been  suggested  in  one  form  or  another  as  an  underlying  reason  for 
FDI  but  was  only  first  developed  as  a  theory  in  ints  own  right  by  Buckley  and  Casson 
(1976).  Their  original  objective  was  to  use  the  concept  to  develop  a  model  of  the 
growth  of  the  firm.  Their  theory  depends  on  the  assumption  of  profit  maximization, 
emphasizes  very  general  forms  of  imperfect  competition  stemming  from  the  costs  of 
organizing  markets,  and  concentrates  on  imperfections  in  intermediate  product 
markets  rather  than  in  the  final  products  markets  (Buckley,  1989;  pg.  78). 
Buckley  and  Casson  criticized  previous  FDI  theories  as  lacking  in  comprehensive 
theoretical  base  and  failing  to  take  into  account  the  various  other  activities  that  MNEs 
engage  in  such  as  research  and  development  (R&D),  marketing  and  distribution, 
training  and  development,  etc.  These  activities  are  linked  to  the  physical  production 
process  and  generate  a  flow  of  a  series  of  intermediate  products,  which  could  be  in  the 
form  of  knowledge,  information,  human  capital  and  other  intangibles.  With  market 
imperfection  even  more  pertinent  in  the  market  for  these  intermediate  products  than  in 
final  markets,  a  company  will  seek  to  maximize  its  returns  on  these  intermediate 
products  by  internalizing.  Internal  transfer  pricing,  for  example,  was  suggested  as  an 
internalization  weapon  for  sidestepping  government-imposed  market  barriers  such  as 
tax,  tariff,  etc.  Since  flows  of  knowledge  are  so  difficult  to  value,  they  provide  an 
excellent  basis  for  the  manipulation  of  transfer  pricing.  Substantial  benefit  is  derived 
from  the  ability  to  minimize  the  impact  of  government  intervention  through  the  use  of 
transfer  prices  (Buckley  &  Casson,  1976).  Markets  will  be  internalized  when  the 
transaction  costs  of  overcoming  market  imperfections  exceed  the  cost  of  internal 
corporate  trading. 
The  internalization  theory  rests  on  two  axioms: 
1.  companies  will  choose  the  least  cost  location  for  each  activity  they 
perform;  and, 
17 2.  companies  grow  by  internalizing  to  the  point  where  the  costs  of  before 
making  a  decision,  firms  consider  explicitly  the  relative  costs  of 
servicing  foreign  markets  in  one  (or  any  combination)  of  three  ways: 
exporting,  FDI  or  licensing.  The  method  of  servicing  a  market  is 
predicted  to  fluctuate  with  the  associated  costs  of  implementing  each 
strategy  (Rugman,  1980). 
This  internalization  theory  proposes  that  before  FDI  can  proceed  at  all,  the  firm  must 
possess  some  unique  advantages  obtained  as  "the  rewards  for  past  investments  in  (1) 
R&D  facilities;  (2)  the  creation  of  an  integrated  team  of  skills;  and,  (3)  the  creation  of 
an  information  transmission  network  which  not  only  allows  the  benefits  of  the  first 
two  advantages  to  be  transmitted  at  low  cost  within  the  organization,  but  also  protects 
such  information  from  outsiders.  "  (Buckley  and  Casson,  1976,  pg.  69).  In  essence,  a 
company  must  not  only  possess  unique  advantages  but  also  must  be  convinced  in  its 
economic  calculations  that  it  will  be  able  to  profitably  exploit  those  advantages  with 
minimal  risk  of  dissipation. 
Rugman's  (1980)  and  Rugman  et  al's  (1985)  approach  are  very  similar  to  Buckley 
and  Casson's.  Progressing  from  a  free  trade  assumption,  they  introduced  market 
imperfection  into  the  transfer  pricing  discussion  and  observed  that  MNEs  are 
replacements  for  free  trade  when  trade  is impeded  by  market  imperfections.  Two  sets 
of  factors  that  account  for  FDI  strategy  were  identified  as  a  location-specific  factors 
(environmental  variables)  and  company-specific  factors  (internal  variables). 
Location-specific  factors  are  the  economic  and  non-economic  variables  in  a  country's 
aggregate  production  function  which  include  its  political,  cultural  and  social  systems. 
They  are  exogenous  parameters  which  the  MNE  cannot  influence.  Company-specific 
advantages  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  internal  advantages  (such  as  knowledge, 
management,  marketing,  R&D  and  strategic  planning  skills,  etc.  )  possessed  by  MNEs 
which  gives  them  a  relative  advantage  over  other  firms.  The  MNE  then  needs  to 
exercise  proprietary  rights  over  its  company-specific  advantages  to  maximize  its 
worldwide  income  with  minimal  dissipation  of  this  invaluable  asset.  Through 
internalization,  the  creation  of  an  internal  market  allows  a  company  to  appropriate  the 
returns  from  the  advantage  it  generates.  Internalization  therefore  is  a  rational 
18 response  to  market  imperfections  in  the  pricing  of  MNEs'  unique  advantages.  It  is  an 
economically  efficient  internal  response  to  exogenous  impediments  to  free  trade  and 
is  far  superior  to  other  potential  solutions  such  as  licensing  or  patent  rights  as  it  gives 
the  MNE  the  additional  benefit  of  self-regulation  and  monitoring  of  its  advantages. 
The  development  of  internalization  as  a  complete  concept  is  a  major  breakthrough  in 
the  search  for  an  FDI  theory.  Buckley  and  Casson  were  able  to  synthesize  most 
previous  theories  of  FDI  and  explain  them  relative  to  their  own  position.  The  overall 
effect  is  pervasive  and  most  of  the  concepts  that  were  developed  afterwards  have  not 
been  able  to  successfully  eclipse  Buckley  and  Casson's  theory  with  the  exception  of 
Dunning's  Eclectic  OLI  paradigm. 
2.3.2  Dunning's  Eclectic  OLI  Paradigm 
According  to  Dunning's  OLI  paradigm,  MNEs  are  the  most  successful  form  of 
business  organization  because  of  their  ownership,  locational,  and  internalization 
(OLI)  advantages.  The  OLI  paradigm,  developed  by  John  Dunning,  provides  a  general 
explanation  as  to  why  firms  engage  in,  and  are  successful  at,  international  production. 
The  model  is  formed  from  three  basic  approaches  to  the  question  of  why  MNEs  exist 
and  why  they  are  relatively  more  successful  than  domestic  firms:  the  location, 
ownership,  and  internalization  approaches. 
Dunning  based  his  model  on  several  theories: 
1.  industrial  organization  theory  --  why  international  production  takes  place 
based  on  important  ownership  advantages  (including  technology,  innovative 
capacity,  and  product  differentiation).  In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  industrial 
organization  theorists  shifted  the  focus  from  a  macro  perspective  on  FDI  to  a 
micro  perspective  on  the  firm  and  its  activities  (the  ownership  approach). 
Industrial  organization  theorists  argued  that  MNEs  were  generally  found  in 
oligopolistic  markets,  so  that  monopolistic  advantages  provided  an 
explanation  for  MNEs  (e.  g.,  Hymer  1976).  Another  theory  was  that  MNEs 
owned  intangible  assets  on  which  they  could  earn  additional  profits  if  the 
assets  were  deployed  in  other  countries  (e.  g.,  Caves  1971,  Johnson  1970, 
Magee  1977); 
2.  location  theory  --  why  a  company  produces  in  a  particular  country.  The 
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endowments  and  characteristics.  Explaining  the  FDI  approach  assumes  that 
external  markets  are  characterized  by  high  transactions  costs;  and, 
3.  firm  theory  and  market  failure  theory  --  which  argue  in  favor  of  internalizing 
markets.  Internalizing  the  market  through  a  wholly  owned  foreign  affiliate 
allows  the  firm  to  reduce  transaction  costs  by  creating  an  internal  market  to 
replace  the  imperfect  external  one.  The  internalization  approach  (e.  g., 
Buckley  and  Casson  1976;  Casson  1982;  Rugman  1980,1981,1982,1986) 
dominated  much  of  the  FDI  literature  throughout  the  1980s. 
Firm-Specific  Advantages: 
An  MNE  operating  a  plant  in  a  foreign  country  is  faced  with  additional  costs 
compared  with  a  local  competitor.  The  additional  costs  could  be  due  to  cultural,  legal, 
institutional,  and  language  differences;  a  lack  of  knowledge  about  local  market 
conditions;  and/or,  the  increased  expense  of  communicating  and  operating  at  a 
distance.  So  if  the  MNE  is  to  be  profitable  abroad  it  must  have  some  advantages  not 
shared  by  its  competitors.  These  advantages  must  be,  at  least  in  part,  specific  to  the 
firm  and  readily  transferable  within  the  firm  and  between  countries.  These  advantages 
are  called  ownership  or  firm-specific  advantages.  The  firm  owns  this  advantage,  it  has 
a  monopoly  over  its  firm-specific  advantages  and  can  exploit  them  abroad  resulting  in 
a  higher  marginal  return  or  lower  marginal  cost  than  its  competitors,  thus  more  profit. 
These  advantages  are  internal  to  a  specific  firm  and  may  include  location-bound 
advantages  (i.  e.,  related  to  the  home  country,  such  as  monopoly  control  over  a  local 
resource)  or  non-location-bound  (e.  g.,  technology,  economies  of  scale  and  scope  from 
simply  being  of  large  size). 
There  are  three  basic  types  of  ownership  advantages  for  an  MNE  as  follows: 
1.  Knowledge/technology  --  broadly  defined  to  include  all  forms  of  innovative 
activity; 
2.  Economies  of  large  size  (advantages  of  common  governance)  --  economies  of 
scale  and  scope,  economies  of  learning,  broader  access  to  financial  capital 
throughout  the  MNE  organization,  and  advantages  from  international 
diversification  of  assets  and  risks;  and, 
3.  Monopolistic  advantages  --  accrue  to  the  MNE  in  the  form  of  privileged 
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natural  resources,  and  the  like. 
As  Dunning  (1993)  notes,  some  of  these  ownership  advantages  can  be  found  with 
first-time  overseas  investments  while  others  come  from  being  an  established  affiliate 
in  an  MNE.  Firm-specific  advantages  can  change  over  time  and  will  vary  with  the  age 
and  experience  of  the  multinational. 
Country-Specific  Advantages: 
A  company  must  use  some  foreign  factors  in  connection  with  its  domestic  firm- 
specific  advantages  in  order  to  gain  full  value  on  these  firm-specific  advantages. 
Therefore,  the  location  advantages  of  various  countries  are  key  in  determining  which 
will  become  host  countries  for  the  MNE.  Clearly  the  relative  attractiveness  of 
different  locations  can  change  over  time  so  that  a  host  country  can  to  some  extent 
engineer  its  competitive  advantage  as  a  location  for  FDI. 
The  country-specific  advantages  that  influence  where  an  MNE  will  invest  can  be 
broken  into  three  categories:  economic,  social,  and  political.  Economic  advantages 
include  the  quantities  and  qualities  of  the  factors  of  production,  size,  and  scope  of  the 
market  and  transport  and  telecommunications  costs.  Social/cultural  advantages 
include  relative  proximity  between  the  home  and  host  country,  general  attitude 
towards  foreigners,  language  and  cultural  differences,  and  the  overall  stance  towards 
free  enterprise.  Political  country-specific  advantages  include  the  general  and  specific 
government  policies  that  affect  inward  FDI  flows,  international  production,  and 
intrafirm  trade.  Attractive  country-specific  advantages  for  an  MNE  would  include  a 
large,  growing,  high-income  market,  low  production  costs,  a  large  endowment  of 
factors  scarce  in  the  home  country,  and  an  economy  that  is  politically  stable, 
welcomes  FDI,  and  is  culturally  and  geographically  close  to  the  home  country. 
Internalization  Advantages: 
The  existence  of  a  specialized  knowledge  or  skill  is  an  asset  that  can  generate 
economic  rents  for  a  company.  These  rents  can  be  earned  by  licensing  the  firm- 
specific  advantages  to  another  company,  exporting  products  using  this  firm-specific 
advantage  as  an  input,  or  setting  up  subsidiaries  abroad.  The  ownership  advantages  of 
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explain  where  MNEs  set  up  foreign  subsidiaries. 
The  OLI  model  argues  that  external,  arm's  length  markets  are  either  imperfect  or  in 
some  cases  nonexistent.  As  a  result,  the  MNE  can  substitute  its  own  internal  market 
and  reap  some  efficiency  savings.  A  company  could  go  abroad  by  simply  exporting  its 
products  to  foreign  markets;  however,  uncertainty,  search  costs,  and  tariff  barriers  are 
additional  costs  that  will  deter  such  trade  and  possibly  result  in  the  loss  of  company 
specific  advantages. 
The  OLI  model  predicts  that  the  hierarchy  (the  vertically  or  horizontally  integrated 
company  based  on  internal  markets)  is  a  superior  method  of  organizing  transactions 
than  the  market  (trade  between  unrelated  companies)  whenever  external  markets  are 
nonexistent  or  imperfect.  The  theory  predicts  that  internalization  advantages  will  lead 
the  MNE  to  prefer  wholly  owned  subsidiaries  over  minority  ownership  or  arm's  length 
transactions.  It  is  therefore  the  internalization  advantages,  part  of  the  OLI  paradigm, 
that  explain  why  MNEs  are  integrated  businesses,  are  producing  in  several  countries, 
and  are  using  intrafirm  trade  to  ship  goods,  services,  and  intangibles  among  their 
affiliates. 
In  summary,  the  internalization  part  of  the  OLI  paradigm  therefore  answers  how  an 
MNE  goes  abroad.  The  model  predicts  that  the  MNE  will  internalize  markets  in  order 
to  reduce  natural  market  imperfections. 
2.3.2.1  Criticisms  of  Dunning's  OLI  Paradigm 
Critics  of  the  OLI  theory  suggest  that  Dunning  has  underestimated  the  power  of 
internalization  theory  for  explaining  MNEs.  Teece  (1982)  addressed  the  issue  of 
when  internalization  is  most  likely  to  be  the  most  efficient  way  for  an  organization  to 
conduct  its  economic  activity.  One  of  the  benefits  of  dimensionalizing  international 
trade  is  that  "a  contingency  theory  of  the  MNE  (can  be)  developed"  (pg.  52).  Teece 
further  explained  FDI  by  distinguishing  between  production  costs  (associated  with 
foreign  production)  and  transactions/governance  costs  (associated  with 
internalization).  Analyzing  the  combination  of  the  production  cost  function  and  the 
transactions  cost  function,  Teece  showed  that  there  is  a  cost  advantage  favoring  FDI 
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increases.  Similarly  for  vertically  integrated  MNEs  there  is  a  cost  advantage 
associated  with  internalization  once  the  characteristics  of  an  asset  has  reached  a 
certain  level  of  specificity. 
2.3.2.2  Implications  of  the  Internalization  Theory  and  Dunning's  OLI  Paradigm  on 
ITP 
Within  an  MNE,  FDI  theory  suggests  that  there  will  be  internal  transactions  which 
cross  international  borders  and  have  ITP  consequences.  An  MNE  can  be  assumed  to 
have  certain  ownership  advantages.  In  addition,  it  can  be  assumed  from  the  statistics 
on  FDI  that  MNEs  prefer  to  internalize  these  ownership  advantages.  (The  markets 
and  hierarchies  framework  also  lends  some  support  to  this  assumption.  )  Finally, 
either  to  gain  proximity  to  a  market  and/or  take  advantage  of  market  imperfections 
(Qian,  1996)  a  suitable  location  will  be  selected.  It  is  these  market  imperfections 
which  the  FDI,  coupled  with  appropriate  ITP  policies,  seeks  to  exploit. 
Therefore,  from  a  FDI  viewpoint,  MNEs  seek  to  maximize  location-specific 
advantages  by  taking  advantage  of  government  incentives  and  market  imperfections. 
Consistent  with  this,  ITP  can  be  used  as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  the  MNE  is 
able  to  utilize  these  market  imperfections  (Leitch  and  Barrett,  1992).  Dunning  (1981) 
supported  the  link  between  ITP  and  internalization: 
"Government  intervention  ...  encourages  (MNEs)  to  internalize  existing 
activities  and  to  engage  in  new  activities  which  offer  the  possibility  of 
internalizing  gain.  Other  things  being  equal,  the  more  internal  transactions  the 
company  engages  in  the  greater  its  opportunity  for  doing  this  (manipulating 
transfer  prices)  -  hence,  in  the  case  of  and  to  practice  product  or  process 
specialization  within  its  organization"  (pg.  31). 
There  does  appear  to  be  strong  support  for  the  view  that  ITP  is  a  means  for  ensuring 
that  FDI  market  imperfections  can  be  exploited.  ITP  cannot  be  based  on  the  market 
as  it  is  imperfect.  Although  the  majority  of  empirical  studies  survey  the  relative 
importance  of  a  set  of  factors  on  the  transfer  pricing  decision,  very  few  studies  either 
justify  how  these  factors  were  selected  or  anchor  them  in  terms  of  market 
imperfections  and  FDI  theory. 
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Porter  (1985)  stated  that:  "Competition  is  at  the  core  of  the  success  or  failure  of  firms. 
Competition  determines  the  appropriateness  of  a  firm's  activities  that  can  contribute 
to  its  performance,  such  as  innovations,  a  cohesive  culture,  or  good  implementation. 
Competitive  strategy  is  the  search  for  a  favorable  market  position  in  an  industry,  the 
fundamental  arena  in  which  competition  occurs.  Competitive  strategy  aims  to 
establish  a  profitable  and  sustainable  position  against  the  forces  that  determine 
industry  competition.  "  (pg.  1) 
Porter  proposed  that  competitive  strategy  is  based  on  five  competitive  forces:  the 
threat  of  new  entrants;  the  threat  of  substitute  products  or  services;  the  bargaining 
power  of  suppliers;  the  bargaining  power  of  buyers;  and,  the  rivalry  among  the 
existing  competitors. 
Porter's  competitive  advantage  determines  the  way  in  which  firms  position 
themselves  in  an  industry.  The  two  basic  types  of  competitive  advantage  are  lower 
cost  and  differentiation  (provision  of  superior  value  to  the  buyer).  Porter  (1990) 
argued  that  the  central  task  concerning  competitive  advantage  in  industries  "is  to 
explain  why  firms  based  in  a  nation  are  able  to  compete  successfully  against  foreign 
rivals  in  particular  segments  and  industries.  Competing  internationally  may  involve 
exports  and/or  locating  some  company  activities  abroad"  (pg.  10).  Porter  further 
argued  that  "multinational  status  is  a  reflection  of  a  company's  ability  to  exploit 
strengths  gained  in  one  nation  in  order  to  establish  a  position  in  other  nations"  (pg. 
18). 
Porter  further  noted  that  the  reason  for  industries  globalizing  is  that  "shifts  in 
technology,  buyer  needs,  government  policy,  or  country  infrastructure  create  major 
differences  in  competitive  position  among  firms  from  different  nations  or  make  the 
advantages  of  a  global  strategy  more  significant"  (pg.  63).  The  company  can  either 
generate  competitive  advantage  by  concentrating  activities  in  one  country  and 
exporting,  or  it  can  disperse  activities  through  a  number  of  countries  through  the  use 
of  FDI.  In  turn,  the  decision  to  disperse  activities  will  mean  that  transfer  pricing  is 
more  influential  within  that  company.  Whenever  a  company  has  activities  located  in 
a  number  of  different  countries  it  must  be  able  to  coordinate  these  activities. 
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It  is  argued  that  the  focus  of  strategy  should  not  be  on  how  to  beat  the  competition  but 
on  how  to  create  value  for  customers.  A  middle  strategic  course,  between  cost- 
leadership  and  up-market  product  differentiation,  is  consistent  with  the  focus  on  the 
customer.  Also,  some  believe  that  companies  can  successfully  pursue  cost  leadership 
and  product  differentiation  simultaneously  (Ohmae,  1988). 
In  addition,  Porter's  nation-state  focus  has  been  challenged.  It  has  been  argued  that  on 
a  competitive  map  political  boundaries  have  largely  disappeared  and  the  notion  of 
national  boundaries  are  becoming  obsolete.  It  is  further  contended  that  the  crucial 
question  relevant  to  national  competitiveness  is  where  a  company  conducts  its  R&D 
and  other  technologically  complex  activities,  and  not  where  the  company  is 
headquartered  or  where  a  majority  of  its  shareholders  are  domiciled  (Reich,  1990). 
2.3.3.2  Implications  of  Competitive  Advantage  Theory  for  ITP 
Within  the  competitive  advantage  framework,  Porter  (1985)  identified  transfer  pricing 
policies  as  one  of  the  procedures  used  to  govern  cross-business  unit  activities.  The 
framework  identifies  a  particular  role  for  transfer  pricing  systems: 
"Interrelationships  imply  that  transfer  pricing  and  other  decisions  should  be 
designed  to  improve  the  firms'  overall  position  and  not  the  financial  results  of 
individual  business  units...  Business  unit  goals  also  may  need  to  be  adjusted  in 
order  to  make  them  consistent  with  transfer  pricing  rules"  (pg.  404). 
2.3.4  Transaction  Cost  Economics  Theory 
Transaction  cost  theory  concentrates  on  the  relative  efficiency  of  different  exchange 
processes.  If  internalization  of  one  or  more  stages  of  production  might  generate 
savings  on  the  costs  for  that  company,  it  could  lead  also  to  transactional  economies 
(savings  on  the  cost  of  inputs)  when  reduced  amounts  of  resources  are  required  to  get 
the  intermediate  inputs. 
A  central  hypothesis  of  transaction-cost  theory  is  that  interunit  relationships  in  which 
supplier  assets  are  specialized  have  lower  transaction  costs  inside  an  organization  than 
when  the  relationship  occurs  between  organizations  (Klein,  Crawford,  and  Alchian. 
1978;  Riordan  and  Williamson,  1985;  Demsett,  1988). 
25 Williamson  (1985)  identifies  a  number  of  types  of  asset  specificity  which  involve 
investments  in  the  transactions  by  one  or  both  parties  to  the  transaction.  These 
include:  (1)  physical  asset  specificity  resulting  from  investments  in  tangible  assets, 
e.  g.  plant,  equipment,  tooling,  dies,  etc.  that  are  more  or  less  unique  to  this  economic 
relationship;  (2)  human  asset  specificity  resulting  from  investments  in  specialized 
training  or  specialized  know-how  gained  through  education  or  experience  which  is 
not  easily  transferred  to  other  transactions;  (3)  site  specificity  which  results  from 
parties  locating  their  operations  in  close  physical  proximity  to  one  another  for  flow 
economies;  and,  (4)  dedicated  asset  specificity  which  arises  from  investments  in 
generalized  (as  contrasted  to  special  purpose)  productive  capacity  for  the  explicit 
purpose  of  selling  a  significant  amount  of  a  product  to  a  specific  customer  and  that 
capacity  cannot  be  redeployed  or  otherwise  utilized  with  a  cost. 
Proponents  of  transaction  cost  economics  theory  (Williamson,  1985)  have  found  that 
organizations  and  markets  differ  in  their  governance  capabilities.  Other  authors 
(Stinchcombe,  1983;  Granovetter,  1985;  Eccles  and  White,  1988),  however,  suggest 
that  the  transaction-cost  argument  is  stated  too  strongly.  They  argue  that  organizations 
and  markets  are  not  discrete  institutions  to  which  the  theory  can  be  applied  in  a 
straight  forward  fashion. 
2.3.4.1  Criticisms  to  Transaction  Cost  Economics  Theory 
The  major  criticisms  of  transaction  cost  theory  is  that  it  overstates  the  effect  of  asset 
specialization  on  vertical  integration  and  understates  the  costs  of  managing  interunit 
relationships  within  an  organization,  particularly  for  nonstandard  organizations  and 
markets.  Transaction  costs  are  only  relevant  when  relationships  are: 
1.  Frequent  -  if  a  transaction  is  not  frequent  there  is  less  chance  of 
internalization; 
2.  Uncertain  -  if  complete  contracts  cannot  be  foreseen,  the  company  making  the 
specific  investment  is  advantaged  when  future  contingencies  impose  to 
renegotiate  the  contract  terms  based  on  environmental  uncertainty 
(unpredictability  of  future  contingencies)  and  behavioral  uncertainty 
(possibility  of  monitoring  the  behavior  of  the  contract  party);  and, 
3.  Asset  specific 
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Spicer  (1988)  draws  on  transaction  cost  economics  to  develop  a  positive  theory  of  the 
transfer  pricing  process  in  which  the  strategic  and  transactional  characteristics  of 
specific  transfers  are  related  to  transfer  pricing  issues  and  the  organizational  processes 
used  to  manage  transfers  within  firms.  Based  on  the  premise  that  internal  transfers  are 
transactions,  he  argues  that  transaction  cost  economics  can  be  used  to  consider 
contracting  issues  involved  with  the  management  of  internal  transfers  and  the  setting 
of  transfer  prices. 
As  Spicer  (1988)  points  out,  the  extent  to  which  a  company  makes  internal  transfers 
arises  out  of  a  strategic  choice  between  buying  components  from  external  sources  and 
making  them  itself.  This  is  the  issue  of  the  appropriate  extent  of  vertical  integration. 
Porter  (1980)  cites  the  potential  benefits  of  vertical  integration  as  including 
economies  of  operations,  tapping  into  technology,  assuring  supply,  offsetting 
bargaining  power  and  input  cost  distortions  in  non-competitive  markets,  and 
enhancing  ability  to  differentiate  end  products.  The  transaction  cost  economics  frame- 
work  offers  a  particular  explanation  for  vertical  integration.  The  make-or-buy 
decisions  can  be  made  so  as  to  minimize  the  sum  of  production  and  transaction  costs. 
The  scope  of  the  transactions  involved  (asset  specificity,  uncertainty  and  extent)  is 
thought  to  positively  relate  to  the  decision  to  integrate  vertically  into  component 
production. 
2.4  Summary 
Through  the  years  a  number  of  theories  explaining  the  origin  and  continued  influence 
of  MNEs  have  been  reviewed.  Those  reviewed  here  are  primarily  economic  in  nature 
although  most  of  them  drew  upon  varied  aspects  such  as  political,  socio- 
psychological,  etc.  backgrounds  in  an  attempt  to  develop  concepts  well  rounded 
enough  to  cover  the  multitudinous  nature  of  MNEs'  involvement,  and  predict  them 
over  time.  The  asset  specificity  dimension  gives  further  reason  to  state  that  market 
prices  are  unavailable,  hence  providing  justification  to  the  regulators  in  adopting 
profit  based  ITP  methods  and  increasing  the  reliance  on  comparables  in  setting 
transfer  prices.  As  MNE  theories  claim  that  foreign-owned  companies,  due  to  their 
internal  and  external  advantages  over  time  should  perform  as  well  or  better  than 
domestic  companies,  this  statement  needs  to  be  certified  in  order  to  ensure  that 
27 comparables  (including  MNEs)  under  different  regulations  are  reliable  to  determine 
whether  MNE  discretion  is  limited  or  safeguarded. 
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Literature  Review  &  Income  Shifting  Evidence 3.1  Introduction 
The  importance  of  international  transfer  pricing  has  increased  due  to  the  ever-growing 
effect  of  international  taxation  on  the  global  economy.  For  many  years,  there  has  been 
an  awareness  that  MNEs  can  evade  a  large  portion  of  their  statutory  tax  burden 
through  the  manipulation  of  transfer  prices  on  cross-border  charges.  In  summary,  a 
number  of  research  approaches  have  been  used  to  examine  the  transfer  price 
manipulation:  macro-level  and  regional  studies,  comparison  at  the  company  level,  and 
micro  level  (plant  level)  studies  using  primary  data  drawn  from  questionnaires  and/or 
case  studies.  Each  approach  has  its  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages. 
This  chapter  lists  some  of  the  important  empirical  studies  in  order  to  determine 
whether  the  theoretical  foundation  of  comparables  can  be  matched  with  previous 
empirical  studies.  The  demonstration  of  the  income  shifting  studies  is  essential  in 
order  to  uncover  limitations,  various  focuses,  limited  theoretical  bases,  methods 
adopted  by  previous  empirical  studies,  and  provide  a  justification  of  the  under 
researched  area  of  comparables  and  income  shifting  in  the  UK. 
3.2  Income  Shifling  Evidence 
This  chapter  provides  summaries  of  previous  research  studies  to  help  demonstrate  the 
significance  of  income  shifting  on  both  in  the  UK  and  on  a  global  scale.  Brief 
synopses  of  the  objectives,  data  and  methods  used,  findings,  and  evidence  of  income 
shifting  by  previous  researchers  is  given  to  highlight  the  different  approaches 
including  sources  that  previous  research  has  adopted. 
3.2.1  Arpan  (1972a  1972b) 
Arpan  investigated  the  ITP  practices  of  US-based  subsidiaries  of  non-US  MNEs  and 
compared  them  to  those  of  US  MNEs  to  determine  the  environmental  factors 
influencing  ITP  as  well  as  cultural  differences  that  MNEs  perceive  when  determining 
ITP  systems. 
Arpan  sent  a  letter  to  the  largest  or  most  representative  wholly  owned  US  based 
subsidiary  of  145  foreign-owned  companies.  The  parent  companies  were  based  in 
fifteen  different  countries  and  the  size  of  the  parent  company  (in  terms  of  sales) 
ranged  from  under  $1  million  to  over  $500  million.  From  the  145  companies,  60 
30 responses  were  received  from  the  15  selected  countries.  Of  the  60  responses,  16 
granted  follow-up  interviews.  In  addition,  partners  of  international  accounting  firms 
were  interviewed. 
For  very  large  MNEs,  no  significant  differences  were  found  for  external  variables  on 
a  parent  nationality  basis.  Taxes  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  important 
considerations  for  US,  Canada,  France  and  Italy,  but  not  as  important  for  Germany, 
Scandanavia  or  England.  The  main  finding  for  internal  variables  was  that  non-US 
MNEs  considered  only  roughly  half  as  many  internal  parameters  as  their  US 
counterparts.  With  regards  to  ITP  methods,  Arpan  found  that  approximately  50%  of 
firms  used  market  pricing,  30%  used  cost-oriented  pricing,  while  20%  used  a 
combination  of  the  two.  He  also  found  that:  larger  firms  tended  to  use  cost-oriented 
systems;  the  higher  the  level  of  market  competition  for  a  firm's  product,  the  greater 
the  likelihood  that  it  would  use  market  pricing;  nationality  and  cultural  diversity 
affected  TP  orientation;  and,  US  systems  are  more  cost  oriented  while  non-US 
systems  are  more  market  oriented. 
3.2.2  Kim  and  Miller  (1979) 
Kim  and  Miller's  research  investigated  the  factors  influencing  the  ITP  policies  of  US 
MNEs  operating  in  eight  developing  countries.  With  a  useable  questionnaire  response 
rate  of  8.8%  (30  out  of  342  MNEs,  with  at  least  one  subsidiary  in  two  of  the  eight 
countries  specified,  listed  in  the  1978  edition  of  US  Subsidiaries  and  Affiliates 
Abroad  World  Trade  Academy  Inc.  ),  they  proceeded  to  rank  eight  factors  in  the  order 
of  importance  placed  on  them  by  respondents. 
The  two  researchers  found  profit  repatriation  restrictions  and  exchange  controls  in  the 
host  country  to  be  the  two  most  important  factors  affecting  ITP  decisions.  Other 
factors  included  joint  venture  constraints,  tariffs/custom  duties  and  income  tax 
liability  (in  that  order)  in  the  host  country. 
As  a  follow-up  to  their  1978  research,  Kim  and  Miller  sought  to  establish  a  theoretical 
framework  for  worldwide  transfer  pricing  for  US  MNEs  with  specific  reference  to 
subsidiaries  in  less  developed  countries  (LDCs).  Using  survey  and  interview 
evidence,  30  US  MNEs  (out  of  342  US  parents  listed  in  the  World  Trade  Academy 
31 Press,  1978)  with  subsidiaries  in  at  least  2  out  of  8  LDCs,  rated  the  importance  of  9 
variables  relating  to  the  transfer  pricing  decision  on  a  scale  of  1  to  4.  The  average 
scores  of  these  variables  were  ranked  with  profit  repatriations  considered  as  the  most 
important  and  tax  influences  at  numbering  fifth  and  sixth. 
Kim  and  Miller  surmised  that  in  the  late  1960's  and  early  1970's  income  tax  liability 
was  probably  the  most  significant  factor,  but  by  the  late  1970's  it  was  only  one  of 
several  factors  MNEs  took  into  consideration  when  making  transfer  pricing  decisions. 
3.2.3  Tang  and  Chan  (1979) 
Tang  and  Chan  endeavored  to  compare  the  ITP  practices  of  US  and  Japanese  MNEs 
at  both  domestic  and  international  levels,  determine  important  environmental 
variables  considered  by  large  US  and  Japanese  MNEs  when  formulating  their  transfer 
pricing  polices,  and  to  find  those  environmental  variables  which  discriminated 
between  large  US  and  Japanese  MNEs. 
They  sent  questionnaires  to  the  controller,  treasurer,  financial  vice-president,  or 
secretary  of  300  manufacturing  and  mining  companies  selected  from  the  largest  1000 
US  industrial  corporations,  and  to  the  president  of  369  of  the  largest  manufacturing 
and  mining  companies  in  Japan.  In  terms  of  responses,  145  out  of  300  sampled  US 
and  102  out  of  369  Japanese  companies  were  received.  76  US  and  50  Japanese 
companies'  responses  were  useable  allowing  an  aggregate  useable  response  rate  of 
nineteen  percent. 
They  found  overall  profitability  to  be  the  most  important  of  twenty  environmental 
factors  affecting  ITP  decisions  of  both  sets  of  MNEs.  With  regards  to  ITP  practices, 
cost-based  methods  (particularly  full  production  cost  plus  some  allowance  for  profits) 
were  revealed  to  be  the  most  popular  among  both  US  and  Japanese  MNEs.  Forty-six 
and  forty-five  percents  of  US  and  Japanese  firms  respectively  use  cost-based  methods. 
Thirty-two  and  sixteen  percents  of  US  firms  use  market-based  and  negotiation-based 
pricing  methods  as  compared  to  thirty-eight  and  eighteen  percents  of  Japanese  MNEs. 
3.2.4  Wu  and  Sharp  (1979 
Wu  and  Sharp  investigated  both  domestic  and  international  transfer  pricing  practices 
32 of  US  firms  to  establish  the  dominant  TP  methods  used  in  the  presence  or  absence  of 
market  prices  and  to  find  out  whether  differences  exist  between  domestic  and 
international  transfer  prices.  From  their  questionnaire  they  received  61  useable 
responses,  spread  over  11  industries,  from  all  500  firms  listed  in  the  Fortune  500. 
From  their  statistical  analysis,  they  found  that  where  market  prices  were  available, 
they  were  the  predominant  basis  for  pricing  transfers.  In  their  absence,  full  product 
cost  plus  a  profit  margin  were  most  frequently  used.  While  many  firms  encouraged 
negotiation  as  part  of  their  TP  method  (especially  as  a  means  of  settling  disputes), 
little  evidence  was  found  for  the  use  of  mathematical  programming  and  marginal 
costing  approaches.  Significant  differences  were  found  between  domestic  and 
international  transfer  pricing  practices,  which  Wu  and  Sharp  attributed  to  the  fact  that 
the  economic  environment  for  international  transfers  of  goods  was  much  more 
complex  and  perplexing  than  that  for  domestic  transfers.  For  international  transfers, 
due  considerations  were  given  to  additional  economic  factors  such  as  host  country 
inflation,  currency  fluctuation  and  exchange  control,  foreign  governmental  regulations 
of  income  taxes,  tariffs,  dividend  remittance  and  ownership  by  foreign  parties,  and 
host  country's  economic,  social  and  political  stability. 
3.2.5  Bums  (1980) 
Bums  aimed  to  improve  the  understanding  of  intracompany  policies  on  transfer 
pricing  decisions  of  US  based  MNEs.  She  sent  a  questionnaire  to  the  senior  financial 
officer  of  210  US  MNEs  to  assess  the  influence  of  14  variables  on  the  export  pricing 
decision  and  select  the  five  most  important.  Sixty-two  useable  responses  were 
received. 
Bums  identified  five  factors  (internal  foreign  environment,  influences  on  cash  flows, 
artificial  barriers,  taxes,  and  economic  structure),  each  explaining  more  than  five 
percnt  of  the  variance  and  eighty  percent  in  total.  Using  factor  analysis,  she  isolated 
ten  variables  with  the  greatest  influence  on  the  intra-firm  pricing  decisions  of  the 
respondents.  Market  conditions  in  the  foreign  country,  competition  in  the  foreign 
country,  and  reasonable  profit  for  foreign  affiliates,  in  that  order,  were  found  to  be  the 
three  most  influential  factors  in  the  TP  decisions  of  firms. 
33 3.2.6  Tang  0  981) 
Tang  extended  his  previous  work  on  US  and  Japanese  firms  (Tang,  1979;  Tang  and 
Chan,  1979)  to  British  and  Canadian  MNEs  in  an  attempt  to  investigate  domestic  and 
international  practices  with  regards  to  methods  and  environmental  factors. 
With  80  (28%)  and  192  (48%)  useable  UK  and  Canadian  responses  respectively, 
Tang  found  that  UK  MNEs  showed  similar  preferences  for  both  cost-oriented  (34%) 
and  market-oriented  (34%)  methods  in  pricing  their  international  transfers.  Twenty- 
seven  percent  of  UK  MNEs  preferred  negotiated  pricing.  Canadian  MNEs,  on  the 
other  hand,  showed  slightly  greater  preference  for  market-oriented  pricing.  With 
respect  to  ITP  objectives,  44%  of  UK  MNEs  cited  the  maximization  of  consolidated 
after-tax  profit  as  their  most  dominant  ITP  objective  while  39%  cited  equitable 
performance  evaluation  of  domestic  and/or  foreign  divisions.  These  compared  with 
38%  and  46%  of  Canadian  respondents  respectively.  With  regards  to  environmental 
factors  affecting  ITP,  both  sets  of  companies  ranked  overall  profitability  highest  while 
the  competitive  position  of  subsidiaries  in  foreign  countries  was  ranked  second  and 
third  respectively  by  UK  and  Canadian  companies.  Opinions  differ  significantly 
between  the  two  groups  with  regards  to  the  ranking  of  the  influence  of  custom  duty 
rates  and  legislation.  While  UK  companies  ranked  it  eleventh  out  of  twenty,  Canadian 
companies  ranked  it  second. 
3.2.7  Czechowicz  et  al  (1982) 
The  aim  of  this  research  was  to  document  the  ITP  practices  of  US-based  firms  as  part 
of  a  broad  investigation  of  the  performance  evaluation  practices  of  US  and  non-US 
MNEs  operating  in  the  US.  Czechowicz  et  at  sent  out  300  questionnaires  and 
received  88  useable  responses  from  MNEs. 
They  found  that  cost-based  methods  were  most  often  used  by  US  firms  while  non-US 
firms  preferred  market-based  methods.  Negotiated  pricing  was  more  popular  with 
non-US  firms  than  with  US  MNEs  who  appeared  to  have  equal  preferences  for  central 
administration  and  negotiation  of  prices. 
3.2.8  Tan  (1982 
For  this  study  Tang  identified  the  environmental  factors  that  UK  MNEs  consider  in 
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directors  of  290  manufacturing  and  mining  companies  selected  from  the  largest  500 
UK  companies  in  The  Times  1000  Directory.  Eighty  companies  returned  useable 
responses  of  which  forty-seven  rated  the  importance  of  twenty  environmental  factors 
(on  a  five-point  scale)  in  formulating  their  transfer  pricing  policies.  He  found  that  the 
overall  profit  to  the  company  was  ranked  highest  followed  by  the  competitive  position 
of  subsidiaries  in  foreign  countries. 
3.2.9  Benvignati  (1985) 
The  aim  of  Benvignati's  research  was  to  analyze  the  scope,  uniqueness,  method  of 
pricing,  and  firm  and  industry  characteristics  for  transfer  pricing. 
Using  confidential  corporate  data  from  the  US  Federal  Trade  Commission's  Line  of 
Business  program,  466  companies  with  3186  lines  of  business  were  analyzed. 
Benvignati  ran  multiple  regression  analysis  on  the  percentage  of  foreign  transfers  at 
market  against  twelve  independent  variables  to  test  which  variables  were  significant 
in  the  market  versus  non-market  decision. 
The  higher  the  level  of  intra-firm  exports  the  higher  the  proportion  of  non-market 
pricing.  If  firms  were  exporting  to  branches  (rather  than  subsidiaries)  this 
corresponded  to  higher  levels  of  market-based  pricing.  Of  the  organizational 
variables,  market-based  pricing  was  significantly  related  to  the  size  of  the  film  and 
also  to  the  number  of  foreign  subsidiaries. 
The  results  were  significantly  different  with  75%  of  foreign  transfers  compared  to 
50%  of  domestic  transfers  accounting  for  non-market  pricing.  The  research  suggested 
that  differences  in  the  market  versus  non-market  pricing  decision  were  due  to  inter- 
company  differences  rather  than  inter-industry  differences. 
3.2.10  Lecraw  (1985) 
Lecraw  investigated  MNEs  from  US,  European,  Japanese  and  other  less  developed 
countries  with  subsidiary  operations  in  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  Indonesia  or 
the  Philippines  to  establish  the  extent  of  usage  of  market  and  non  market-based  TP 
methods  by  his  respondents  relative  to  their  home  country. 
35 Through  the  use  of  responses  from  questionnaires  he  administered  during  interviews 
with  top  managers  of  153  subsidiaries  of  111  MNEs,  he  found  the  use  of  non  market- 
based  methods  to  be  significantly  greater  among  Japanese  firms  with  seventy-five  per 
cent  of  their  transfers  (inwards  and  outwards)  priced  on  a  non-market  basis.  US 
MNEs  used  market-based  pricing  for  sixty-eight  percent  of  their  transfers  compared 
to  sixty-five  percent  and  forty-five  percent  usage  by  MNEs  from  Europe  and  other 
countries  respectively.  Subsequent  multiple  discriminant  analysis  confirmed  that 
Japanese  MNEs  tended  to  use  non  market-based  transfer  prices  to  a  greater  extent 
than  the  other  MNEs. 
Lecraw  also  found  the  use  of  non  market-based  TP  to  be  strongly  associated  with 
attempts  by  MNEs  to  reduce  duties  and  profit  taxes,  allocate  capital  between 
countries,  reduce  risk  and  circumvent  government  price  and  capital/profit  remittance 
controls.  Joint  ventureship  with  local  partners  was  found  to  significantly  reduce  the 
extent  to  which  non  market-based  prices  were  used. 
3.2.11  Al-Eryani  (1987) 
Al-Eryani  identified,  tested  and  explained  similarities  and  differences  in  transfer 
pricing  motives  and  tested  the  influence  on  company  size  and  industry  on  a  transfer 
pricing  model  for  both  affiliates  in  less  developed  (LDCs)  and  more  developed 
countries  (MDCs). 
Questionnaires  were  sent  to  791  MNEs  identified  by  Dunn  and  Bradstreet's  Billion 
Dollar  Directory.  Of  those  sent  surveys,  164  US  MNEs  replied  of  which  88  had 
affiliates  in  LDCs  and  76  had  affiliates  in  MDEs.  The  questionnaire  asked 
respondents  to  rate  thirty-four  environmental  factors  and  fifteen  transfer  pricing 
methods  using  a  five-point  scale. 
Al-Eryani  found  that  the  top  four  ranked  environmental  determinants  for  US  MNEs 
operating  in  MDCs  (and  LDCs)  were  compliance  with  US  tax  and  customs 
regulations,  compliance  with  the  tax  and  custom  regulation  of  the  host  country, 
maximization  of  overall  corporate  profit,  and  minimization  of  overall  corporate 
income  taxes. 
36 3.2.12  Wheeler  (1988) 
Wheeler  sought  to  compare  the  rate  of  return  on  assets  of  US-based  foreign-owned 
companies  and  their  US-owned  counterparts  using  Statement  of  Income  data  from  the 
IRS.  He  found  that  the  return  on  assets  of  all  US-owned  corporations  was  six  times 
larger  than  those  of  foreign-owned  US  subsidiaries.  He  concluded  that  improper 
transfer  pricing  is  the  only  potential  explanation  for  these  differences. 
3.2.13  Al-Eryani.  Alam  and  Akhter  (1990) 
These  three  researchers  sought  to  examine  the  impact  that  both  organizational  and 
environmental  factors  have  on  the  ITP  strategies  of  US  MNEs.  Based  on  information 
obtained  through  a  questionnaire-based  survey  of  164  US  MNEs,  Al-Eryani  et  al 
identified  the  key  determinants  of  transfer  pricing  decisions. 
Legal  constraints  and  firm  size  were  the  most  significant  factors  influencing  the  ITP 
strategies  of  US  MNEs.  In  addition,  larger  firms  tended  to  use  market-based  TP 
methods  enabling  them  to  comply  with  the  laws  and  regulations  of  both  home  and 
host  countries. 
3.2.14  Kim  and  Lyn  (1990) 
Kim  and  Lyn  compared  the  profitability  of  foreign-owned  companies  to  those  of  US 
owned  ones  as  part  of  a  broad-ranging  study  of  the  power,  performance,  growth 
opportunities,  risk,  efficiency,  etc.  of  foreign  MNEs  in  the  US. 
A  group  of  fifty-four  foreign  companies  was  compared  with  an  unmatched  group  of 
fifty-four  US  companies  using  the  average  of  five  different  ratios  (earnings  per  share, 
return  on  equity  before  tax,  return  on  equity  after  tax,  gross  profit  margin  and 
operating  profit  margin)  for  the  years  1980  to  1984. 
The  unpaired  univariate  t-test  statistics  revealed  significant  differences  between  the 
two  groups,  thus  Kim  and  Lyn  concluded  that  foreign  companies  operating  in  the  US 
earn  lower  profits  than  American  companies.  By  using  accounts  receivable  turnover, 
inventory  turnover,  and  total  asset  turnover  as  measures  of  efficiency,  they  found  that 
American-owned  companies  were  more  efficient  than  foreign-owned  ones. 
37 3.2.15  Business  International  Corporation  and  Ernst  &  Young  (1991) 
The  aim  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  how  internal  and  external  factors  affect 
MNEs'  ITP  methodology  and  policy  formulation  processes.  Ninety-six  useable 
responses  were  received  and  interviews  with  a  wide-range  of  professionals  (lawyers, 
accountants,  etc)  were  conducted. 
Both  environmental  and  organizational  factors  were  found  to  affect  impact  respondent 
firms'  TP  policies.  The  two  most  important  environmental  factors  were  competitive 
pressures  and  tax/accounting  rules  changes,  while  the  two  most  important  internal 
factors  were  organizational  structure  and  corporate  strategy.  With  regards  to  ITP 
methods,  market  price  or  CUP  ranked  first  for  the  transfer  of  tangible  products  by 
respondents,  followed  by  modified  market  price,  standard  price  and  rate  of  return 
methods  in  that  order.  The  descending  order  of  method  preference  for  intangibles  was 
profit  split  method,  exact  comparable  method  and  inexact  comparable  method 
respectively.  Ensuring  arm's  length  relationship,  avoiding  ITP  audits,  global  tax 
minimization  and  profit  maximization  were  found  to  be  the  most  important  TP 
objectives  of  respondents. 
3.2.16  Grubert  and  Mutti  (1991) 
Grubert  and  Mutti  investigated  income  shifting  and  tax  planning  opportunities  used 
by  MNEs  as  well  as  addressed  a  number  of  international  taxation  issues. 
1982  data  on  a  cross-section  of  33  countries  was  used  to  determine  whether  income 
shifting  would  be  supported  by  a  negative  correlation  between  the  reported  after-tax 
profit  rate  and  the  tax  rate.  Several  regression  models  were  run  using  different 
measures  of  tax  (average  effective  tax  rate;  statutory  tax  rate),  profitability  (book 
income/sales  net  of  purchases  from  the  parent;  book  income/equity),  algebraic 
relationship  (linear  or  not),  and  with  and  without  an  adjustment  for  GDP  growth  rate. 
They  found  that  tax  rates  were  a  highly  significant  determinant  of  reported  profits.  It 
was  also  suggested  that  the  influence  of  the  tax  rate  on  reported  profits  was  much 
more  pronounced  at  the  low  end  of  the  tax  spectrum  and  that  GDP  was  often  a 
significant  determinant. 
38 3.2.17  Johnson  and  Kirsch  (1991) 
Johnson  and  Kirsch  examined  the  ITP  objectives  of  US-based  MNEs  through  a 
survey-based  study.  Questionnaires  were  sent  to  576  US-based  companies  identified 
from  the  Business  Week  Global  1000  and  Fortune  500  lists.  Out  of  the  576,230 
companies  responded  of  which  79  used  transfer  pricing  in  an  international  setting. 
Minimization  of  corporate  taxes  was  the  most  important  ITP  goal  of  US  companies. 
Other  important  goals  were  increasing  overall  corporate  profit  and  simplicity/ease  of 
application.  Performance  evaluation  of  subsidiaries'  managers  was  the  least  ranked 
corporate  objective.  In  addition,  companies  who  claimed  to  use  decentralized  ITP 
policies  ranked  performance  evaluation  low. 
3.2.18  Borkowski  (1992a) 
Borkowski  strove  to  investigate  the  motivational  criteria  that  US-based  MNEs  use  to 
select  an  ITP  method  to  determine  whether  the  choice  of  an  ITP  method  was  affected 
by  either  organizational  (internal)  or  international  (external)  variables. 
Based  on  a  selection  of  7  overall  internal  variables,  7  overall  external  variables,  and 
using  the  TPM  as  the  dependent  variables,  Borkowski  sent  questionnaires  to  301 
manufacturing  companies  with  international  affiliates  listed  on  either  the  Fortune  500 
or  Business  Week  1000.  Replies  were  received  from  seventy-nine  companies,  which 
transferred  products  internationally.  Of  the  79,51.9%  used  a  version  off  full-cost, 
32.9%  used  market-based  and  15.2%  used  negotiated  price. 
She  found  that  the  choice  of  TP  method  was  affected  by  organizational  variables  such 
as  size,  conflict  between  parent  and  subsidiary,  ease/cost  criterion,  degree  of 
decentralization  and  performance  evaluation.  TP  choice  was  also  affected  by 
international  factors  such  as  international  tax  and  tariffs,  economic  stability  of  parent 
MNEs,  favorability  of  the  economy  to  parent,  and  SS  482  regulations. 
3.2.19  Borkowski  (1992b) 
As  a  follow-up  to  her  1992a  research,  Borkowski  sought  to  investigate  the 
organizational  and  environmental  factors  affecting  the  ITP  practices  of  US-based 
MNEs  and  the  objectives  of  their  ITP  methods. 
39 Using  the  data  obtained  from  Borkowski  1992a,  nonparametric  tests  (Chi-square  test 
of  goodness  of  fits  and  Wilcoxon  paired  sign-rank  tests)  were  applied  to  247  (39 
matched)  respondents.  Differences  were  found  in  a  number  of  organizational  and 
environmental  factors  affecting  their  transfer  decision-making  process.  These 
differences  were,  however,  not  reflected  in  transfer  pricing  choices.  Most  MNEs 
employed  the  same  transfer  pricing  method  for  both  domestic  and  international 
transfers  in  an  attempt  to  achieve  similar  domestic  and  international  objectives.  In 
addition,  the  choice  of  TP  method  was  contingent  upon  specific  organizational  and 
environmental  characteristics  rather  than  the  nature  of  transfer. 
3.2.20  Borkowski  (1992c) 
For  this  research  Borkowski  attempted  to  expand  on  her  two  previous  studies  (1992a, 
1992b).  Her  findings  were  adapted  to  document  the  TP  methods  preferred  by  MNEs 
operating  in  the  US. 
Borkowski  found  that  in  relation  to  legally  accepted  TP  methods,  under  SS  482  of  the 
US  Internal  Revenue  Service  regulations,  of  the  128  useable  responses  received,  47% 
used  cost  plus,  33%  used  comparable  uncontrolled  prices  (CUP),  while  20%  used  the 
"fourth  method".  She  also  reported  that  most  MNEs  used  their  current  method  mainly 
to  fulfill  US  legal  requirements.  Given  the  choice,  the  majority  of  the  companies 
would  shift  to  other  methods  they  considered  optimal. 
3.2.21  Cravens  (1992) 
Cravens  attempted  to  increase  the  understanding  of  the  motivating  factors  involved 
for  MNEs  in  setting  transfer  pricing  policies  using  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
measures.  In  addition,  she  explored  the  causal  relationship  beginning  with  the  extent 
to  which  situational  determinants  influence  transfer  pricing  objectives  which,  in  turn, 
influences  transfer  pricing  policy  thus  influencing  financial  statements. 
Cravens  received  82  questionnaires  out  of  a  sample  of  542  US-based  MNEs  to 
determine  the  objectives  of  their  transfer  pricing  policies,  the  characteristics  of  these 
companies,  and  assess  how  well  these  companies  achieved  their  stated  objectives. 
She  tested  five  main  hypotheses  -  two  on  tax  management,  two  on  competitive 
position,  and  one  on  internal  dimensions  (performance  evaluation,  motivation  and 
40 goal  congruence).  These  hypotheses  were  tested  on  the  basis  of  objectives  rather  than 
pricing  method  on  the  grounds  that  firms  following  different  objectives  might  still  use 
similar  pricing. 
Cravens  findings  stressed  that  transfer  pricing  was  viewed  as  an  effective  tool  rather 
than  merely  a  necessity.  Cravens  concluded  that  transfer  pricing  should  play  an  active 
role  in  business  strategy  and  could  be  used  to  achieve  a  variety  of  objectives  such  as 
managing  the  tax  burden,  maintaining  competitive  position,  and  promoting  equitable 
performance  evaluation. 
3.2.22  Tang 
`(1992) 
In  an  update  of  Tang's  1977  study,  Tang  used  the  143  replies  from  the  largest  500  US 
industrial  companies  listed  in  the  1990  directory  of  Fortune  500  (80%  of  these 
respondents  had  at  least  one  foreign  subsidiary)  to  determine  if  the  transfer  pricing 
methods  utilized  by  respondents  in  his  1977  were  still  found  to  be  applicable. 
Since  the  1977  study,  the  respondents  stated  that  market-priced  methods  were  now 
used  more  than  cost-based  methods.  In  a  direct  comparison  of  the  1977  and  1990 
rankings  of  environmental  factors  considered  in  formulating  transfer  pricing  policies, 
overall  profit  to  the  company  remained  the  most  important  environmental  variable  but 
"differentiation  in  income  tax:  rate  and  income  tax:  legislation  among  countries"  rose 
from  number  four  to  number  two. 
3.2.23  Klassen  et  al  (1993) 
Klassen  et  al  attempted  to  examine  geographic  income  shifting  by  US  MNEs  in 
relation  to  worldwide  changes  in  corporate  tax  rates  between  1984  and  1990. 
Financial  statement  data  from  191  US  MNEs  was  used  to  determine  changes  in 
reported  profitability  for  the  period  subsequent  to  a  particular  tax  change. 
They  found  that  US  MNEs  shifted  income  to  the  United  States  from  Canada  and  from 
the  United  States  to  Europe  in  1985  and  1986,  consistent  with  increasing  Canadian 
rates  and  decreasing  rates  in  Europe. 
41 3.2.24  Harris  (1993) 
Harris  compared  US  MNEs'  US  and  worldwide  income  and  investment  activities  both 
before  and  after  the  Tax  Reform  Act  (TRA)  of  1986,  which  reduced  the  corporate  tax 
rate  from  45%  to  34%  and  reduced  subsidies  for  capital  investment. 
Two  hundred  US  manufacturing  firms  were  randomly  selected  from  the  SIC3000 
industry  file  on  Compustat  from  1984  to  1988.  Compustat  data  (which  includes  the 
dependent  variable  -current  taxes  payable  to  the  federal  government  net  of  investment 
tax  credits)  was  supplemented  by  company  annual  reports.  Regression  analysis 
including  dummy  variables  for  location  of  subsidiaries  as  well  as  additional  variables 
available  on  Compustat  --  R&D  expenses,  investment  tax  credits,  interest  expense, 
number  of  employees  were  used. 
Harris  found  evidence  to  suggest  that  US  manufacturing  companies  engaged  in 
income  shifting.  In  the  US-based  tests,  MNEs  shifted  more  income  into  the  US  (and 
responded  more  quickly)  after  the  TRA  of  1986.  In  the  foreign-based  tests,  the  results 
supported  MNEs  shifting  income  from  foreign  jurisdictions  into  the  United  States  in 
1987  and  1988. 
3.2.25  Tang  (1993) 
For  this  study,  Tang  investigated  both  domestic  and  international  transfer  pricing 
methods  used  by  firms.  Tang  administered  questionnaires  to  all  the  500  firms  listed 
in  the  1990  edition  of  the  Fortune  500  directory  of  the  largest  industrial  corporations 
in  the  US.  responses  from  143  companies  covering  24  industrial  groupings  were 
received. 
He  found  that  41%,  46%  and  13%  of  firms  used  cost-based,  market-based  and 
negotiation-based  TP  methods  respectively  for  their  international  transfers,  while 
46%,  37%  and  17%  used  the  three  methods  respectively  for  their  domestic  transfers. 
His  comparison  of  these  findings  with  those  of  his  earlier  study  (Tang,  1979)  revealed 
a  shift  towards  greater  use  of  market-based  prices  by  US  companies  for  both  domestic 
(from  32%  in  1979  to  37%  in  1993)  and  international  (39%  in  1979  to  46%  in  1993) 
transactions.  With  regards  to  the  influence  of  environmental  variables  on  the  TP 
decisions  of  companies,  Tang  found  that  overall  profitability,  inter-country 
7  42 differentials  in  income  tax  rates  and  regulations  and  restrictions  on  the  repatriation  of 
profits  and  dividends  by  foreign  countries  (in  that  order)  were  the  three  most 
important  variables  considered  by  his  respondents. 
3.2.26  Crain  and  Stitts  (1994) 
Crain  and  Stifts  compared  the  gross  profit  margin  (GPM)  of  foreign-controlled  firms 
operating  in  the  US  to  their  US-controlled  counterparts. 
Fifty-one  foreign  companies  and  fifty-one  US  companies  were  matched  on  the  basis 
of  SIC  code  and  sales  and  the  mean  GPM  was  compared  using  matched-pair  t-tests. 
They  found  that  the  mean  GPM  of  the  two  groups  were  significantly  different  at  the 
ten  percent  level.  Foreign-controlled  firms  reported  significantly  lower  GPMs  than  the 
US  controlled  firms. 
3.2.27  Borkowski  (1996) 
Borkowski  aimed  to  consolidate  the  findings  of  twenty-five  transfer  pricing  studies  of 
US  MNEs  using  meta-analysis.  Her  main  objective  was  to  analyze  whether  there  were 
any  significant  factors  across  the  studies  which  affected  the  choice  of  ITP  method. 
One  of  the  overriding  findings  was  that  there  was  very  limited  consistency  between 
these  studies  in  terms  of  sample  size,  response  rates,  variables  studied  and  level  of 
statistical  analysis,  making  it  difficult  to  use  meta-analysis.  Her  findings  suggested 
that  many  of  the  empirical  studies  over  the  last  forty  years  had  either  been  ad-hoc  in 
nature,  not  attempting  to  ensure  any  consistency  with  previous  research,  or  designed 
specifically  to  address  shortcomings  of  previous  research. 
3.2.28  Cravens  and  Shearon-0  996) 
For  this  study  Cravens  and  Shearon  extended  Cravens  (1992)  research  on  TP  by 
applying  an  outcome-based  approach  to  companies'  ITP  choices,  concentrating  on  the 
financial  consequences  or  outcomes  of  TP  rather  than  TP  methods. 
Questionnaires  were  sent  to  519  US-based  MNEs  yielding  82  useable  responses. 
Cravens  and  Shearon  developed  and  estimated  multivariate  regression  models  using 
financial  outcomes  (total  tax  burden  and  return  on  assets)  as  dependent  variables. 
43 It  was  found  that  42%  of  firms  used  cost-based  methods,  33%  used  market-based 
methods,  18%  used  negotiated  pricing,  while  the  remaining  7%  used  multiple 
methods. 
3.2.29  Jacob  (1996) 
Following  and  extending  the  approach  of  Harris  (1993),  Jacob  (1996)  supplemented 
the  data  on  taxes  paid  and  geographic  profits  with  information  on  volumes  of  inter- 
geographic  trade. 
The  study  examined  two  time  periods,  206  US  MNEs  in  1982-84  and  289  US  MNEs 
in  1988-90,  and  combined  data  gathered  from  both  Compustat  and  annual  reports. 
The  results  for  both  periods,  considering  the  differentials  in  corporate  tax  rates 
between  the  US  and  overseas,  were  consistent  with  global  tax-minimization  through 
transfer  prices  during  both  periods. 
3.2.30  Borkowski  (1997a) 
For  this  study,  Borkowski  investigated  whether  organizational,  environmental  and 
financial  factors  influenced  the  transfer  pricing  choices  made  by  Japanese  and  US 
MNEs. 
Survey  responses  were  received  from  39  out  of  241  Japanese  MNCs  and  28  out  of 
126  US  MNEs.  The  survey  data  was  mainly  categorical  (5  point  Likert  scale)  and 
was  analyzed  using  nonparametric  statistics  (Wilcoxon  and  Kruskal-Wallis). 
Borkowski  found  that  Japanese  MNEs  shifted  from  the  use  of  cost-based  methods 
market-based  and  negotiated  pricing  methods.  Performance  evaluation  was  a 
significantly  more  important  organizational  factor  to  Japanese  MNEs  than  to  US  ones 
when  TP  choices  are  being  made.  In  addition,  there  was  a  statistically  significant 
difference  in  the  TP  methods  used  by  both  groups  of  MNEs. 
3.2.31  Cravens  (1997) 
In  a  further  expansion  of  her  earlier  research,  she  used  the  data  collected  in  Cravens 
(1992)  to  examine  the  strategic  role  of  TP  among  US-based  MNEs  listed  in  the  World 
44 Directory  of  Multinationals  and  on  the  US  stock  exchange. 
She  received  82  questionnaires  out  of  a  sample  of  542  US-based  MNEs  to  determine 
the  objectives  of  their  transfer  pricing  policies,  the  characteristics  of  these  firms,  and 
assess  how  well  these  firms  achieved  their  stated  objectives. 
Twenty-eight  percent  of  her  respondents  listed  the  management  of  the  tax  burden  and 
other  related  issues  as  the  primary  objective  of  their  ITP  system.  Other  variables  of 
importance  include  maintenance  of  the  competitive  position  of  subsidiaries  and  the 
promotion  of  equitable  performance  evaluation. 
3.2.32  Mundau  &  Peel  (1997) 
Munday  and  Peel  undertook  a  wide-ranging  comparison  of  the  performances  of 
Japanese  owned  manufacturing  companies  operating  in  the  UK  with  those  of  their  UK 
owned  counterparts. 
With  a  matched  sample  of  97  companies,  they  compared  both  groups'  performance 
and  efficiency,  among  other  characteristics,  using  annual  financial  and  non-financial 
details  for  1994  as  provided  by  the  FAME  database. 
They  found  that  Japanese-owned  companies  significantly  underperformed  UK-owned 
ones  with  respect  to  profitability,  asset  efficiency,  stock  efficiency  and  credit  risks. 
The  findings  suggested  that  Japanese  companies  may  have  engaged  in  ITP  strategies 
which  had  the  effect  of  minimizing  liability  to  UK  corporate  tax. 
3.2.33  Collins  and  Shackelford  (1998) 
Collins  and  Shackelford  examined  the  effects  of  taxes  on  cross-border  payments  of 
dividends,  interest,  royalties  and  management  fees,  between  US  MNEs'  foreign 
affiliates. 
Their  study  used  1990  tax  return  information  based  on  US  Form  5471  since  US 
MNEs  are  required  to  file  a  separate  Form  5471  to  the  IRS  for  each  foreign 
subsidiary.  The  form  disclosed  information  on  cross-border  payments  of  dividends, 
interest,  royalties  and  management  fees  (with  the  precise  recipient/payer  of  the  flows 
45 not  identified)  for  the  largest  7,500  foreign  subsidiaries  (by  total  assets). 
Their  findings  supported  the  assertion  that  for  cross-border  payments  of  dividends, 
interest,  and  royalties,  but  not  management  fees,  US  MNEs  coordinated  their  non-US 
activities  to  mitigate  foreign  taxes. 
3.2.34  Oyelere  and  Emmanuel  (1998) 
The  aim  of  this  study  was  to  determine  whether  the  profitability  (performance)  and 
dividend  (post-performance)  distribution  of  foreign-owned  domestic  companies 
(FoDCs)  operating  in  the  UK  revealed  evidence  of  the  use  of  ITP  for  income  shifting. 
The  study  investigated  the  link  between  reported  profitability  and  dividend 
distributions  of  UK-based  FoDCs  and  UK-controlled  enterprises  (UKCEs)  to 
determine  whether  ITP  was  used  for  income-shifting  purposes. 
Sample  FoDCs  were  matched  with  sample  UKCEs  on  the  basis  of  capability  (total 
assets),  and  consequently,  a  comparison  of  the  reported  profitability  (performance) 
and  dividend  (post-performance)  distributions  of  the  two  samples  was  undertaken.  A 
sample  of  36  FoDCs  operating  in  the  UK  were  matched  with  36  UKCEs  on  the  basis 
of  total  assets  value. 
Their  findings  revealed  significant  divergence  in  the  performance  and  post- 
performance  distributions  of  the  two  samples.  They  found  an  unusual  relationship 
between  the  profitability  and  distribution  of  FoDCs,  suggesting  that  ITP  was  used  to 
shift  income  from  the  UK. 
3.3  Limitations 
In  addition  to  the  limited  theoretical  bases  and  the  various  focuses  of  previous 
research,  one  of  the  limitations  of  the  findings  of  previous  studies  is  that  the 
explanation  for  the  results  is  limited  to  the  influences  of  tax  (i.  e.,  income  shifting, 
transfer  pricing).  The  studies  usually  do  not  consider  alternative  explanations  for 
observed  effects  or  even  the  total  tax  regime  such  as  corporate  strategy  and  regulatory 
requirements  with  the  exception  of  Emmanuel  (1999).  As  the  aim  of  this  research  is 
to  test  whether  comparables  under  different  regulations  allows  greater  or  lesser 
discretion,  this  research  provides  an  evaluation  of  the  new  profit  methods  (TNMM 
46 and  CPM)  within  the  transfer  pricing  regulatory  framework,  building  upon  previous 
research  (Lecraw,  1985;  Wheeler,  1988,1990;  Kim  and  Lyn,  1990;  Crain  and  Stiffs, 
1994;  Chan  and  Chow,  1997;  Munday  and  Peel,  1997;  Oyelere  and  Emmanuel,  1998; 
Tworkowski,  1999)  while,  at  the  same  time,  computing  comparables  that  can  be  used 
for  profit  based  methods  and  support  transaction  based  methods. 
The  limitations  of  previous  research  vary  according  to  the  aim  of  the  research, 
research  method,  statistical  tests,  etc.  In  addition,  the  limitation  of  the  previous 
empirical  studies  lie  in  the  data  used.  The  majority  of  income  shifting  studies  analyze 
US  MNEs  reflecting  the  predominance  of  US  studies  and  further  illustrating  that  there 
is  more  access  to  informative  data  (both  accounting  and  tax  data)  in  the  US  where  ITP 
research  is  more  welcome  compared  to  other  countries. 
Although  in  the  UK  access  to  quality,  publicly  available  data  remains  available, 
research  on  transfer  pricing  is  limited  with  the  majority  of  empirical  evidence  being 
US  based  and  a  limited  amount  UK  based.  Small  empirical  studies  (Munday  &  Peel, 
1997)  were  conducted  based  on  1993-1994  data  before  the  introduction  of  profit 
based  methods  and  (Oyelere  and  Emmanuel,  1998)  did  not  focus  on  comparables. 
Empirical  US  evidence  was  monitored  under  different  tax  systems  than  the  UK  and 
was  subject  to  substantial  changes  i.  e.  1986  IRS  Tax  Changes.  Through  the  use  of 
UK  data,  this  research  increases  the  understanding  of  the  degree  of  discretion  that  can 
be  provided  under  different  regulations  and  the  extent  to  which  the  ownership  effect 
on  profit  and  taxes  can  be  detected.  This  study  opens  a  new  avenue  for  ITP  research 
which  stresses  issues  on  whether  comparables  give  wide  discretion  calculation,  and  to 
what  extent  control  is  exercised  over  abuse. 
3 
.4 
Summary  and  Justification  for  Current  Study 
After  reviewing  the  relevant  literature,  it  is  apparent  that  there  is  a  lack  of  non-US 
studies  in  this  area.  The  income  shifting  literature  relates  to  either  tax  regime  change 
(mainly  in  the  US)  or  was  conducted  prior  to  the  introduction  of  comparables.  The 
absence  of  empirical  tests  on  companies  discretion  on  comparables  and  the  limited 
theoretical  bases  justifies  this  research  and  attempts  to  go  beyond  previous  work  in 
testing  whether  current  regulations  allow  MNEs  discretion  in  terms  of  compliance  by 
providing  an  evaluation  of  the  most  recent  OECD  TNMM  and  US  IRS  CPM.  Under 
47 the  new  regulations,  it  can  be  observed  that  all  the  transfer  pricing  methods  and 
documentation  relates  to  comparables.  This  study  compares  the  profitability  of 
foreign-owned  UK  companies  to  UK  companies  and  tests  the  reported  taxes  by 
foreign-owned  and  domestic  companies.  Although  indirect  observation  of  income 
shifting  has  its  limitations,  due  to  data  access  it  is  perhaps  the  only  feasible  approach. 
This  work  is  not  primarily  concerned  with  income  shifting  but  whether  or  not  the  new 
ITP  profit-based  methods  and  comparables,  TNMM  and  CPM,  curb  discretion. 
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ITP  Regulations 4.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  highlights  the  relevance  of  the  ITP  legislation,  provides  a  brief 
background  on  each  of  the  main  players  in  the  ITP  studies,  and  explains  the  main 
features  of  the  1995  OECD  Guidelines,  1998  UK  transfer  pricing  regulations  self 
assessment,  1994US  IRS  section  482  Regulations,  and  1986  Japan  Special  Taxation 
Measures  Law  66-4  (STML).  The  focus  on  mainly  of  ITP  methods,  the  hierarchy  of 
methods  adopted  by  these  regulations,  and  the  differences  between  these  regulatory 
bodies.  This  chapter  represents  an  introduction  to  the  complex  world  of  transfer 
pricing  and  highlights  the  fact  that  different  countries  are  subject  to  different  rules, 
regulations,  and  recommendations  from  their  tax  authorities  and  governments.  This 
chapter  demonstrates  that  the  exercise  of  discretion  may  be  country  oriented  and/or 
facilitated  by  methods  chosen. 
4.2  The  Relevance  of  ITP  Regulations 
Each  time  a  MNE  sets  transfer  prices,  as  it  must  when  members  of  the  group  in 
different  countries  do  business  with  each  other,  the  group  is  determining  the  income 
subject  to  the  income  tax  of  each  country  involved.  A  relatively  small  percentage 
change  in  the  transfer  prices  of  a  large  volume  of  exports  or  imports  can  make  a 
significant  difference  in  a  country's  taxable  income.  As  trade  between  related  parties 
in  different  countries  grows,  the  stakes  become  even  higher.  According  to  previous 
research,  MNEs  have  a  motive  for  setting  their  transfer  prices  in  such  a  way  as  to 
reduce  the  amount  of  income  in  high-tax  countries  and,  concomitantly,  to  increase  the 
amount  of  income  in  low-tax  countries. 
Therefore,  under  the  laws  of  most  countries  including  the  UK,  the  tax  administration 
is  given  the  authority  to  review  and,  if  appropriate,  to  adjust  the  transfer  prices  of  their 
taxpayers  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  income  subject  to  tax,  specifically  in  the 
case  of  transactions  with  related  parties  in  foreign  countries. 
Having  determined  that,  in  order  to  protect  the  income  taxable  income,  the  tax 
administration  needs  the  authority  to  review  and  adjust  transfer  prices  and  determine 
the  standard  to  be  applied.  Throughout  the  world,  the  "arm's  length"  standard  has 
become  the  accepted  benchmark  for  transfer  pricing.  The  arm's  length  standard  is 
mandated  by  OECD  Guidelines  and  reflects  the  international  consensus  on  transfer 
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excluding  Japan  which  has  not  expressly  addressed  the  issue.  Under  the  arm's  length 
principle  the  prices  charged  in  transactions  between  commonly  controlled  parties 
must  be  consistent  with  the  consideration  in,  or  results  of,  similar  transactions 
between  uncontrolled  taxpayers. 
Transfer  pricing  issues  typically  arise  in  two  different  contexts.  According  to  Cole 
(1999),  the  first  scenario  is  transfer  pricing  between  a  taxpayer  in  a  high-tax  country 
and  a  related  party  in  a  low-  (or  no-)  tax  country.  A  country  could  be  low-tax 
generally,  it  may  provide  tax  holidays  (or  partial  tax  holidays)  for  certain  types  of 
activities,  or  the  related  party  may  have  loss  or  other  carryovers  so  that,  for  a  time,  it 
effectively  is  subject  to  a  low  rate  of  taxation.  Such  cases  are  of  particular  concern  to 
tax  authorities  of  high-tax  countries  as  the  MNE  derives  a  benefit  to  the  extent  that  it 
can  allocate  income  away  from  the  high-taxed  taxpayer  to  the  low-taxed  related  party. 
The  second  scenario  includes  circumstances  where  the  related  party  is  also  in  a  high- 
tax  jurisdiction  and  where  the  MNE  as  a  whole  has  not  avoided  taxes  (taking  into 
account  taxes  it  paid  to  all  jurisdictions). 
In  general,  transfer  pricing  rules  have  become  more  strict  and  transfer  pricing 
enforcement  more  intense  over  the  past  two  decades  as  related  party  international 
trade  has  increased,  and  as  more  countries  have  focused  on  the  enormous  amount  of 
tax  revenue  that  is  linked  to  transfer  pricing.  This  trend  toward  expanded  rules  and 
tighter  enforcement  has  been  led  by  the  US  (Cole,  1999). 
Since  the  mid  1980s,  the  US  has  been  the  prime  instigator  of  the  introduction  of  more 
onerous  and  punitive  transfer  pricing  rules  and  regulations,  culminating  in  Section 
482  final  regulations  released  July  1994.  At  the  same  time  the  OECD  revised  its  own 
draft  guidelines.  Since  then  the  OECD  and  the  US  have  been  refining  their  guidelines 
and  regulations,  respectively,  and  many  fiscal  authorities  around  the  world  have 
responded  by  introducing  their  own  transfer  pricing  rules  and  regulations.  Deloitte 
Touche  Tohmatsu  (1999)  summarized  the  current  transfer  pricing  positions  in  selected 
countries  as  of  1  January  1999.  (See  Table  4-1) 
51 Table  4-1:  Transfer  pricing  issues  in  selected  countries  (extract  from  Deloitte  Touche 
Tohmatsu  (1999)) 
OECD  Japaii  UK  USA 
Tax  authority  Not  applicable  National  Tax  Inland  Revenue  Internal  Revenue 
Administration  Service 
Regulations,  Transfer  pricing  STML-  Sch  28AA,  Taxes  Act  Reg  sl.  482s,  1994 
Rulings  Guidelines  for  Enforcement  of  1998  Reg  sl.  6662-6# 
Guidelines  Multinational  order  39-12 
Enterprises  and  tax  STML-  Circular 
Administrations  66-4-1  -  66-4-9 
Documentation  Pricing  decision  No  statutory  Taxpayers  should  Must  include 
requirement  should  be  requirements,  but  keep  records  needed  certain  principal 
documented  in  strongly  to  deliver  a  correct  documents,  as  well 
accordance  with  recommended  for  and  complete  return  in  as  supporting 
prudent  business  audit  defense  no  practice,  burden  documents 
practices  reasonable  contemporaneous  shifting  to  taxpayer  to  contemporaneous 
for  tax  authorities  to  obligation  demonstrate  documentation 
expect  taxpayers  to  reasonable  transfer  required 
prepare  and  pricing  certain 
maintain  such  documents  are 
material  no  required  to  be 
contemporaneous  prepared  and  retained 
obligation  contemporaneous 
documentation  is 
expected 
Tax  return  Should  be  limited  to  Schedule  16-4:  No  separate  Forms  5471  and 
disclosure  information  Detailed  statement  disclosure  required  5472  require 
sufficient  to  allow  concerning  (i.  e.  on  signing  tax  disclosure  of 
tax  administration  to  foreign  affiliated  return  taxpayer  will  detailed 
determine  which  persons  be  implicitly  information  on 
taxpayers  need  confirming  controlled 
further  examination  compliance  with  transactions  with 
arm's  length  foreign  entities 
principle) 
Table  4-1  gives  selected  extracts  for  the  OECD,  Japan,  UK  and  US.  The  first  two 
rows  present  the  tax  authority  and  the  regulations,  rulings  and  guidelines  which  are 
applicable  in  each  country.  The  third  row  demonstrates  how  onerous  documentation 
requirements  have  become  globally  and  the  importance  of  MNEs'  ability  to  support 
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presents  the  variety  of  requirements  concerning  the  transfer  pricing  information  which 
should  be  disclosed  on  the  tax  return.  In  relation  to  disclosure,  the  UK  is  the  least 
onerous,  but  there  is  a  presumption  that  all  transactions  are  at  an  arms'  length  and  can 
be  supported  (Elliott  and  Emmanuel,  2000).  For  accounting  periods  ending  on  or 
after  1  July  1999,  transfer  pricing  falls  within  the  corporate  tax  self-assessment 
system.  This  means  that  taxpayers  are  required  to:  ensure  their  computation  of  taxable 
profits  reflects  arm's  length  prices;  justify  the  transfer  pricing  policy;  and,  maintain 
sufficient  and  appropriate  contemporaneous  documentation.  In  addition,  penalties 
might  apply  to  certain  tax  adjustments  based  on  non-arm's  length  pricing  for  selected 
countries  (See  Table  4-2). 
Table  4-2:  Penalties  on  Transfer  Pricing  Assessment  (Deloitte  &  Touche  strategy 
matrix  for  Global  Transfer  Pricing  (as  of  June  2000) 
Penalty  Size  o  fTenalty  Comments 
OECD  10-200%  Notes  that  civil  monetary  penalties  are  frequently 
calculated  as  a  percentage  of  the  tax  understatement 
Japan  10-40%  +  14.6  p.  a.  Ordinary  penalties  of  10-40%  of  additional  tax  plus 
delinquency  tax  of  14.6%  per  annum 
UK  Up  to  100%  Up  to  100%  of  unpaid  tax.  No  penalty  if  taxpayer  has 
made  an  "honest  and  reasonable"  attempt  to  comply 
USA  20%  or  40%  20%  or  40%  of  additional  tax  for  adjustments 
exceeding  objective  thresholds 
4.2.1  Legislation  to  Minimize  Tax  Avoidance  Practices 
Tax  authorities  remain  aware  of  the  incentive  for  transfer  pricing  manipulations  by 
MNEs.  Transfer  pricing  provisions  were  first  introduced  at  the  time  of  World  War  I 
(Pagan  and  Wilkie,  1993)  in  an  attempt  to  counteract  them.  With  war  resulting  in 
higher  levels  of  taxation,  there  was  the  need  to  discourage  tax  avoidance  by  overseas 
associates  who  desired  to  keep  their  profits  away  from  tax  authorities  in  high-tax 
nations.  The  UK's  1915  pioneering  start  in  this  direction  was  closely  followed  by  the 
US  in  1917.  Minimal  activity  however  took  place  on  the  transfer  pricing  front 
between  1915  and  the  mid-1960s.  Transfer  pricing  only  became  an  issue  of  much 
general  concern  in  the  mid-1960s  when  international  trade  and  investment  began  to 
reach  new  levels.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  international  businesses  made  no  use  of 
53 transfer  pricing  to  transfer  profits  abroad.  Despite  the  broad  powers  which  many 
countries  gave  their  tax  authorities  in  the  1920s  and  1930s,  transfer  prices  were 
manipulated  to  shuffle  profits  internationally  (probably  to  avoid  what  was  considered 
unfair  or  double  taxation)  with  British  firms  having  subsidiaries  in  the  US  claiming, 
when  pressing  the  government  for  a  tax  treaty  in  1944  that  high  US  taxes  on 
dividends  have  forced  them  to  repatriate  profits  by  "unsatisfactory  expedients  such  as 
invoicing  goods  at  higher  prices"  (PRO  file  F0371/38588  reported  in  Picciotto,  1992; 
p.  770). 
4.2.2  Background  -  OECD 
The  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD),  was  founded 
in  1960.  Its  current  members  include  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Korea,  Japan,  Luxembourg, 
Mexico,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Turkey,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.  The  OECD  is 
governed  by  a  Council  comprised  of  member  representatives  with  its  work  mostly 
accomplished  by  committees  of  member  country  representatives,  the  OECD's  "main 
tax  policy  body"  the  Committee  on  Fiscal  Affairs  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Preface, 
para.  10).  Technically,  the  OECD  Transfer  Pricing  Guidelines  are  a  report  of  the 
Committee  on  Fiscal  Affairs  that  has  been  approved  for  publication  by  the  Council. 
The  present  Guidelines  are  a  successor  to  a  1979  report  of  the  Committee  on  Fiscal 
Affairs  entitled  "Transfer  Pricing  and  Multinational  Enterprises.  "  Between  the 
publication  of  the  1979  report  and  the  publication  of  the  present  Guidelines,  the 
Committee  issued  three  other  reports  that  addressed  transfer  pricing  issues:  a  1984 
report  entitled  "Transfer  Pricing  and  Multinational  Enterprises-Three  Taxation 
Issues,  "  a  1987  report  entitled  "Thin  Capitalization,  "  and  a  1993  report  on  the  then- 
proposed  U.  S.  transfer  pricing  regulations  entitled  "Tax  Aspects  of  Transfer  Pricing 
within  Multinational  Enterprises:  The  United  States  Proposed  Regulations.  " 
According  to  the  Committee  on  Fiscal  Affairs,  the  current  Guidelines  are  "intended  to 
be  a  revision  and  compilation"  of  the  1979,1984,  and  1987  reports,  which  "also  draw 
upon"  the  1993  report  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Preface,  paras.  13-14). 
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In  the  UK,  Inland  Revenue  (IR)  is  less  specific  as  to  the  acceptable  methods  for  arm's 
length  pricing  although  a  provision  to  tax  a  foreign  parent  on  the  basis  of  percentage 
of  the  turnover  of  the  business  undertaken  by  its  UK  subsidiary.  S.  485  of  the  Taxes 
Management  Act,  1970  (now  S.  770  of  the  Income  and  Corporate  Taxes  Act  1988) 
empowers  the  Board  of  Inland  Revenue  to  adjust  the  taxable  income  of  a  UK  resident 
involved  in  artificial  pricing  to  a  figure  that  would  have  resulted  if  the  parties  to  the 
transaction  had  been  unrelated.  The  legislation  was  drafted  to  cover  a  wide  range  of 
transactions,  both  tangible  and  intangible,  including  lettings  and  hiring  of  property, 
grants  and  transfers  of  rights,  interests  or  licenses  and  the  giving  of  business  facilities 
of  whatever  kind  [S.  773(4)]. 
Once  in  a  while,  IR  issues  guidance  notes  stating  its  interpretation  of  transfer  pricing 
rules.  One  of  these,  The  Transfer  Pricing  of  Multinational  Enterprises:  Notes  by  the 
UK  Inland  Revenue,  issued  in  a  press  release  in  January  1981,  provides  guidance  on 
the  IR's  interpretation  of  UK's  TP  legislation.  Another  note,  Transfer  Pricing  New 
OECD  Report:  Guidance  on  Revenue  Procedures,  issued  as  IR  Tax  Bulletin  Issue  No. 
25  in  October  1996,  reflects  IR's  position  on  OECD  (1995).  IR  upheld  the  arm's 
length  principle  as  laid  down  in  the  (OECD)  Guidelines  and  stated  that  their 
application  of  domestic  legislation  will  be  guided  by  the  Guidelines. 
In  October  1997,  IR  issued  a  consultative  document,  Modernization  of  the  TP 
Legislation,  which  serves  as  a  basis  for  revamping  UK's  cumbersome  transfer  pricing 
legislation.  The  document,  which  includes  draft  rules  applied  from  1999,  was 
necessitated  by  the  need  to  reform  the  system  to  fit  into  the  new  self-assessment 
regime  operating  for  UK  taxpayers  and  the  increased  level  of  cross-border  intra-group 
trading  by  MNEs  (Rolfe,  1997).  In  1998  Finance  Act  introduced  a  comprehensive 
modernization  of  the  United  Kingdom's  transfer  pricing  legislation.  These  changes 
were  part  of  a  wider  reform  of  the  Corporation  Tax  regime,  which  included  the 
introduction  of  self-assessment  for  companies.  For  accounting  periods  ending  on  or 
after  July  1,1999,  and  years  of  assessment  1999/2000  et  seq.,  sections  770  to  773  of 
the  Income  and  Corporation  Taxes  Act  (ICTA)  1988  have  been  replaced  by  sections 
108-111  and  Schedule  16FA  98.  The  full  text  of  the  basic  rule  now  appears  as 
Schedule  28AA  ICTA  1988. 
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of  the  OECD  Model  Tax  Convention  directly  into  UK  statutory  rules.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  UK  transfer  pricing  law  enforcement,  penalties  of  up  to  100% 
became  imposable  on  adjustments  for  transfer  pricing  errors  caused  by  fraud  or 
neglect.  Due  to  the  continued  importance  of  this  regulation,  more  analysis  of  the 
effect  of  the  new  UK  transfer  pricing  legislation  will  be  provided  in  Chapters  6  and  7. 
4.2.4  Background  -  United  States 
The  US  IRS'  principal  weapon  up  to  1990  had  been  S.  482  of  the  Internal  Revenue 
Code  which  is  the  same  as  the  old  S.  45  of  the  Revenue  Act  of  1928.  Approved  in 
1968,  it  provided  the  basis  for  the  US  IRS's  monitoring  of  transfer  prices  for  two 
decades  without  substantial  changes.  It  authorized  the  IRS  to  "distribute,  apportion,  or 
allocate  gross  income,  deductions,  credits  or  allowances  between  or  among 
organizations,  trades,  businesses"  in  any  case  involving  two  or  more  organizations, 
trades  or  businesses  owned  or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  same  interests  if 
the  service  determines  that  such  distribution,  apportionment  or  allocation  is  necessary 
to: 
a.  clearly  reflect  the  income  of  any  of  the  organizations,  trades  or  businesses; 
and, 
b.  prevent  the  evasion  of  taxes. 
Section  S.  482  required  the  transfer  price  to  be  at  an  arm's  length  price  and  which 
unrelated  parties  would  charge  and  accept  in  the  transaction.  It  is  specified  for  each  of 
five  major  categories  of  transaction  that  the  primary  test  would  be  the  comparable 
uncontrolled  price  (CUP),  the  amount  that  was  charged  or  would  have  been  charged 
in  an  independent  transaction  with  or  between  unrelated  parties  dealing  at  arm's 
length.  This  was  considered  to  be  the  arm's  length  pricing  principle  which  was  first 
promulgated  for  the  valuation  of  inter  company  transactions  by  the  Treasury 
Department  in  1934.  The  relative  insignificance  of  MNE  intra  corporate  trade 
however  made  the  section  and  its  requirements  almost  redundant  at  that  time. 
Attempts  were  made  by  different  countries  in  the  early  1950s  to  early  1970s  to  attack 
the  aggressive  use  of  tax  havens  by  domestic  corporations  through  the  introduction  of 
the  controlled  foreign  corporation  (CFC)  provision,  an  anti-avoidance  legislation  that 
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US  authorities,  fully  aware  that  the  arm's  length  principle  needed  to  be  internationally 
agreed  to  substantially  increase  its  level  of  potency,  was  actively  involved  in 
international  meetings  of  professional  bodies  and  intergovernmental  organizations 
(Picciotto,  1992).  This,  among  other  factors,  probably  accounted  for  the  continued 
popularity  of  the  arm's  length  principle  with  international  attempts  at  regulating 
transfer  pricing  along  with  the  difficulty  encountered  in  attempts  to  enforce  the 
principle. 
The  1980s  saw  a  strong  push  by  the  US  to  reform  and  upgrade  TP  regulations.  The 
period  1986  to  1996  witnessed  eleven  years  of  additional  provisions,  commencing 
with  the  broadening  of  the  legal  provision,  followed  by  the  upgrading  of  compliance 
requirements,  penalties  for  under-filing,  interest  deduction  restrictions,  issuance  of 
new  temporary  regulations  involving  complex  methodology,  and  ending  with  the 
enactment  of  final  regulations  released  July  1994. 
4.2.5  Background  -  Japan 
Japan's  transfer  pricing  environment  has  been  shaped  by  its  historical,  political,  and 
cultural  influences.  This  can  be  seen  in  the  tax  authorities'  often  apparent  desire  to 
retain  in  Japan  the  profits  of  foreign  affiliated  Japanese  corporations  operating  in  the 
heavily  regulated  Japanese  economy.  The  following  provides  a  comprehensive 
overview  of  the  historical,  legislative,  and  practical  aspects  of  Japan's  transfer  pricing 
environment. 
When  comparing  Japanese  tax  practices  with  those  of  other  jurisdictions,  it  is 
important  to  note  that  notwithstanding  the  volume  and  entirety  of  the  Japanese  tax 
regulations,  and  administrative  guidance,  there  still  remains  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty 
as  to  the  precise  manner  of  its  application.  Accordingly,  Japanese  tax  authorities  have 
considerably  more  discretion  in  the  imposition  and  collection  of  taxes  than  their  peers 
in  other  major  industrialized  nations  (notably  the  United  States)  where  the  laws  and 
regulations  are  more  precisely  laid  out  as  to  provide  greater  certainty  for  both  the 
taxpayer  and  the  enforcing  tax  administration.  Therefore  in  recognition  of  the 
generally  vague  nature  of  Japanese  legislation,  within  the  Japanese  tax  environment, 
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regulations  is  paramount  (Feinschriber,  2000). 
The  corporate  tax  system  is  essentially  a  self-assessment  system.  Taxable  income  is 
based  on  the  accounting  profits  of  the  company,  with  net  profit  before  tax  adjusted  for 
items  that  are  not  tax  deductible  and  for  items  such  as  special  allowances  and  tax 
losses  brought  forward.  The  tax  year  is  the  corporation's  annual  accounting  period  and 
can  be  a  calendar  year  or  a  fiscal  year,  but  cannot  exceed  12  months  (Kato  et  al, 
1994). 
4.3  OECD 
4.3.1  Introduction 
The  OECD  has  recommended  to  its  member  countries  that  their  tax  administrations 
follow  the  guidance  contained  in  the  OECD's  "Transfer  Pricing  Guidelines  for 
Multinational  Enterprises  and  National  Tax  Administrations"  set  forth  in  1995. 
Similar  to  US  transfer  pricing  regulations,  the  OECD  Guidelines  adhere  to  the  arm's- 
length  standard  and  recommend  the  use  of  uncontrolled  comparable  transactions  and 
specific  transfer  pricing  methods  to  determine  a  range  of  arm's  length  prices  for  a 
controlled  cross-border  transaction.  While  OECD  Guidelines  acknowledge  that 
taxpayers  should  base  their  controlled  transfer  prices  on  a  sound  analysis  and  should 
document  the  basis  on  which  such  prices  are  set,  the  amount  of  effort  called  for  by 
OECD  Guidelines  is  markedly  less  than  what  US  regulations  would  require  to  avoid  a 
tax  penalty  on  a  large  transfer  pricing  adjustment  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
Most  OECD  member  countries,  including  major  international  traders  such  as  the 
United  Kingdom,  have  never  issued  detailed  transfer  pricing  regulations.  In  those 
countries,  the  Guidelines  may  serve  as  the  local  transfer  pricing  regulations.  Even 
when  a  member  country  has  issued  detailed  regulations,  the  Guidelines  will  serve  as 
the  common  point  of  reference  for  negotiations  with  the  competent  authorities  of  tax 
treaty  partners  over  the  proper  allocation  of  taxable  income  from  cross-border 
transactions  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
4.3.2  Arm's  Length  Principle 
A  principal  purpose  of  the  Guidelines  is  to  endorse  continued  application  of  the  arm's- 
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should  be  adjusted  by  national  tax  administrations.  According  to  the  Guidelines,  the 
arm's-length  standard  permits  adjustments  only  insofar  as  the  conditions  that  obtain 
between  associated  enterprises  differ  from  those  that  would  have  obtained  "between 
independent  enterprises  in  comparable  transactions  and  comparable  circumstances" 
(OECD,  1995,  Chap  1,  para.  1.6).  The  Guidelines  cite  Article  9  of  the  OECD  Model 
Tax  Convention  as  authority  for  this  principle  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.6). 
The  Guidelines  identify  certain  administrative  practices  as  departures  from  the  arm's- 
length  principle  and  recommend  against  their  use.  A  comparison  of  controlled  and 
uncontrolled  transactions  requires  a  consideration  of  all  of  the  differences  that  might 
have  affected  the  price  charged  in  the  uncontrolled  transactions.  Accordingly,  the  use 
of  "unadjusted  industry  averages"  to  adjust  the  results  of  controlled  transactions  is 
expressly  criticized  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.16).  Restructuring  a 
transaction  into  something  other  than  what  the  associated  enterprises  actually 
undertook  is  described  as  an  arbitrary  and  inequitable  exercise  unless  either  of  two 
situations  apply:  (1)  the  substance  of  the  transaction  varies  from  its  form  or,  (2)  the 
form  varies  so  far  from  what  uncontrolled  enterprises  would  have  undertaken  that  it 
impedes  the  determination  of  an  arm's-length  price  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  1, 
para.  1.37). 
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3.3  Comparability  (OECD  &  US  IRS) 
The  Guidelines  hold  that  the  results  of  uncontrolled  transactions  can  serve  as  a  useful 
benchmark  for  adjusting  the  results  of  controlled  transactions  only  if  the 
"economically  relevant  characteristics"  of  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions 
are  "comparable"  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.15).  For  this  purpose,  transactions 
are  considered  to  be  comparable  only  if.  (1)  any  differences  would  have  no  material 
effect  on  the  results  or  (2)  any  material  effect  can  be  eliminated  by  adjustments 
(OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.15). 
The  attributes  of  a  transaction  that  may  affect  comparability  are  as  follows: 
"  The  specific  characteristics  of  the  product  or  service  being  sold; 
The  functions  performed  by  the  parties; 
59 "  Any  contractual  terms; 
"  The  economic  circumstances  of  the  parties;  and, 
"  The  business  strategies  of  the  parties.  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.17) 
These  attributes  are  essentially  the  same  as  the  factors  identified  by  US  transfer 
pricing  regulations  as  relevant  to  comparability.  One  purely  formal  distinction 
between  the  Guidelines  and  US  IRS  regulations  is  that  US  regulations  treat  the  risks 
assumed  by  the  parties  as  a  separate  factor,  while  the  Guidelines  treat  risk  as  part  of 
the  functional  analysis  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.23). 
As  to  contractual  terms,  the  Guidelines  reflect  US  regulations  in  cautioning  that 
substance  may  vary  from  form  in  a  controlled  transaction  and  that  the  national  tax 
administration  should  analyze  comparability  based  upon  the  true  terms  of  the 
transaction  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.29).  Among  the  relevant  "economic 
circumstances"  listed  in  the  Guidelines  are  the  levels  (wholesale  vs.  retail)  and 
geographic  location  of  the  markets  in  which  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled 
transactions  take  place  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.30),  factors  also  emphasized  in 
the  U.  S.  regulations.  Among  the  relevant  "business  strategies"  listed  in  the  Guidelines 
are  "market  penetration  schemes,  "  whereby  a  taxpayer  may  charge  lower  prices  than 
uncontrolled  enterprises  in  order  to  enter  or  expand  into  a  new  market  (OECD,  1995, 
Chap,  I,  para.  1.32).  Similar  to  US  transfer  pricing  regulations,  the  Guidelines  affirm 
that  lower  prices  do  not  warrant  an  adjustment  if  the  market  penetration  strategy  is 
plausible  and  reasonably  limited  in  time  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.35). 
4.3.4  Arm's  Len  h  Range  (OECD  &  US  IRS) 
The  Guidelines  specify  that  a  range  of  prices  or  profit  results  may  qualify  as  arm's 
length.  It  also  observes  that  a  range  may  be  particularly  appropriate  when  the 
transactional  net  margin  method  is  applied.  Substantial  deviations  within  the  range 
may  reflect  variations  in  the  reliability  of  data  supporting  the  various  points  within  the 
range.  By  contrast,  US  regulations  suggest  that  such  deviations  may  reflect  a  lack  of 
complete  comparability.  The  Guidelines  do  not  follow  the  US  approach  of  adjusting 
for  suspiciously  wide  ranges  by  applying  statistical  methods  such  as  the  inter-quartile 
range  which  consists  of  the  results  for  which  there  is  a  75  percent  probability  of  a 
result  falling  below  the  upper  end  of  the  range  and  a  75  percent  probability  of  a  result 
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Moreover,  while  US  regulations  provide  that  controlled  transactions  that  fall  without 
the  arm's-length  range  will  ordinarily  be  adjusted  to  the  midpoint  of  the  range,  the 
Guidelines  simply  note  that  there  are  arguments  both  for  adjusting  to  the  midpoint  and 
for  adjusting  to  the  nearest  end  point  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  paras.  1.45-1.48). 
Adjusting  the  arm's  length  range  is  one  of  the  major  differences  between  the  OECD 
and  the  US  IRS.  This  research  tests  the  adjustment  of  the  range  on  the  applications  of 
TNMM  and  CPM.  According  to  previous  research,  a  wide  range  exists  even  after 
applying  statistical  methods  such  as  the  inter-quartile  range.  Horst  (Cole  et  al,  1999) 
investigated  return  on  assets  of  US  independent  wholesalers.  Horst  found  that  the  25th 
percentile  average  for  the  return  on  assets  was  2.6%,  while  the  75th  percentile  was 
15.4%.  Thus,  the  inter-quartile  range  between  2.6%  and  15.4%. 
4.3.5  Transfer  Pricing  Methods 
Priority  of  Methods 
OECD  Guidelines  recognize  five  transfer  pricing  methods  as  potentially  consistent 
with  the  arm's-length  principle:  the  CUP  method,  the  resale  price  method,  the  cost 
plus  method,  the  profit  split  method,  and  the  transactional  net  margin  method.  The 
traditional  transaction  methods  are  the  three  methods  that  were  specifically  endorsed 
in  the  1968  US  transfer  pricing  regulations.  Under  those  regulations,  other  methods 
were  to  be  applied  only  if  the  traditional  methods  could  not  be  used.  This  priority  of 
methods  was  abandoned  in  current  US  regulations,  but  it  is  preserved  in  the 
Guidelines,  which  describe  the  profit  split  and  transactional  net  margin  method  as 
methods  "of  last  resort"  to  be  applied  only  when  the  complexities  of  real  life  business 
situations  place  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  application  of  the  traditional 
transaction  methods  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  II,  para.  2.49;  Chap.  III,  3.1). 
The  introduction  of  the  profit  based  methods  in  the  US  was  mainly  due  to  the  increase 
of  the  number  of  transactions  among  the  national  affiliates  of  a  multinational 
company  typically  involve  unique  products  or  occur  at  different  levels  of  the  market 
from  arm's  length  transactions,  taxpayers  or  tax  administrators  could  not  identify  or 
obtain  pertinent  information  about  comparable  uncontrolled  transactions  and  so  could 
not  apply  anyone  of  the  three  traditional  specified  methods.  By  default,  "fourth" 
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what  specific  methods  were  or  were  not  appropriate  (Cole,  1999). 
This  significant  deficiency  in  the  1968  Regulations  would  likely  have  continued 
indefinitely  were  it  not  for  the  amendment  of  Section  482  in  1986  to  require  that  for 
transfers  of  intangible  assets,  the  royalty  or  other  consideration  received  by  the  owner 
of  the  intangible  should  be  commensurate  with  the  income  attributable  to  the 
intangible.  In  the  1988  White  Paper  on  Transfer  Pricing  (A  Study  of  Inter-company 
Pricing  Under  Section  482  of  the  Code,  IRS  Notice  88.123,1988-2  C.  B.  458),  the  US 
Treasury  Department  and  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  concluded  that  in  cases  where 
no  comparable  uncontrolled  transaction  could  be  identified  and  the  licensee  had  not 
itself  developed  or  otherwise  acquired  valuable,  non-routine  intangibles,  the 
commensurate  with  income  royalty  should  be  computed  by  allowing  the  licensee  to 
earn  a  "basic  arm's  length  return"  (the  BALR  method).  Under  the  BALR  method; 
"the  royalty  would  soak  up  any  excess  profits  of  the  licensee,  so  the  licensee's 
rate  of  profit  would  be  comparable  to  the  profits  of  comparable  independent 
companies  that  owned  only  routine  intangibles"  (Cole,  1999,  Pg.  9-3). 
In  January  1992,  the  US  Treasury  Department  and  the  IRS  proposed  Regulations 
(1992  Proposed  Regulations)  that  included  what  has  come  to  be  called  the  comparable 
profits  method  (CPM).  Confronted  by  a  firestorm  of  criticism  by  foreign  governments 
and  U.  S.  taxpayers  (including  foreign-based  multinational  corporations)  of  the 
constructive  profit  interval  as  formulated  in  the  1992  Proposed  Regulations,  the  US 
Treasury  Department  and  the  IRS  scaled  back  the  application  of  CPM  in  the 
Temporary  Regulations  promulgated  in  January  1993  (1993  Temporary  Regulations) 
and  further  still  in  the  final  Regulations  promulgated  in  July  1994  Regulations  (Cole, 
1999). 
4.3.5.1  Comparable  Uncontrolled  Price  Method 
The  CUP  method  compares  the  price  charged  for  controlled  transfers  to  the  price 
charged  for  comparable  uncontrolled  transfers.  When  comparable  uncontrolled 
transactions  can  be  identified,  it  is  considered  "preferable  over  all  other  methods"  and 
can  be  applied  to  tangible  property,  intangible  property,  and  services  (1995  OECD 
Guidelines,  Chap.  II,  paras.  2.6,2.7,2.11,  Chap.  VI,  para.  6.23,  Chap.  VII,  para. 
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property.  The  regulations  provide  an  analogous  method  for  transfers  of  intangible 
property  called  the  comparable  uncontrolled  transaction  (CUT)  method.  US 
regulations  presently  contain  nothing  analogous  to  the  CUP  method  for  services. 
4.3.5.2  Resale  Price  Method 
The  resale  price  method  determines  an  arm's  length  price  for  an  enterprise's  controlled 
purchases  of  property  by  subtracting  from  the  uncontrolled  resale  price  an  appropriate 
gross  margin  (the  "resale  price  margin").  The  appropriate  resale  price  margin  can  be 
determined  from  uncontrolled  purchases  and  resales  by  the  enterprise  or  from 
uncontrolled  purchases  and  resales  by  independent  enterprises.  The  OECD  Guidelines 
note  that  the  activities  of  a  reseller  may  range  from  a  mere  forwarding  function  to  full 
ownership  of  the  inventory  and  full  responsibility  for  a  variety  of  connected  services 
such  as  advertising  and  guaranteeing  the  products,  and  that  the  level  of  activity  will 
influence  the  size  of  the  appropriate  margin  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  II,  paras. 
2.14,2.15,2.24). 
The  resale  price  method  tolerates  larger  differences  between  the  products  sold  in 
controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions  than  does  the  CUP  method,  and  greater 
weight  may  be  given  to  functional  comparability.  The  method  may  be  difficult  to 
apply  when  the  reseller  adds  substantially  to  the  value  of  the  product.  The  1995 
OECD  Guidelines  contemplate  using  the  resale  price  method  for  both  tangible  and 
intangible  property,  the  latter  when  the  property  is  sublicensed  to  third  parties  (1995 
Guidelines,  Chap.  VI,  paras.  2.19,2.22,6.23).  By  contrast,  US  regulations 
contemplate  its  use  only  for  tangible  property. 
4.3.5.3  Cost  Plus  Method 
The  cost  plus  method  determines  the  arm's-length  price  for  a  controlled  sale  by  adding 
an  appropriate  markup  to  the  costs  incurred  by  the  seller.  The  appropriate  markup  is 
ideally  determined  from  uncontrolled  sales  by  the  enterprise,  but  markups  realized  by 
independent  suppliers  can  also  be  used.  As  with  the  resale  price  method,  product 
comparability  is  generally  less  critical  than  functional  comparability  (1995  OECD 
Guidelines,  Chap.  II,  para.  2.32-2.34).  While  the  US  regulations  limit  the  cost  plus 
method  to  sales  of  tangible  property,  the  Guidelines  also  contemplate  its  use  for  the 
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aversion  of  the  Guidelines  to  the  use  of  net  profits  methods,  adjustments  in  expenses 
are  allowed  if  they  reflect  functional  differences,  but  not  if  they  reflect  only  different 
efficiency  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  II,  para.  2.38). 
4.3.5.4  Profit  Split  Method 
The  profit  split  method  determines  the  division  of  profits  from  controlled  transactions 
in  accordance  with  how  profits  would  have  been  divided  between  independent 
enterprises  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  III,  para.  3.5).  What  the  Guidelines  refer 
to  as  "contributions  analysis"  allocates  profit  in  accordance  with  the  relative  value  of 
the  functions  performed  by  the  parties.  What  the  Guidelines  refer  to  as  "residual 
analysis"  first  assigns  a  basic  market  return  to  each  party  and  then  divides  the  residual 
profits,  presumably  attributable  to  unique  and  valuable  assets  based  upon  an  analysis 
of  the  facts  and  circumstances  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  III,  paras.  3.17,3.19). 
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3.5.5  Transactional  Net  Margin  Method 
The  transactional  net  margin  method  compares  the  net  profit  margins  from  controlled 
and  uncontrolled  transactions  relative  to  an  appropriate  base  such  as  sales,  costs,  or 
assets.  Similar  to  the  cost  plus  method,  it  is  ideally  applied  to  controlled  and 
uncontrolled  transactions  of  the  tested  enterprise  but  can  also  be  applied  using  the 
margins  on  comparable  transactions  of  an  independent  enterprise.  More  detail  is 
provided  on  TNMM  in  the  following  chapter. 
43.6  Documentation  (OECD  &  US  IRS) 
Chapter  V  of  the  OECD  Guidelines  is  devoted  entirely  to  the  subject  of 
documentation  and  advocates  an  approach  that  sharply  contrasts  with  US 
requirements  in  several  particulars.  The  Guidelines  hold  that  taxpayers  should  price 
controlled  transactions  in  accordance  with  the  arm's-length  principle  and  should 
document  their  efforts  in  case  the  prices  are  examined.  The  Guidelines  note  that  the 
documentation  obligations  of  a  taxpayer  will  depend  in  part  upon  where  the  burden  of 
proof  rests  under  domestic  tax  law,  but  conclude  that  even  where  the  burden  rests 
upon  the  tax  administration,  the  taxpayer  may  be  obligated  to  produce  sufficient 
documentation  to  permit  an  examination  of  the  taxpayer's  transfer  prices  (OECD, 
1995,  paras.  5.2-5.4). 
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available  only  after  the  controlled  transaction  took  place  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  V, 
para.  5.8).  A  premise  of  the  documentation  recommendations  of  the  Guidelines  is  that 
taxpayers  are  not  expected  to  take  account  of  information  that  becomes  available  only 
after  a  controlled  transaction  has  occurred  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  V,  paras.  5.3,5.28). 
In  relation  to  the  disclosure,  the  Guidelines  recommend  against  requiring  production 
of  transfer  pricing  documents  when  the  return  is  filed  beyond  the  minimum  necessary 
to  identify  taxpayers  needing  examination  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  V,  para.  5.11).  An 
example  of  this  would  be  a  requirement  to  disclose  on  the  return  which  transfer 
pricing  methods  were  used  by  the  taxpayer. 
4.4  United  Kingdom 
4.4.1  Introduction 
There  has  been  transfer  pricing  provisions  in  the  UK  tax  code  for  more  than  50  years. 
Transfer  pricing  changes  were  overhauled  in  1998,  as  the  1998  Finance  Act 
introduced  a  comprehensive  modernization  of  the  United  Kingdom's  transfer  pricing 
legislation.  These  changes  were  part  of  a  wider  reform  of  the  Corporation  Tax  regime, 
which  included  the  introduction  of  self-assessment  for  companies. 
For  accounting  periods  ending  on  or  after  July  1,1999,  and  years  of  assessment 
1999/2000  et  seq.,  sections  770  to  773  of  the  Income  and  Corporation  Taxes  Act 
(ICTA)  1988  have  been  replaced  by  sections  108-111  and  Schedule  16  FA  98.  The 
full  text  of  the  basic  rule  now  appears  as  Schedule  28AA  ICTA  1988. 
The  introduction  of  the  1998  legislation  began  with  the  publication  of  a  Consultative 
Document  on  9  October  1997  in  which  the  UK  government  unveiled  its  plans  to 
update  the  laws  on  transfer  pricing.  The  consultation  was  largely  limited  to  peripheral 
matters  and  the  main  body  of  the  proposed  legislation  went  unchanged  into  Schedule 
28AA  ICTA  1988.  The  alignment  with  Corporation  Tax  Self-Assessment  (CTSA) 
was  cited  as  the  impetus  behind  the  changes,  but  the  1998  legislation  was  clearly 
designed  to  protect  the  tax  base  from  further  erosion  in  an  environment  where  other 
fiscal  authorities  were  aggressively  policing  compliance  with  their  own  domestic 
transfer  pricing  rules.  The  Inland  Revenue  wished  to  level  the  playing  field  and  to  halt 
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jurisdictions  where  rules  were  tighter  and  aggressively  policed.  Inland  Revenue 
believed  the  changes  in  the  tax  regime  should  not  only  promote  voluntary  compliance 
and  fairness,  but  also  minimize  compliance  costs  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
The  1998  legislation  contains  a  specific  requirement  that  profits  be  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  arm's  length  standard.  Previously,  there  was  no  requirement  to 
adhere  to  the  arm's  length  standard  in  calculating  profits  for  inclusion  in  a  tax  return. 
Instead,  Inland  Revenue  had  the  power  to  replace  transfer  prices.  This  process  was 
burdensome  and  included  the  issuance  of  formal  Directives  by  the  Inland  Revenue 
Board  to  replace  transfer  prices.  The  IR  Board  addressed  transactions  that  had 
resulted  in  the  understatement  of  profits  in  the  United  Kingdom  through  non-arm's 
length  pricing  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
No  penalties  could  ordinarily  be  attached  to  the  tax  on  pricing  increases  made  by  the 
Inland  Revenue  since  there  was  no  statutory  requirement  to  return  profits  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  arm's  length  standard.  The  transfer  pricing  regime  remained 
totally  reactive  for  50  years.  Everything  has  changed  for  accounting  periods  ending 
on  or  after  1  July  1999,  for  which  Schedule  28AA  ICTA  1988  is  now  in  effect. 
4.4.2  Implementing  OECD  Principles 
The  1998  UK  transfer  pricing  rules  are  aligned  with  the  OECD  Transfer  Pricing 
Guidelines  and  Article  9  ("Associated  Enterprises")  of  the  OECD  Model  Tax 
Convention.  The  new  rules  were  to  be  interpreted  in  such  a  manner  as  best  secures 
consistency  with  the  OECD  Model  and  Guidelines.  This  approach,  of  course, 
effectively  imports  the  interest  and  meanings  of  the  OECD  text  to  the  1998  UK  statute 
(Section  2  Schedule  28AA). 
The  basic  assertion  of  the  arm's  length  principle  is  found  within  Article  9  of  the 
OECD  Model,  the  subject  of  which  is  the  application  of  this  principle.  Article  9  states 
that  adjustments  can  be  made  to  dealings  between  certain  parties  if  one  of  those 
parties  participates  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  management,  control,  or  capital  of  the 
other  party  (or  other  parties  do  so  in  both  companies),  and  the  terms  and  conditions 
between  them  are  not  at  arm's  length.  The  OECD  did  not  define  indirect  control,  but 
66 Inland  Revenue  has  attempted  to  define  indirect  control  in  a  wide  manner  for  the 
purposes  of  the  1998  legislation.  Prior  to  the  new  rules,  Inland  Revenue  had  in  the 
past,  attempted  to  use  Article  9  when  unsuccessful  under  other  articles,  especially 
Article  11,  which  pertains  to  interest.  Inland  Revenue  sought  to  impose  a  UK  tax 
charge  using  Article  9  in  conjunction  with  section  788(3)(c)  TA  1988.  There, 
deficiencies  with  the  old  transfer  pricing  law  have  prevented  adjustment.  Inland 
Revenue  was  only  partially  successful  with  this  approach,  mainly  in  the  context  of 
negotiated  settlements  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
4.4.3  Definitional  Issues 
Schedule  28AA  raises  a  number  of  definitional  issues  pertaining  to  provision, 
transaction,  and  the  like. 
Provision 
The  arm's  length  provision  can  be  applied  where  dealings  are  between  connected 
parties  and  where  the  actual  provision  has  conferred  a  potential  tax  advantage  on  one 
or  both  of  the  persons.  The  provision  may  be  made  or  imposed  by  means  of  a  single 
transaction  or  series  of  transactions.  The  transfer  of  assets,  creation  of  legal 
relationships,  and  the  assumption  of  liabilities  are  all  seemingly  within  the  new  rules, 
as  well  as  mutual  practices  that  are  not  legally  enforceable.  The  wording  of  the 
legislation  may  enable  Inland  Revenue  to  raise  two  arguments: 
1.  That  a  particular  arrangement  is  not  at  arm's  length;  and, 
2.  That  a  series  of  arrangements  of  which  the  arrangement  forms  one  part 
is  not  at  arm's  length  (Section  1  of  Schedule  28AA). 
Returns  must  be  made  on  a  yearly  basis  and  each  must  be  considered  separately. 
Transaction 
Transaction  encompasses  transactions  for  which  no  price  has  been  set  and 
transactions  that  would  not  have  taken  place  between  third  parties.  The  1998  rules 
include  a  series  of  transactions.  Schedule  28AA  includes  transactions  without  cost 
price.  Taxpayers  contended  that  interest-free  loans  were  not  within  the  legislation 
(Paragraph  3  of  Schedule  28AA). 
Inland  Revenue  takes  the  approach  that  it  can  ignore  a  transaction  that,  in  its  opinion, 
would  not  have  taken  place  between  third  parties,  an  approach  prone  to  difficulties 
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simply  hypothesize  a  transaction  that  was  different  in  form  from  the  one  that  had 
taken  place.  Inland  Revenue  was,  instead  restricted  to  assigning  an  arm's  length  price 
to  the  actual  transaction,  however  unusual  the  transaction  may  have  appeared  to  them. 
The  transfer  pricing  provisions  include  a  series  of  transactions  in  which  only  one  of 
the  parties  is  involved,  or  transactions  in  which  neither  party  is  involved.  These 
provisions  would  catch  those  situations  wherein  third  party  funding  is  provided  say  by 
a  bank,  but  is  guaranteed  by  a  connected  party.  The  transfer  pricing  provisions  would 
seem  to  apply  to  those  transactions  that  would  have  been  carried  out  between  the 
parties  but  are  instead  performed  by  others,  perhaps  even  unconnected  parties, 
interposed  in  the  chain  (Paragraphs  3(3)  and  (4)  of  Schedule  28AA). 
4.4.4  Joint  Ventures 
A  potential  major  participant  may  include  joint  venture  participants.  The  UK  tax  law 
widens  the  control  net  such  that  certain  joint  ventures  are  included.  Most  significantly, 
joint  ventures  that  previously  relied  on  a  50-50  split  are  now  within  the  purview  of  the 
tax  law.  Neither  party  in  the  joint  venture  may  exercise  control,  an  arrangement  that 
is  common  in  many  commercial  situations.  Under  the  1998  rules,  any  joint  venture  in 
which  the  parties  each  have  a  minimum  40  percent  of  the  relevant  interests,  rights, 
and  powers  in  or  over  the  joint  venture  will  now  have  to  ensure  that  all  their  dealings 
with  the  joint  venture  are  at  arm's  length.  The  joint  venture  participants  must 
document  the  transactions  as  arm's  length. 
A  party  is  considered  to  have  a  40  percent  interest  in  the  joint  venture  if,  at  any  time 
in  the  future,  the  party  is  entitled  to  acquire  or  become  entitled  to  acquire  sufficient 
rights  or  powers.  The  party  is  considered  to  have  this  interest  if  another  person  can 
exercise  sufficient  rights  or  powers  on  the  parties'  behalf,  under  the  parties'  direction, 
or  for  the  parties'  benefit.  This  transfer  pricing  rule  may  be  of  concern  to  those 
companies  that  have  only  40  percent  interest  in  another  company,  but  have  little 
control  over  the  pricing  policy  laid  down  by  the  major  participant  (Ernst  &  Young, 
2000). 
As  a  part  of  the  investigation  on  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies 
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on  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies.  This  research  used  individually 
matched  Japanese/UK  (Japanese  joint  venture),  US/UK  (US  joint  ventures),  and 
UK/Other  (UK  joint  ventures). 
Due  to  time  and  resource  constraints  which  did  not  permit  investigation  of  individual 
joint  venture  companies'  percentages  of  interest,  this  research  defined  a  foreign- 
owned  joint  venture  as  a  foreign  company  (Japanese-  or  US-owned)  with  at  least  one 
British  company  as  shareholder.  A  joint  venture  UK  company  is  defined  as  a  UK 
company  with  at  least  one  foreign  company  as  shareholder  (excluding  Japanese  or  US 
companies). 
4.4.5  Penalties 
These  transfer  pricing  penalty  provisions  apply  to  the  submission  of  an  incorrect 
return  or  where  there  is  fraudulent  or  negligent  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  person 
making  the  return.  Under  the  1998  rules,  a  person  will  be  considered  to  have  been 
negligent  if  he  or  she  fails  to  consider  whether  the  transfer  pricing  arrangements  are  in 
accordance  with  the  arm's  length  principle.  That  person  must  have  made  a  reasonable 
attempt  to  comply  with  the  condition  and  maintain  appropriate  records  to  demonstrate 
that  they  have  not  been  negligent.  Inland  Revenue  stated  that  they  believe  taxpayers 
will  want  to  document  what  they  do  to  the  extent  necessary  to  enable  them  to  sustain 
the  arm's  length  nature  of  their  arrangements  and  prices  in  any  subsequent  discussions 
with  Inland  Revenue.  Inland  Revenue  further  stated  that  taxpayers  who  act  in 
accordance  with  the  published  guidance  on  documentation  should  not  face  penalties 
on  account  of  fraudulent  or  negligent  conduct.  However,  Inland  Revenue  has 
confirmed  that  detailed  documentation  will  not  in  itself  free  them  from  penalties  if  the 
documentation  does  not  show  that  the  taxpayers  had  good  grounds  for  believing  their 
arrangements  and  pricing  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  arm's  length  principle  (Ernst  & 
Young,  2000). 
The  Inland  Revenue  Board  has  the  power  to  mitigate  the  100  percent  maximum,  and 
the  board  will  have  regard  to  the  size  of  the  business,  gravity  of  the  acts,  disclosure, 
and  cooperation.  Inland  Revenue  has  issued  some  guidance  as  to  the  practical 
application  of  the  mitigation  criteria.  This  guidance  was  centered  almost  entirely  on 
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protection  against  penalties  is  a  transfer  pricing  policy  fully  documented  as  arm's 
length  in  line  with  Inland  Revenue's  published  guidance  (Feinschriber,  2000). 
4.4.6  UK  Documentation 
Documentation  becomes  important  as  penalties  can  reach  up  to  100  percent  where  the 
taxpayer  has  neglected  the  due  consideration  of  a  pricing  policy  such  as  the  arm's 
length  requirement.  Documentation  needs  to  demonstrate  due  process  to  Inland 
Revenue  in  affirming  adherence  with  the  arm's  length  standard.  Inland  Revenue  has 
chosen  to  rely  on  the  issue  of  Guidelines,  which  it  published  in  final  form  in  its 
October  1998  Tax  Bulletin  rather  than  on  prescriptive  rules  and  regulations  on  what  is 
to  be  kept. 
4.5  US  IRS 
4.5.1  Introduction 
The  Treasury  Department  in  the  US  adopted  final  income  tax  regulations  under 
Internal  Revenue  Code  (IRC)  Section  482  on  July  8,1994  which  included  all 
transaction-based  and  profit-based  methods.  In  January  1992,  the  US  Treasury 
Department  and  the  IRS  proposed  Regulations  (1992  Proposed  Regulations)  that 
included  the  comparable  profit  method  and  profit  split  method.  The  US  Treasury 
Department  and  the  IRS  limited  the  application  of  CPM  in  the  Temporary  Regulations 
promulgated  in  January  1993  (1993  Temporary  Regulations)  and  further  still  in  the  fi- 
nal  Regulations  promulgated  in  July  1994  Regulations  (Cole,  1999). 
The  final  regulations  allow  for  substantially  greater  flexibility  in  determining  whether 
an  inter-company  transaction  has  been  conducted  at  an  arm's-length  price.  However, 
that  flexibility  is  achieved  at  a  cost.  Multinational  groups  face  greater  uncertainty 
under  the  final  rules  because  they  must  apply  the  "best  method"  of  the  various  pricing 
methods  which  could  be  applicable.  Taxpayers  must  be  prepared  to  support  transfer 
pricing  policies  with  thoughtful  economic  analysis  based  on  accurate  data  regarding 
the  group's  business.  The  regulations  impose  enhanced  compliance  requirements, 
which  appear  in  the  penalty  provisions  of  regulations  issued  under  Internal  Revenue 
Code  Section  6662(e)  and  (h) (Feinschriber,  2001). 
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Transfer  pricing  in  the  US  focuses  on  pricing  or  net  income  allocations  among 
affiliated  entities,  primarily  corporations  with  very  little  attention  being  paid  to 
branches  or  divisions  from  a  transfer  pricing  perspective.  Transfer  pricing  focuses 
primarily  on  the  legal  ownership  and  control  of  legal  entities,  but  US  transfer  pricing 
provisions  permits  the  IRS  to  examine  contractual  relationships,  corporate 
partnerships,  and  other  relationships.  Nevertheless,  the  US  transfer  pricing  rules  that 
define  related  parties  are  often  narrower  than  the  scope  of  related  parties  as  defined  in 
other  national  jurisdictions.  Transfer  pricing  in  the  United  States  is  perceived  as 
having  two,  often  conflicting  objectives: 
1.  Determining  an  equitable  share  of  the  profits  between  taxing  jurisdictions; 
and, 
2.  Determining  equitable  prices  for  inter-company  transactions  (Feinschriber, 
2000,  pg.  11-2). 
(a)  Comparability  Analysis 
US  transfer  pricing  rules  do  not  establish  transfer  pricing  priorities  or  the  selection  of 
transfer  pricing  methods.  Instead,  the  taxpayer  and  the  IRS  undertake  the  following 
comparability  analysis  to  determine  the  "best"  transfer  pricing  method: 
"  Functions 
"  Contract  terms 
9  Risks 
"  Economic  conditions 
"  Property  or  services 
The  detailed  explanation  of  each  of  these  steps  were  explained  in  the  OECD 
comparability  section. 
(b)  Pricing  Methods 
The  transfer  pricing  regulations  in  the  United  States  establish  the  following  transfer 
pricing  methods: 
"  Comparable  uncontrolled  price  (CUP)  method 
"  Resale  price  method 
"  Cost  plus  method 
71 "  Comparable  uncontrolled  transaction  method 
"  Additional  transfer  pricing  methods  described  below 
These  methods  are  similar  to  the  OECD  methods  with  minor  differences. 
(c)  Profit  Split  Methods 
Profit  split  methods  focus  on  the  entire  activities  of  the  transaction  or  group  of 
transactions  across  international  borders: 
"  The  comparable  profit  split  method 
"  The  residual  profit  split  method 
"  Global  dealing  transfer  pricing  method 
(d)  Comparable  Profits  Methods 
CPMs  focus  on  US  activities  of  the  business  in  seeking  comparative  data  between 
ostensibly  similarly  situated  companies  in  the  US.  The  CPM  is  similar  to  TNMM, 
detailed  in  section  5.2  in  the  following  chapter. 
A  number  of  adjustments  are  made  to  establish  the  CPM.  These  adjustments  include 
the  following: 
"  Inventory  adjustments 
"  Accounts  receivable 
"  Accounts  payable 
"  Foreign  exchange  risk 
(e)  Implementing  the  Standard  Industrial  Classification  System 
Transfer  pricing  regulations  in  the  US  require  the  taxpayer  to  use  the  "best"  transfer 
pricing  method.  In  practice,  both  the  taxpayer  and  US  IRS  auditors  often  deviate 
sharply  from  applying  the  best  method  analysis.  The  taxpayer  or  the  US  IRS  auditor 
often  applies  the  CPM  procedure  by  using  the  steps  that  involve  the  Standard 
Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  code: 
"  Use  the  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  code  for  the  business  or 
division  most  typically  a  four  digit  SIC  code; 
"  Include  other  businesses  in  that  SIC  code;  and, 
72 "  Prepare  and  utilize  CPM  comparative  formulas"  (Feinschriber,  2002, 
pg.  11-3). 
For  this  research  as  detailed  in  Chapter  6,  four-digit  SIC  codes  were  applied  to 
determine  the  activities  of  the  comparable  company  sets.  The  SIC  approach  to 
transfer  pricing  is  fraught  with  difficulty.  The  following  are  the  six  most  serious 
problems  for  the  taxpayer  or  IRS  examiner: 
1.  The  initial  selection  of  SIC  may  be  determined  by  a  staff  person  in  the 
company  who  is  unfamiliar  with  the  ramifications  of  SIC  selection; 
2.  Such  individual  may  not  be  familiar  enough  with  the  operations  of  the 
business  to  adequately  select  the  SIC  code; 
3.  A  four-digit  SIC  code  is  too  broad-based  and  encompasses  activities  vastly 
different  from  the  taxpayer's  under  examination; 
4.  The  SIC  process  does  not  adequately  reflect  changes  in  the  taxpayer's  busi- 
ness.  Many  businesses  continue  on  with  the  SIC  code  by  habit,  rather  than 
by  further  analysis; 
5.  The  SIC  process  does  not  contain  an  established  process  for  changing  a 
business's  SIC  code;  and, 
6.  The  SIC  code  may  become  obsolete  as  high-technology  moves  rapidly. 
Multiyear  data  might  not  be  available  in  any  event  (Feinschriber,  2000). 
4.5.3  Contemporaneous  Documentation 
A  taxpayer  can  avoid  a  detailed  transfer  pricing  audit  under  Section  482,  and  foreign- 
owned  U.  S.  corporations  can  avoid  audit  under  section  6038A  and  section  6038C  by 
preparing  and  retaining  primary  documents  and  background  documents.  The 
documents  are  part  of  the  "contemporaneous  documentation"  provisions  and  must  be 
prepared  as  a  matter  of  course,  not  prepared  specifically  for  audit.  Contemporaneous 
documentation  are  of  two  types: 
1.  Principal  documents-applies  to  foreign-owned  U.  S.  corporations;  and, 
2.  Background  documents-applies  to  foreign-owned  U.  S.  corporations  and 
transfer  pricing  transactions. 
Principal  documents  include  business  overview;  organizational  structure;  Section  482 
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comparables;  and,  general  index. 
4.5.4  Penalties 
The  US  has  a  complex  transfer  pricing  penalty  regime  that  is  separate  from  penalties 
that  could  apply  to  taxpayers  in  other  contexts  and  from  the  special  penalty  rules  that 
could  apply  to  foreign-owned  US  corporations.  These  penalties  are  not  deductible  in 
determining  gross  income.  There  are,  in  fact,  two  transfer  pricing  penalties: 
1.  The  transaction  penalty;  and, 
2.  The  net  adjustment  penalty. 
There  are  two  penalty  levels: 
1.  The  substantial  valuation  misstatement  penalty  (20  percent);  and, 
2.  The  gross  valuation  misstatement  penalty  (40  percent). 
All  penalties  apply  to  Section  482-related  tax  underpayments.  Each  type  of  penalty 
can  apply  at  either  of  the  two  levels  mentioned  above.  The  penalty  applies  to  the  tax, 
not  to  underpayment  itself.  Tax  underpayment  is  the  difference  between  the  result 
reflected  on  the  tax  return  and  the  results  as  finally  determined.  The  substantial 
valuation  misstatement  penalty  applies  if  the  price  stated  is  twice  as  much  as  the  true 
price  or  is  half  as  much  as  the  true  price. 
Many  foreign  governments,  in  their  direct  discussions  with  US  Treasury  and  the  IRS 
and  through  the  OECD  Committee  on  Fiscal  Affairs,  strongly  criticized  even  the 
scaled-back  version  of  CPM  in  the  1993  Temporary  Regulations  and  final  1994 
Regulation  as  contrary  to  the  arm's  length  standard  and  urged  its  elimination  from  the 
final  Regulations.  According  to  Horst  (Cole,  1999  pg.  9-4): 
"the  foreign  governments'  harsh  criticism  of  the  scaled-back  version  of  CPM 
was  based  on  a  naive  and  ultimately  insupportable  assertion  that  the  traditional 
transfer  pricing  methods  could  be  applied  in  most  cases". 
Given  the  frequent  difficulty  of  identifying  closely  comparable  transactions,  taxpayers 
and  tax  administrators  both  benefit  from  being  able  to  rely  on  a  specified  method 
(CPM)  that  can  be  used  when  the  critical  input  to  other  transfer  pricing  methods  is 
74 missing  (Cole,  1999).  Similar  to  OECD  methods  with  the  exception  of  the  priority  of 
the  method  and  the  differences 
4.6  Japan 
4.6.1  Introduction 
The  Japanese  transfer  pricing  environment  is  unique  and  is  fashioned  to  operate 
within  the  Japanese  political,  legislative,  and  economic  context.  Due  to  the  nature  of 
Japanese  transfer  pricing  legislation  and  supporting  regulations,  the  tax  authorities 
retain  a  considerable  degree  of  discretion  in  the  manner  of  the  imposition  and 
collection  of  tax.  Accordingly,  despite  the  fact  that  Japan  does  not  have  a  formal 
documentation  policy  enforced  by  a  significant  penalty  regime,  it  is  essential  within 
the  Japanese  transfer  pricing  environment  to  have  full  and  detailed  documentation  in 
place.  Failure  to  undertake  such  documentation  and  planning  in  advance  of  a  transfer 
pricing  investigation  places  the  taxpayer  at  a  significantly  increased  risk  of  receiving 
transfer  pricing  assessment. 
Japan  is  a  member  of  the  OECD  and  actively  participated  in  the  drafting  of  both  the 
1979  OECD  Report  (Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development. 
"Transfer  Pricing  and  Multinational  Enterprises,  "  and  the  1995  OECD  Guidelines 
(Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development.  "Transfer  Pricing 
Guidelines  for  Multinational  Enterprises  and  Tax  Administrations,  "  As  such,  the 
Japanese  tax  authorities  advocate  the  theory  and  practices  set  out  by  the  OECD, 
including  the  OECD's  arm's  length  principle. 
Japanese  domestic  transfer  pricing  legislation  is  based  on  the  1979  OECD  Report 
rather  than  the  later  and  more  comprehensive  OECD  Guidelines.  This  arguably 
anachronistic  feature  of  the  Japanese  domestic  legislation  results  from  the  fact  that  the 
Japanese  legislation  was  enacted  in  1986  and  has  not  been  subsequently  amended  to 
incorporate  the  features  of  the  1995  OECD  Guidelines.  Unlike  other  transfer  pricing 
guidelines  or  rules,  including  OECD  Guidelines,  the  use  of  an  arm's  length  range  had 
not  been  expressly  mentioned  as  acceptable  in  Japan. 
462  Use  of  Secret  Comparables 
Japanese  tax  authorities  place  heavy  reliance  on  comparable  transactions  as  opposed 
75 to  comparable  company  financial  performance,  given  the  tax  authorities'  practice  of 
reviewing  transfer  prices  on  a  transaction  specific  basis.  In  most  cases,  these 
comparables  are  external  uncontrolled  comparables  obtained  by  reverse  audit  of  the 
taxpayer's  competitors,  who  remain  undisclosed  throughout  the  audit  process.  In  this 
situation,  the  taxpayer  is  immediately  and  significantly  disadvantaged,  because 
without  knowing  the  source  of  the  external  comparable,  the  taxpayer  stands  little 
chance  of  assessing  comparability  and  making  meaningful  adjustments  between  its 
own  transactions  and  the  comparable  transactions  (Feinschriber,  2000). 
4.6.3  Importance  of  the  Japanese  Intangibles 
The  term  "Japan  Intangible"  is  the  description  given  to  the  aggregate  of  a  number  of 
economic  and  business  factors  to  which  the  Japanese  tax  authorities  attach  particular 
importance  during  a  transfer  pricing  audit.  The  two  main  factors  that  have  been 
commonly  referred  to  in  connection  with  the  Japan  Intangible  are  as  follows, 
1.  The  Japanese  entity's  contribution  to  the  development  of  the  Japanese 
market  for  the  goods  it  sells  (e.  g,  Japan-specific  marketing,  Japan-- 
specific  product  development,  the  results  of  research  and  development 
performed  in  Japan,  the  relationships  with  key  customers,  etc.  );  and, 
2.  The  economic  benefit  derived  by  foreign-owned  companies  from  the 
relatively  high  prices  in  Japan's  often  regulated  markets. 
4.6.4  Methods 
Methods  Specified  for  Inventory  Goods 
Japan  has  adopted  the  methods  for  computing  the  arm's  length  price  outlined  in  the 
1979  OECD  Report.  SMTLArticle  66-4(2)  provides  three  transactional  methods  and 
two  "other  methods"  for  calculating  the  arm's  length  price  for  "tested"  (i.  e., 
controlled)  transactions  involving  inventory  goods,  namely: 
"  Transactional  Methods 
"  Comparable  uncontrolled  price  (CUP)  method 
"  Resale  price  method 
"  Cost  plus  method 
Other  Methods 
"A  method  similar  to  the  above  three  methods  (the  quasi  methods) 
76 "  Methods  prescribed  by  Cabinet  Order  (the  profit  split  method) 
The  legislation  does  not  recognize  either  the  US-style  CPM  or  the  OECD  TNMM  as 
an  acceptable  basis  for  establishing  transfer  pricing  in  Japan.  However,  it  is  thought 
that  the  transactional  net  margin  method  may  be  included  in  the  legislation  in  the 
future  in  order  for  Japanese  rules  to  maintain  full  consistency  with  the  1995  OECD 
Guidelines. 
There  is  no  priority  among  the  three  transactional  methods,  or  concept  of  the  "best 
method"  as  required  by  the  US  Internal  Revenue  Code's  482  or  the  concept  of  the  or 
"last  resort"  as  adopted  by  OECD  guideline.  The  other  methods  are  to  be  used  only  as 
a  last  resort  in  the  event  that  the  traditional  three  methods  cannot  be  used. 
4.6.4.1  Comparable  Uncontrolled  Price  Method 
The  CUP  method  establishes  a  comparison  between  the  prices  employed  in  actual 
transactions  between  unrelated  parties  that  are  similar  in  terms  of  the  products  or 
services  handled,  the  transactional  level,  transactional  quality,  transactional  time,  and 
other  criteria. 
The  transactions  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  comparison  under  the  CUP  method 
could  be  either  internal  transactions  (i.  e.,  transactions  by  one  of  the  persons  engaged 
in  the  tested  transaction)  or  external  transactions  (i.  e.,  transactions  between  two 
unrelated  persons,  neither  of  which  is involved  in  the  tested  transaction). 
4.6.4.2  Resale  Price  Method 
The  Japanese  resale  price  method  establishes  the  amount  of  "normal  profit"  to  be 
deducted  from  the  resale  price  of  the  purchaser.  The  Japanese  legislation  refers  to  the 
"normal  profit  margin,  "  defining  this  as  the  amount  computed  by  multiplying  the 
resale  price  by  a  normal  profit  ratio  to  be  prescribed  by  Cabinet  Order.  (SMTL  article 
66-4(2)(i)(b))  The  normal  profit  ratio  prescribed  by  Cabinet  Order  is  the  ratio  of  gross 
profit  to  the  total  amount  of  sales  revenue  of  a  reseller  from  a  similar  transaction 
under  similar  circumstances  with  an  unaffiliated  person  (SMTL  EO,  article  39-12(6). 
Either  internal  or  external  comparable  transactions  can  be  used  to  assess  the  arm's 
77 length  nature  of  the  tested  transaction  as  in  the  CUP  method.  These  ratios  are 
sometimes  referred  to  as  the  internal  profit  margin  and  external  profit  margin 
respectively. 
In  practice,  many  of  the  transfer  pricing  audits  conducted  in  Japan  have  involved 
foreign-owned  Japanese  taxpayers  whose  primary  functions  are  the  marketing  and 
distribution  in  Japan  of  products  manufactured  and  developed  outside  Japan.  The  tax 
authorities  have  been  particularly  aggressive  in  pursuing  companies  that  possess  a 
large  market  share  and  high  brand  profile.  In  these  cases,  it  has  been  usual  to  employ 
the  resale  price  or  quasi-resale  price  method  (Borstell,  et  al,  1997). 
When  using  the  resale  price  method,  it  is  typical  for  Japanese  tax  authorities  to  apply 
an  external  comparable  transaction  for  determining  the  appropriate  gross  margin.  The 
tax  authorities  frequently  obtain  this  information  from  the  taxpayer's  competitors 
through  a  reverse  audit.  SMTLArticle  66-4(2)(i)(b)  specifically  requires  the  tax 
authorities  to  make  adjustments  for  the  differences  between  the  taxpayer's  transaction 
and  the  comparable  transaction(s).  However,  in  practice,  it  is  very  difficult  for  the 
taxpayers  to  even  identify  the  differences,  due  to  the  anonymity  of  the  source  of  the 
external  comparable  (Borstell,  et  al,  1997). 
Taxpayers  are  able  to  surmise  the  external  comparable  transaction(s)  used  by  the  tax 
authorities  in  some  cases.  The  number  of  third-party  transactions  similar  to  the 
taxpayer's  transaction  are  often  extremely  limited  and  are  familiar  to  businesses 
competitors  within  a  narrow  field.  However,  even  in  these  cases,  taxpayers  are  still 
disadvantaged  due  to  the  lack  of  access  to  comprehensive  financial  information  and 
contractual  terms  relating  to  the  external  comparable(s)  (Borstell  et  al,  1997). 
Furthermore,  in  some  cases,  the  adjustment  process  amounts  to  a  battle  between  tax 
authorities  who  claim  that  the  taxpayer's  large  market  share  and  high  total  sales 
volumes  are  due  to  the  onshore  party's  unique  marketing  intangibles,  and  the 
taxpayer's  contrary  claim  that  their  success  in  the  Japanese  market  is  due  to  product 
intangibles  developed  by  the  foreign  affiliated  party  outside  Japan  (Borstell,  et  al, 
1997) 
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The  Japanese  cost  plus  method  establishes  the  arm's  length  price  as  the  amount 
computed  by  adding  to  the  costs  of  the  seller  to  acquire,  manufacture,  or  perform 
other  acts  as  to  the  inventory  assets  the  normal  profit  margin  (SMTLArt.  66- 
4(2)(i)(c)).  As  with  the  resale  price  method,  the  normal  profit  margin  is  defined  as  the 
amount  computed  by  multiplying  the  cost  of  goods  by  a  normal  profit  ratio  to  be 
determined  according  to  the  Cabinet  Order  (SMTLArt.  66-4(2)(i)(c)).  The  Cabinet 
Order  then  defines  the  normal  profit  margin  as  the  ratio  of  the  gross  profit  margin  to 
the  total  amount  of  costs  incurred  by  the  seller  when  the  same  or  similar  assets  are 
sold  to  an  unaffiliated  person.  (SMTLEO  39-12(7)).  As  with  the  resale  price  method, 
either  an  internal  profit  ratio  or  external  profit  ratio  can  be  utilized. 
Japan's  National  Tax  Administration  (NTA)  has  not  published  any  formal  statement 
that  would  suggest  particular  markups  that  would  apply  to  specific  situations  or 
business  activities.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  the  general  transaction-specific 
approach  of  the  Japanese  tax  authorities.  However,  it  places  taxpayers  at  a 
disadvantage  because  they  do  not  have  any  guidance  as  to  the  acceptability  of  their 
transfer  prices  until  subject  to  a  transfer  pricing  investigation  (Roach  et  al,  1999).  In 
practice,  there  are  two  main  issues  encountered  in  the  application  of  the  cost  plus 
method  in  Japan.  The  first  is  the  appropriate  markup  level  to  be  used  when  applying 
the  cost  plus  margin.  The  second  issue  is  the  appropriateness  of  the  cost  base  that 
should  be  used  in  applying  the  cost  plus  markup. 
The  cost  plus  method  is  normally  used  to  assess  the  arm's  length  nature  of  transactions 
where  the  tested  party  is  the  manufacturer  of  tangible  assets,  and  the  tested  party 
provides  services  to  its  foreign  affiliated  person,  This  approach  is  specifically  relevant 
for  a  foreign-owned  taxpayer.  Language  and  cultural  barriers  to  developing  business 
in  Japan  have  led  to  the  common  business  structure  in  which  many  foreign 
companies,  who  sell  their  products  directly  to  Japanese  customers,  have  established  a 
local  service  company  to  provide  their  foreign  parent  with  services  such  as  market 
research  and  liaison  activities  (Brostell  et  al,  1997). 
Buckley  and  Hughes  (1996)  suggested  that  the  Japanese  overseas  subsidiary  is  not 
regarded  as  profit  centre  in  its  own  right,  therefore  there  is  no  incentive  to  increase 
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companies  operating  overseas  was  due  to  the  target  costing  system  widely  used  by 
Japanese  companies.  An  Investigation  of  the  performance  of  the  Japanese-owned 
companies  compare  to  their  UK  counterparts  is  conducted  as  apart  of  this  research. 
4.6.4.4  Other  Methods 
It  is  possible  to  use  other  methods  in  the  event  that  none  of  the  traditional  methods 
can  be  utilized.  These  other  methods  may  either  be  a  method  corresponding  to  a 
prescribed  transactional  method  or  any  method  prescribed  by  Cabinet  Order.  (SMTL 
article  66-42(2)(i)(d)).  The  law  or  regulations  provide  no  details  in  defining  a 
"method  corresponding  to  a  proscribed  transactional  method.  "  In  practice,  the 
Japanese  tax  authorities  have  been  known  to  cite  the  "quasi-resale  price"  in  the 
official  Notice  of  Assessment  when  significant  adjustments  were  required  to  account 
for  differences  between  the  tested  transaction  and  the  comparable  transaction(s).  This 
practice  is  sometimes  referred  to  by  commentators  as  the  Japanese  tax  authorities' 
practice  of  employing  "loose  comparables.  "  (Feinschriber,  2000) 
Japanese  tax  authorities  have  placed  much  greater  emphasis  on  reviewing  profit  splits. 
This  is  so  not  only  for  foreign-owned  companies  in  Japan,  but  also  for  Japanese 
MNEs.  In  many  cases  the  outcome  from  applying  the  profit  split  approach  can  be 
markedly  different  from  applying  the  comparable  profits  method  adopted  by  the  US 
(Kato  et  al,  1994). 
The  profit  split  method  is  generally  utilized  by  Japanese  tax  authorities  during  the 
field  audit  stage  when  conducting  a  transfer  pricing  investigation  of  Japanese 
multinationals.  In  such  cases,  the  Japanese  taxpayer  holds  all  the  essential  cost  data 
and  the  Japanese  tax  officials  have  access  to  the  information  necessary  to  evaluate  the 
total  system  profit.  This  information  is  generally  very  difficult  to  access  when  the 
taxpayer  is  a  foreign-owned  Japanese  subsidiary  with  an  offshore  parent.  (Borstell  et 
al,  1997).  Nevertheless  Japanese  tax  authorities  focus  on  the  profit  split  for  foreign- 
owned  companies  in  Japan.  The  authorities  routinely  request  information  to  review 
how  much  profit  is  earned  by  foreign  affiliates  from  transactions  with  Japanese 
affiliates  (Kato  et  al,  1994). 
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Penalty  taxes  are  imposed  on  the  additional  corporate  taxes  at  the  rate  of  10  percent 
for  additional  taxes  equal  to  the  amount  originally  reported  and  15  percent  for 
additionally  assessed  taxes  in  excess  of  the  amount  originally  reported.  In  the  event 
of  fraud,  the  penalty  tax  is  increased  to  40  percent.  These  penalties  are  not  deductible 
and  will  not  be  waived,  even  where  there  was  no  intentional  manipulation 
demonstrated  by  the  taxpayer. 
Full  understanding  of  the  evolving  transfer  pricing  regulatory  environment,  taxpayers 
and  transfer  pricing  practitioners  is  important.  Although  Japanese  transfer  pricing 
rules  are  considered  outdated  and  growing  at  a  slower  pace  compared  to  the  US  and 
OECD,  over  the  past  few  years  circulars  and  small  NTA  guidelines  have  expanded 
significantly.  Japanese  transfer  pricing  rules  are  clearer  and  more  easily  applied,  with 
the  general  consensus  being  that  transfer  pricing  rules  will  continue  to  evolve 
(Horiguchi,  2002). 
4.7  Summary 
Globalization  provides  MNEs  with  more  opportunities  to  manipulate  transfer  prices. 
An  increased  desire  on  the  part  of  tax  authorities  faced  with  tight  fiscal  situations  to 
protect  and  enhance  their  revenue  base,  has  resulted  in  tightened  regulatory 
frameworks,  presumably  due  to  the  fact  that  individual  fiscal  jurisdictions  are 
concerned  that  ITP  abuse  results  in  unfair  profits  being  reported  and  tax  revenues 
being  reduced.  Each  jurisdiction  allows  profit  methods  and  hence  the  need  to  compute 
comparables.  Whether  or  not  profit  method  is  adopted,  comparison  of  comparables 
may  be  prudent  in  order  to  justify  and  support  the  use  of  transaction  methods. 
Different  countries  are  subject  to  different  rules,  regulations,  and  recommendations 
from  their  tax  authorities  and  governments  and  the  exercise  of  discretion  may  be 
country  oriented  and/or  facilitated  by  methods  chosen.  Hence,  a  focus  on  comparables 
under  different  regulations  is  deemed  appropriate  when  determining  whether  MNE 
discretion  is  limited  or  safeguarded. 
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Comparables  and  TNMM  vs.  CPM 5.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  provides  a  comparison  between  the  OECD's  TNMM  and  the  US  IRS' 
CPM,  including  the  main  features  of  each  of  these  profit-based  methods  as  well  as 
their  applications.  These  alternative  regulations  raise  an  important  issue  as  to  whether 
any  of  these  regulations  can  reflect  a  real  adjustment  of  function  and  risk  differences. 
FDI  theories  suggest  that  MNEs  have  competitive  advantage  although  the  regulations 
reinforce  that  they  should  be  equivalents.  This  chapter  demonstrates  the  attempts 
made  by  various  regulations  to  control  function  and  risk  differences.  Additionally, 
this  chapter  defines  comparables  in  relation  to  transfer  pricing  methods  in  general, 
and  to  the  research  method  adopted  by  this  study. 
5.2  OECD  Transactional  Net  Margin  Method  (TNMM  )  vs.  US  IRS  Comparable 
Profit  Method  (CPM) 
The  transactional  net  margin  method  (TNMM)  is  a  transfer  pricing  methodology 
adopted  by  the  OECD  in  1995.  TNMM  approximates  arm's  length  conditions  when 
traditional  transaction  methods  cannot  be  reliably  applied  alone  or,  in  exceptional 
circumstances,  when  these  traditional  methods  cannot  be  applied  at  all.  Unlike 
TNMM,  CPM  is  a  transfer  pricing  method  adopted  by  the  US  IRS  section  482  and  can 
be  used  similar  to  any  other  transfer  pricing  method  under  the  best  method  rule. 
5.2.1  Transactional  Net  Margin  Method  (TNMM) 
The  transactional  net  margin  method  examines  the  net  profit  margin  relative  to  an 
appropriate  base  (e.  g.,  costs,  sales,  assets)  that  a  taxpayer  realizes  from  a  controlled 
transaction  (OECD,  1995).  TNMM  is  based  on  the  concept  that  returns  earned  by 
firms  operating  in  the  same  industry  and  under  similar  conditions  tend  toward  equality 
over  a  reasonably  long  period  of  time.  If  one  firm  is  earning  higher  returns  than  its 
rivals,  it  should  be  able  to  expand  its  production  or  sales  at  the  expense  of  the  less- 
efficient  competitors.  In  the  long  run,  the  firm's  competitors  will  either  go  out  of 
business  or  become  more  efficient  and  thus  increase  their  returns.  Economic  theory 
predicts  what  will  happen  in  equilibrium  over  the  long  run,  but  is  unspoken  about  the 
time  needed  to  achieve  equilibrium  or  what  the  rates  of  return  ought  to  be  in  the 
interim. 
In  TNMM,  the  profits  earned  by  a  taxpayer  in  a  controlled  transaction  (or  a  group  of 
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Guidelines)  are  compared  with  the  same  measure  of  profitability  from  arm's-length 
uncontrolled  transactions.  As  the  Guidelines  state,  "The  net  margin  of  the  taxpayer 
from  the  controlled  transaction...  should  ideally  be  established  by  reference  to  the  net 
margin  that  the  same  taxpayer  earns  in  comparable  uncontrolled  transactions.  Where 
this  is  not  possible,  the  net  margin  that  would  have  been  earned  in  comparable 
transactions  by  an  independent  enterprise  may  serve  as  a  guide"  (OECD,  1995, 
B.  3.26).  TNMM  is  based  on  the  net  profit  margin,  rather  than  the  gross  profit  margin 
on  which  both  the  resale  price  and  cost  plus  methods  are  based.  The  net  profits  are 
expressed  relative  to  sales,  costs,  or  assets  with  the  most  commonly  employed 
measures  being  return  on  sales  and  return  on  assets. 
Only  one  party  to  the  controlled  transaction  is  analyzed  when  applying  TNMM.  The 
choice  of  which  party  to  examine  depends  on  the  availability  of  comparable  data.  In 
general,  TNMM  is  applied  to  the  least  complex  entity  involved  in  the  inter-company 
transaction.  There  is  usually  more  comparable  data  in  existence  for  the  least  complex 
entities,  and  fewer  adjustments  will  be  required  to  account  for  differences  in  function 
and  risk  between  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions.  Substantial  differences 
in  intangible  property  ownership  generally  render  a  potential  comparable  unusable  for 
TNMM,  as  well  as  for  all  other  methods  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
"TNMM  can  be  used  to  determine  transfer  prices  at  the  time  those  prices  are  set,  or  it 
can  be  used  to  test  the  reasonableness  of  transfer  prices  established  by  some  other 
means.  Tax  authorities  are  likely  to  use  TNMM  as  a  test  of  reasonableness  to 
determine  whether  a  transfer  pricing  audit  should  be  initiated"  (Feinschriber,  2001, 
pg.  24).  For  this  purpose,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  what  profits  will  be  analyzed 
before  applying  TNMM. 
When  applying  TNMM  the  following  steps  are  required: 
"  Performing  a  functional  analysis; 
"  Identifying  comparables; 
"  Choosing  a  profit  measure; 
"  Determining  the  appropriate  time  period  for  analysis;  and, 
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Performing  a  Functional  Analysis  and  Identifying  Comparables: 
The  first  step  in  applying  TNMM  is  to  analyze  the  functions  performed  by  the  affiliate 
in  question  and  the  risks  borne  by  that  affiliate,  and  to  determine  whether  the  affiliate 
owns  valuable  intangible  property. 
The  second  step  is  to  identify  potentially  comparable  transactions  or  companies. 
OECD  Guidelines  recommend  using  internal  comparables,  which  are  uncontrolled 
transactions  in  which  the  affiliate  participates.  Transactions  in  which  the  taxpayer  is 
not  involved  should  be  used  only  if  there  are  no  internal  comparable  transactions. 
The  OECD  Guidelines  approach  is  consistent  with  Section  482  of  US  IRS  regulations. 
Companies  have  much  more  detailed  information  about  transactions  in  which  they 
participate  than  unrelated  transactions  in  which  they  do  not  participate.  As  a  result, 
the  comparability  of  the  transactions  can  be  evaluated  with  more  accuracy  than  when 
data  are  limited  to  publicly  available  information  from  third-party  transactions. 
A  function  and  risk  assessment  should  be  performed  once  the  comparables  have  been 
identified,  whether  the  comparables  are  internally  generated  or  the  company  is  relying 
on  external  comparables.  This  function  and  risk  analysis  is  necessarily  less  thorough 
for  external  comparables  than  for  analysis  of  the  affiliated  party.  Since  the  goal  is  to 
obtain  the  "correct"  arm's-length  answer,  great  care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  all 
differences  that  can  affect  profitability  are  identified  and  accounted  for  through 
adjustments  to  the  comparables. 
OECD  Guidelines  do  not  discuss  adjustments  for  differences  in  functions  and  risks  in 
much  detail.  Instead,  they  emphasize  the  need  to  carefully  choose  comparables  that 
are  as  similar  in  function  and  product  as  is  possible.  "Where  differences  in 
characteristics  of  the  enterprises  being  compared  have  a  material  effect  on  the  net 
margins  being  used,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  apply  the  transactional  net  margin 
method  without  making  adjustments  for  such  differences"  (OECD,  1995,  B.  3.53). 
After  deciding  which  comparables  are  to  be  used,  and  whether  to  make  adjustments 
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profitability  in  applying  TNMM.  OECD  Guidelines  are  not  very  specific  regarding 
the  profit  measures  that  can  be  employed.  From  the  point  of  view  of  this  study,  it  is 
feasible  to  employ  more  than  one  profitability  measure,  using  one  to  test  the 
reasonableness  of  the  others.  Using  this  additional  measure  to  test  the  selected  method 
provides  additional  assurance  that  the  transfer  pricing  is  reasonable,  assuming,  of 
course,  that  the  other  method  yields  a  result  consistent  with  the  original  method 
chosen.  All  the  profit-level  measures  used  in  TNMM  are  based  on  operating  income, 
which  is  net  profit  margin.  Typically,  return  on  assets  (operating  income/assets)  or 
return  on  sales  (operating  income/net  sales)  are  the  two  profit-level  measures 
analyzed  to  determine  transfer  prices. 
OECD  Guidelines  state  that  "net  margins  are  less  affected  by  transactional  differences 
than  is  the  case  with  price,  as  used  in  the  CUP  method.  "  OECD  Guidelines  further 
state,  "The  net  margins  also  may  be  more  tolerant  to  some  functional  differences 
between  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions  than  gross  profit  margins  (1995 
OECD  Guidelines,  B.  3.27).  In  addition,  the  net  margin  may  be  less  sensitive  to 
differences  in  generally  accepted  accounting  practices  across  countries  and  by 
companies  within  a  country. 
Once  the  profit  measure  or  measures  have  been  chosen,  they  must  be  computed  for 
each  of  the  comparables  and  for  the  controlled  transaction.  The  number  of  years  of 
financial  data  that  should  be  considered  is  open  to  question.  OECD  Guidelines 
provide  no  specific  advice,  merely  stating,  "Multiple  year  data  should  be  considered 
to  take  into  account  the  effects  on  profits  of  product  life  cycles  and  short-term 
economic  conditions"  (OECD,  1995,  B.  3.44).  There  are  many  approaches  in 
determining  the  appropriate  number  of  years  to  be  used  in  applying  TNMM.  The 
profitability  amount  is  affected  by  the  business  cycle;  sometimes  it  will  vary 
significantly  within  the  business  cycle.  In  this  situation,  it  is  necessary  to  use  the 
entire  business  cycle  to  determine  the  range  of  net  margins  under  the  transactional  net 
margin  method  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
Multiple-year  data  provide  many  advantages.  Companies  are  subject  to  one-time 
events  that  create  an  abnormal  change  in  company  profits.  The  use  of  multiple  years 
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taxpayers  or  tax  collectors  to  reach  inappropriate  conclusions  regarding  the  adequacy 
of  transfer  pricing  policies. 
Another  advantage  of  using  multiple  years  concerns  companies  that  use  market 
penetration  strategies.  During  the  market  penetration  period,  profits  of  the  company 
will  be  lower  than  normal.  Ordinarily,  it  is  expected  that  a  company  engaged  in  a 
market  penetration  strategy  will  earn  above-normal  profits  after  the  market 
penetration  period  to  provide  a  return  on  its  investment,  that  is,  the  below  normal 
profits  it  earned  during  the  penetration  period.  However,  sometimes  the  market 
penetration  is  merely  market  maintenance  and  is  pursued  to  allow  the  company  to 
remain  in  business  in  the  face  of  intense  competition.  In  such  cases,  no  return  to  the 
investment  accrues  to  the  company  because  the  market  conditions  do  not  allow  it.  In 
these  cases,  a  multiple-year  analysis  may  be  required  to  adequately  assess  the 
company's  transfer  pricing  policies  (Feinschriber,  2001). 
An  average  can  be  computed  in  several  ways  using  multiple-year  data.  Margins  can 
be  computed  for  each  company,  across  time,  with  a  simple  average  being  calculated. 
Alternatively,  margins  can  be  computed  using  a  weighted  average,  so  that  years  with 
higher  sales  will  have  more  weight.  By  contrast,  a  yearly  average  of  all  comparables 
(either  simple  or  weighted)  could  be  computed,  with  these  averages  then  averaged 
across  time.  The  method  of  averaging  depends  on  the  reasons  for  using  multiple-year 
data.  If  the  overall  business  cycle  is  considered,  averaging  the  individual  results  for 
each  year  may  be  the  preferred  method.  In  this  case,  company-to-company  differences 
within  a  year  are  covered  up,  so  that  the  overall  profitability  across  time  becomes 
clearer. 
While  the  Guidelines  do  not  stress  the  importance  of  testing  the  reasonableness  of  the 
resulting  transfer  pricing  policy,  this  is  considered  essential.  The  final  step  in 
determining  transfer  prices  using  TNMM  (or  any  other  method)  is  to  check  the 
reasonableness  of  the  results  using  alternative  measures  or  methods.  If  the  true  arm's- 
length  range  has  been  determined,  it  will  be  supported  by  alternative  pricing 
measures.  If  significant  differences  occur  in  application  of  multiple  methods,  it  is 
almost  always  the  result  of  errors  in  either  the  comparables  selection  or  application  of 
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5.2.2  Comparable  Profits  Method  (CPM) 
CPM  evaluates  whether  the  amount  charged  in  a  controlled  transaction  is  arm's 
length,  based  on  objective  measures  of  profitability  (profit-level  indicators),  which  are 
derived  from  uncontrolled  taxpayers  that  engage  in  similar  business  activities  under 
similar  circumstances  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5(a))  Profit-level  indicators  are  "ratios  that 
measure  relationships  between  profits  and  costs  incurred  or  resources  employed 
(Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5(b)  (4)).  Several  profit-level  indicators  can  be  used,  depending 
on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  tested  party.  Common  profit-level  indicators 
include  rate  of  return  on  assets  and  financial  ratios  such  as  operating  profits  to  sales  or 
gross  profits  to  operating  expenses.  The  taxpayer  must  decide  which  profit-level 
indicator  is  most  appropriate,  or  if  a  combination  of  profit-level  indicators  should  be 
used.  If  a  combination  is  used,  the  taxpayer  must  then  determine  the  weights  given  to 
the  various  indicators. 
The  taxpayer  must  also  decide  which  party  to  the  transaction  should  be  used  as  the 
tested  party.  The  tested  party  is  the  participant  in  the  controlled  transaction  whose 
operating  profit  attributable  to  the  controlled  transactions  can  be  verified  using  the 
most  reliable  data  and  requiring  the  fewest  and  most  reliable  adjustments,  and  for 
which  reliable  data  regarding  uncontrolled  comparables  can  be  located  (Treas.  Reg. 
§  1.482-5(b)(2)(i)).  Generally,  the  tested  party  will  not  own  valuable  intangible 
property  or  have  other  attributes  that  would  differentiate  it  from  uncontrolled 
comparables. 
Profit-level  indicators  are  applied  to  the  tested  party's  actual  financial  data  associated 
with  the  controlled  transactions  under  study.  The  tested  party's  profit-level  indicators 
are  then  compared  to  those  of  uncontrolled  comparables.  Adjustments  may  be  needed 
if  there  are  wide  discrepancies  between  the  tested  party  and  the  comparables  or 
among  the  comparables 
In  applying  CPM,  Wright  (2000)  notes  that  some  practitioners  believe  that  selection 
of  broadly  similar  companies  does  not  require  function  and  risk  differences  to  be 
accounted  for  prior  to  determining  the  arm's-length  range.  CPM  and  TNMM  are 
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differences.  In  this  case,  the  U.  S.  regulations  require  the  use  of  the  inter-quartile  range 
for  setting  transfer  prices.  Wright  (2000)  also  mentions  that  other  practitioners  view 
function  and  risk  adjustments  as  mandatory,  if  a  true  arm's-length  range  is  to  be 
determined.  If  adjustments  are  made,  US  regulations  allow  the  use  of  the  entire  range. 
5.2.3  Comparison  of  TNMM  and  CPM 
MNEs  should  be  interested  in  achieving  a  common  worldwide  approach  to  transfer 
pricing.  Without  a  common  approach,  the  probability  of  double  taxation  is 
unacceptably  high  and  between  TNMM  and  CPM  can  lead  to  double  taxation.  The 
main  issue  when  comparing  TNMM  and  CPM  is  the  priority  of  these  methods.  While 
the  1994  US  IRS  regulations  kept  CPM  and  subjected  the  choice  of  methods  to  the 
best  method  rule,  OECD  guidelines  issued  in  1995  contained  TNMM  and  specified 
that  TNMM  is  a  case  of  last  resort. 
The  principal  distinction  between  TNMM  of  the  OECD  Guidelines  and  the  CPM  of 
the  US  regulations  is  their  approach  to  aggregation  of  financial  data  about  controlled 
and  uncontrolled  transactions.  The  CPM  requires  that  the  analysis  be  based  on  the 
"most  narrowly  identifiable  business  activity"  for  which  financial  data  is  available.  By 
contrast,  the  OECD  Guidelines  start  from  the  presumption  that  transactions  are  ideally 
analyzed  individually  and  that  each  level  of  aggregation  must  be  justified.  Critics  of 
the  CPM  in  some  OECD  countries  are  concerned  that  "the  most  narrowly  identifiable 
business  activity"  may  exceed  the  degree  of  aggregation  that  would  be  acceptable 
under  the  OECD  Guidelines  (Taly,  1996). 
There  are  substantial  similarities  between  TNMM  and  CPM.  Highlights  of  the  two 
methods  are  shown  in  Table  5-1.  One  minor  difference  is  between  TNMM  and  CPM 
is  that  OECD  Guidelines  recommend  using  uncontrolled  transactions  entered  into  by 
the  taxpayer  (internal  comparables)  to  determine  margins,  if  possible,  before  using 
comparable  transactions  between  unrelated  parties  whereas  US  IRS  regulations  have 
no  such  suggestion.  The  use  of  internal  comparables  is  certainly  consistent  with  US 
regulations  and,  no  doubt,  would  be  determined  to  be  more  reliable  as  defined  by  the 
US  regulations  than  would  purely  third-party  data  (external  comparables). 
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recommend  using  three  years  of  data,  whereas  OECD  Guidelines  merely  suggest  the 
use  of  multiple  years.  This  difference,  likewise,  should  not  be  fatal  to  efficient 
worldwide  tax  administration  as  US  regulations  are  broad  enough  to  allow  the  use  of 
an  appropriate  number  of  years  so  long  as  they  are  adequately  explained. 
Table  5-1:  Comparison  of  Comparable  Profit  Method  (CPM)  and  Transactional  Net 
Margin  Method  (TNMM) 
Profit-level  indicators  Three  specified:  None  stated  explicitly  Numerator  can 
"  Operating  income/  operating  assets  be  net  margin  Denominator  can  be 
"  Operating  income/sales  "  Sales 
"  Gross  profit/operating  expenses  "  Assets 
Others  allowed  "  Costs 
Years  of  data  used  Recommended  current  plus  two  previous  Recommended  multiple  years 
years 
Preferred  Nothing  stated  Uncontrolled  transactions  of 
comparables  taxpayer,  then  third-party 
comparables. 
Arm's  length  range  Use  of  inter-quartile  range  if  no  Full  range  of  results 
adjustments  are  made 
Adjustment  point  To  median,  or  mean,  if  outside  range  None 
A  third  difference  between  TNMM  and  CPM  is  that  OECD  Guidelines  require  the 
numerator  of  all  the  profit-level  indicators  to  be  the  net  margin,  whereas  the  US  IRS 
regulations  propose  the  ratio  of  gross  profit  to  operating  expenses  as  one  of  the  profit 
level  indicators  (Berry  ratio).  The  US  IRS  thus  allows  an  additional  profit  indicator 
that  can  be  helpful  when  comparables  have  different  levels  of  operating  expenses  or 
when  data  from  many  countries  are  being  used  to  determine  transfer  prices. 
The  more  substantive  differences  between  OECD  Guidelines  and  US  IRS  regulations 
lie  in  their  treatment  of  ranges.  OECD  Guidelines  state  that  it  is  important  to  take  into 
account  a  range  of  results  when  using  the  transactional  net  margin  method  (OECD, 
1995,  B.  3.45).  The  use  of  the  range  in  this  context  could  help  reduce  the  effects  of 
differences  in  the  business  characteristics  of  associated  enterprises  and  any  inde- 
pendent  enterprises  engaging  in  comparable  uncontrolled  transactions,  because  the 
range  would  permit  results  that  occur  under  a  variety  of  commercial  and  financial 
conditions. 
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three  to  seven  percent  of  assets.  If  a  tax  authority,  following  OECD  Guidelines,  au- 
dited  a  manufacturing  company  in  a  year  in  which  the  company's  actual  return  fell 
outside  that  range,  the  tax  authority  might  be  willing  to  consider  arguments  that  would 
place  the  controlled  manufacturing  company  at  one  or  the  other  extreme  within  the 
range.  For  example,  the  tax  authority  might  consider  arguments  that  the  appropriate 
return  is  3  percent  during  weak  years  (that  is,  when  the  company  was  seeking  to 
penetrate  or  maintain  a  market),  while  the  appropriate  return  might  be  7  percent 
during  good  years.  The  US  IRS,  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  the  language  of  US 
Treasury  Regulation  Section  1.482-1(e)(2),  requires  the  adjustment  to  the  midpoint  of 
the  range  (mean  or  median)  under  all  circumstances.  This  difference  can  be  extremely 
important  and  should  be  reconciled  by  the  two  taxing  bodies.  (More  details  will  be 
forthcoming  in  the  methodology  and  data  analysis  chapters  7  and  8.  ) 
A  further,  important  difference  between  TNMM  and  CPM  is  the  use  of  the  inter- 
quartile  range,  which  excludes  the  top  and  bottom  25  percent  of  the  range.  The  inter- 
quartile  range  is in  US  IRS  regulations,  but  not  OECD  Guidelines.  In  essence,  the  US 
IRS  allows  taxpayers  to  use  comparable  data  without  adjustments  for  differences  in 
functions  and  risks.  In  this  case,  the  taxpayer  is  limited  to  the  inter-quartile  range  for 
determination  and  evaluation  of  transfer  prices  with  three  issues  arising  as  a  result: 
1.  Whether  reliable  results  that  may  determine  an  arm's  length  price  occur  when 
no  adjustments  are  made  for  function  and  risk  differences; 
2.  Whether  narrowing  the  range  to  the  inter-quartile  range  achieves  the  same 
results  as  would  have  occurred  had  the  appropriate  adjustments  been  made; 
and, 
3.  Whether  narrowing  the  profit  range  results  in  an  arm's  length  price  that 
increases/decreases  companies'  discretion. 
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Comparables 
5.3.1  Overview 
OECD  Guidelines  hold  that  the  results  of  uncontrolled  transactions  can  serve  as  a 
useful  benchmark  for  adjusting  the  results  of  controlled  transactions  only  if  the 
"economically  relevant  characteristics"  of  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions 
are  "comparable"  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.15).  For  this  purpose,  transactions 
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effect  on  the  results;  or,  (2)  any  material  effect  can  be  eliminated  by  adjustments 
(OECD,  1995). 
The  attributes  of  a  transaction  that  may  affect  comparability  are  as  follows: 
"  The  specific  characteristics  of  the  product  or  service  being  sold; 
"  The  functions  performed  by  the  parties; 
"  Any  contractual  terms; 
"  The  economic  circumstances  of  the  parties;  and, 
"  The  business  strategies  of  the  parties.  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.17) 
These  attributes  are  essentially  the  same  as  the  factors  identified  by  US  transfer 
pricing  regulations  as  relevant  to  comparability.  One  purely  formal  distinction 
between  OECD  Guidelines  and  US  IRS  regulations  is  that  US  regulations  treat  the 
risks  assumed  by  the  parties  as  a  separate  factor,  while  OECD  Guidelines  treat  risk  as 
part  of  the  functional  analysis  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.23). 
As  to  contractual  terms,  OECD  Guidelines  reflect  US  regulations  in  cautioning  that 
substance  may  vary  from  form  in  a  controlled  transaction  and  that  the  national  tax 
administration  should  analyze  comparability  based  upon  the  true  terms  of  the 
transaction  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.29).  Among  the  relevant 
"economic  circumstances"  listed  in  OECD  Guidelines  are  the  levels  (wholesale  vs. 
retail)  and  geographic  location  of  the  markets  in  which  the  controlled  and 
uncontrolled  transactions  take  place  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  1,  para.  1.30), 
factors  also  emphasized  US  regulations.  Among  the  relevant  "business  strategies" 
listed  in  OECD  Guidelines  are  "market  penetration  schemes,  "  whereby  a  taxpayer 
may  charge  lower  prices  than  uncontrolled  enterprises  in  order  to  enter  or  expand  into 
a  new  market  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.32).  Similar  to  US  transfer 
pricing  regulations,  OECD  Guidelines  affirm  that  lower  prices  do  not  warrant  an 
adjustment  if  the  market  penetration  strategy  is  plausible  and  reasonably  limited  in 
time  (1995  OECD  Guidelines,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.35). 
The  use  of  comparables,  by  definition,  means  that  one  is  using  historical  data  to 
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independent  parties  involving  similar  products/services  and  taking  place  under  similar 
conditions.  Comparables  consist  of  two  main  types  (See  Figure  5-1): 
1.  Internal  comparable  transaction  -a  transaction  that  takes  place  between  the 
tested  party  and  independent  third  parties  which  are  used  to  make  comparisons 
to  a  transaction  that  takes  place  between  the  tested  party  and  its  affiliates. 
Usually  it  contains  information  about  the  comparable  transaction  provided  by 
the  client,  occurs  within  the  context  of  the  tested  party's  business  and  applied 
to  the  CUP  method,  but  also  applicable  to  the  other  transactional  methods. 
2.  External  comparable  transaction  -a  transaction  that  takes  place  between 
unrelated  third  parties  which  are  used  to  make  comparisons  to  a  transaction 
that  takes  place  between  the  tested  party  and  its  affiliates.  It  often  contains 
information  found  via  external  sources  (e.  g.,  commercial  databases, 
standardized  financials,  US  SEC  filing,  trade  journals,  internet,  etc), 
comparable  search  selection  is  subjective,  and  is  normally  applied  when  using 
the  resale  price,  cost  plus,  profit  split  and  transactional  net  margin  methods. 
When  companies  consider  which  method  allows  the  best  result  from  the  variety  of 
methods  for  computing  arm's  length  transfer  pricing,  they  should  consider  the  degree 
of  comparability  between  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions  that  could  be 
assessed  by  functions  performed,  contractual  terms,  risk  undertaken,  economic 
conditions,  and  nature  of  goods  and  services  supplied.  In  addition,  the  quality  of  the 
available  data  could  be  assessed  for  completeness  and  accuracy,  the  quality  of  the 
assumptions  in  terms  of  their  reliability  should  be  considered,  and  the  sensitivity  of 
the  results  to  deficiencies  in  either  data  or  assumptions  should  be  taken  into  account 
(Tyrrall  et  al.,  1999). 
When  the  controlled  transaction  can  be  compared  to  a  transaction  between 
independent  parties,  the  arm's  length  price  is  determined  by  a  transactional  analysis. 
Since  comparability  between  a  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transaction  is  rarely  exact, 
the  uncontrolled  transaction  must  ordinarily  be  adjusted  to  provide  a  reliable  measure 
of  an  arm's  length  result.  Alternatively,  when  comparable  uncontrolled  transactions 
cannot  be  identified,  a  profit-based  analysis  is  used,  comparing  the  profitability  of  a 
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companies.  In  such  a  case,  the  MNE  does  not  search  for  comparable  transactions,  but 
rather  for  comparable  companies. 
Figure  5-1:  Types  of  Comparables  Transactions 
.........................................  ............................ 
Controlled  Affiliate  Controlled  Controlled  Affiliate 
.......................................:  Transaction  :............................. 
Compare  with: 
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............................:  Comparable 
External 
It  is  impossible  to  prescribe  exactly  how  comparables  are  determined,  especially  since 
every  transaction  and  every  company  is  so  different  that  even  transfer  pricing 
regulations  themselves  do  not  offer  specifics  on  the  process  for  obtaining  comparable 
sets  which,  according  to  Horst  (Cole,  1999)  remain  vague.  In  addition,  the  transfer 
pricing  method  chosen  will  determine,  to  a  large  extent,  how  the  search  will  be 
developed. 
Developing  comparables  may  have  two  main  problems.  The  first  is  simply  that 
comparable  prices  and  profits  may  have  been  higher  or  lower  in  previous  years.  The 
second  is  that  the  number  of  potential  comparables  may  be  distorted  such  as  where 
companies  cease  trading  and  evidence  either  fails  to  enter  public  record  or  is  deleted 
from  publicly  available  databases.  The  latter  is  particularly  problematic  when  dealing 
with  transfer  pricing  investigations.  If  a  comparable  company  ceased  trading  or  fell 
into  bankruptcy  during  a  certain  period,  the  comparable  data  in  publicly  available 
databases  when  the  tax  audit  had  started  would  only  be  that  relating  to  companies  that 
had  survived.  Thus  while  it  is  possible  in  hindsight  to  look  for  comparable  data  over 
the  same  years  as  those  covered  by  an  audit,  the  evidence  may  be  somewhat  distorted 
and  distorted  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  taxpayer. 
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thresholds  to  determine  whether  a  company  will  be  included  in  the  comparable  set. 
Two  of  these  thresholds  are  function  and  risk  which  include  factors  that  should  be 
considered  such  as  size,  industry,  activity,  profits,  and  others. 
Searching  for  comparable  companies  is  a  process  that  requires  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative  economic  and  financial  analysis  of  a  large  number  of  potentially 
comparable  companies  with  the  overall  process  summarized  as  follows: 
1.  Locate  comparable  companies  from  financial  databases; 
2.  Filter  comparables  based  on  qualitative  and  quantitative  criteria; 
3.  Obtain  companies'  full  accounts  from  the  databases; 
4.  Adjust  financial  data,  if  necessary,  to  improve  comparability;  and, 
5.  Establish  a  multi-year  average  (Casley  et  al,  2002,  pg.  139). 
Before  answering  questions  regarding  the  availability  of  data  and  its  use,  it  is  first 
necessary  to  consider  the  question  of  comparability.  If  a  company  does  not  have 
comparable  transactions  with  third  parties  or  when  a  comparable  uncontrolled 
transaction  cannot  be  found  and  there  is  no  suitable  open  market  price,  one  must  find 
data  on  comparable  companies.  Utilizing  the  OECD's  definition  of  "comparable 
transactions  or  companies"  accepting  data,  comparable  companies  may  be  used  if: 
"  There  are  no  differences  which  would  significantly  affect  the  price  or  profit 
margin;  or, 
"  There  are  such  differences,  where  reasonable  adjustments  can  be  made  to 
eliminate  their  effect.  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.15). 
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3.2  Company  Size 
One  of  the  major  factors  to  be  considered  when  developing  comparable  companies  is 
obtaining  data  for  a  group  of  companies  similar  in  size  and  nature  to  the  "tested 
party".  If  a  tested  party  has  a  higher  level  of  sales,  the  results  can  be  adjusted  by 
removing  those  companies,  previously  considered  comparable,  with  a  materially 
lower  level  of  sales.  If  on  the  other  hand  the  tested  party  has  a  lower  level  of  sales, 
further  work  is  required  to  determine  to  what  extent  the  range  obtained  is  the  correct 
result  or  whether  the  results  are  distorted. 
95 The  most  compelling  reason  for  excluding  companies  with  the  lowest  levels  of 
turnover  is  that  they  may  be  owner-managed  businesses  and  thus  run  for  the  benefit  of 
the  owner,  who  may  prefer  to  take  dividends  rather  than  salary.  Therefore,  all 
companies  with  particularly  low  levels  of  turnover  ought  to  be  excluded.  The  question 
of  what  an  appropriate  cut-off  might  be  must  be  determined  on  a  case-by-case  basis 
and  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  industry.  Therefore,  reviewing  the  industry  involved 
remains  good  practice  regardless  of  concerns  about  profitability  (Casley  et  al,  2002). 
By  excluding  companies  with  low  turnover  and  assets,  much  of  the  distortion  that 
may  result  from  the  inclusion  of  smaller  companies  is  removed.  It  then  becomes  a 
matter  of  judgment  as  to  whether  further  elimination  is  necessary.  Given  that  what  is 
being  sought  in  line  with  OECD  recommendations  is  often  a  range  (OECD,  1995, 
Para.  1.45),  the  question  is  not  whether  one  company's  results  are  right  or  wrong  but 
whether  the  range  is  materially  affected. 
5.3.3  Companies  Ceasing/Starting  to  Trade 
It  is  important  that  when  a  company  ceases  to  be  included  in  publicly  available 
databases,  all  of  its  results  are  removed  from  the  dataset.  Performing  a  search  for 
comparables  for  a  specified  year  might  include  a  listing  of  companies  that  have 
ceased  to  trade.  The  company  may  have  filed  for  bankruptcy,  ceased  to  trade  (activity 
change;  industry  classification  change;  name  change,  etc.  ),  or  its  results  for  a 
particular  year  when  reported  the  following  year  have  fallen  below  the  thresholds  for 
inclusion.  For  this  reason,  this  research  only  included  companies  active  and  not 
newly  formed,  in  the  search  for  comparables. 
Whichever  of  these  circumstances  applies,  the  fact  remains  that  there  may  be 
comparable  companies  whose  results  for  the  year  will  not  be  reported  because  their 
profits  or  profitability  is  too  low.  The  same  does  not  hold  true  in  reverse.  Companies 
with  higher  levels  of  turnover  and  higher  profits  will  never  be  excluded  in  this 
manner. 
Another  factor  which  may  distort  results  is  the  arrival  of  companies  which  have 
started  to  trade  or  have  formed  new  subsidiaries,  such  as  those  with  start-up  losses,  or 
lower  profitability.  It  is  expected  in  the  normal  run  of  business  that  when  some 
96 companies  exit  a  market  others  enter.  Other  than  during  periods  of  recession, 
problems  that  arise  by  companies  ceasing  to  trade  should  be  offset  by  that  of 
companies  entering  the  market  (Casley  et  al,  2002). 
5.3.4  Matching  Years 
The  final  problem  to  be  considered  in  relation  to  comparable  data  is  that  of  the  results 
reported  by  comparable  companies  for  the  years  prior  to  an  economic  condition  and 
the  presumably  lower/higher  results  which  would  be  appropriate  for  a  specified  year. 
If  current  prices  were  set  prospectively  on  the  basis  of  budgets  or  projections  that  do 
not  predict  the  effects  of  economic  conditions,  then  the  effects  of  future  economic 
conditions  may  generate  the  correct  result.  Specifically,  if  a  gross  margin  was  set 
using  comparable  data  and  was  expected  to  give  a  particular  return,  lower  sales  or  the 
greater  effort  required  to  make  constant  sales  will  result  in  lower  profits. 
Other  issues  can  be  considered  in  the  situation  companies  face  when  setting  prices  for 
a  specified  year  when  an  economic  condition  is  upon  them,  but  in  the  absence  of 
much  of  the  detailed  data  for  the  previous  year.  To  alleviate  this  problem,  the  OECD 
recommends  the  use  of  multiple  year  data  (OECD,  1995,  Para.  1.49)  to  examine  data 
over  a  complete  business  cycle,  or  for  as  much  of  it  as  there  is  data  to  be  found. 
Business  cycles,  however,  can  be  long  (possibly  ten  years  from  peak  to  peak)  and  the 
amount  of  data  required  to  do  this  in  full  can  be  overwhelming.  In  many  cases, 
however,  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  collect  data  for  the  full  cycle  since  half  the  cycle 
should  eliminate  any  major  imbalances  in  the  data  reported  and  give  a  fair  result. 
Taking  the  assumption  of  a  ten-year  cycle  for  a  given  industry,  in  general  terms  this 
would  imply  that  three  to  five  years  of  data  would  give  a  reasonably  reliable  result. 
The  effect  of  using  multiple  year  data  is  that  profits  will  be  lower  than  they  would 
otherwise  be  in  a  prosperous  year  and  will  be  somewhat  higher  than  they  would  be  in 
a  poor  one. 
5  .4 
Applying  TNMM  and  CPM 
5.4.1  Classification 
In  selecting  broadly  comparable  companies,  both  TNMM  and  CPM  emphasizes  the 
functions  and  risks  of  the  tested  party  relative  to  those  of  the  uncontrolled  companies. 
These  function-based  and  risk-based  comparability  standards  are  relatively  relaxed, 
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transaction-based  methods  (comparable  uncontrolled  price  method,  resale  price 
method,  and  cost  plus  method). 
The  focus  on  operating  profitability  makes  CPM  less  sensitive  to  accounting 
classification  differences  than  the  traditional  transaction-based  methods.  Therefore, 
CPM  may  be  more  appropriate  than  other  methods  in  cases  in  which  the  financial  data 
of  the  uncontrolled  comparables  are  not  sufficiently  detailed  to  make  reliable 
judgments  about  differences  in  accounting  classifications  between  the  uncontrolled 
comparables  and  the  tested  party. 
Classification  differences  are  only  one  example  of  a  data  issue  that  taxpayers  may 
face  when  testing  their  transfer  prices.  Taxpayers  operating  in  countries  outside  of 
OECD  member  countries,  specifically  in  countries  that  lack  stringent  financial 
reporting  requirements,  may  find  themselves  dependent  on  erroneously  reported 
financial  data  or  reported  information  that  lacks  sufficient  relevant  income  statement, 
balance  sheet,  and  financial  ratio  data  to  perform  a  CPM  or  TNMM  analysis  using 
local  comparables  (Feinschriber,  2001).  In  addition  to  including  companies  with 
similar  size  in  the  datasets,  this  research  uses  four-digit  SIC  (standard  industry 
classification)  code  and  considers  the  business  activity  description  of  each  company 
in  order  to  obtain  valuable  comparable  sets. 
5.4.2  Adjustment 
It  is  required  that  appropriate  adjustments  should  be  made  for  differences  in  functions, 
risks,  economic  conditions,  and  other  factors  for  which  reliable  adjustments  are 
possible,  before  performing  comparisons.  OECD  and  US  IRS  regulations  do  not 
provide  specific  formulas  for  incorporating  adjustments  into  the  analysis.  Practitioners 
typically  adjust  for  differences  in  terms  of  payment  and  inventory,  as  measured  by 
relative  accounts  payable,  accounts  receivable,  and  inventory  ratios.  Based  on  the 
availability  of  reliable  data  and  the  relevance  to  the  functions  performed  by  the  tested 
party,  adjustments  based  on  additional  financial  statement  items  may  be  incorporated 
into  the  analysis  (Feinschriber,  2001).  The  adjusted  data  for  the  comparable 
companies  establish  the  arm's-length  range.  The  arm's-length  range  may  consist  of  the 
results  of  all  of  the  uncontrolled  comparables  that  meet  the  following  conditions: 
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bles  is  sufficiently  complete  that  it  is  likely  that  all  material  differences  have 
been  identified,  each  such  difference  has  a  definite  and  reasonably 
ascertainable  effect  on  price  or  profit,  and  an  adjustment  is  made  to  eliminate 
the  effect  of  each  such  difference"  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-1  (e)(2)(iii)(A)). 
OECD  Guidelines  specify  that  a  range  of  prices  or  profit  results  may  qualify  as  arm's 
length.  It  also  observes  that  a  range  may  be  particularly  appropriate  when  TNMM  is 
applied.  Substantial  deviations  within  the  range  may  reflect  variations  in  the  reliability 
of  data  supporting  the  various  points  within  the  range.  By  contrast,  US  regulations 
suggest  that  such  deviations  may  reflect  a  lack  of  complete  comparability.  OECD 
Guidelines  do  not  follow  the  US  approach  of  adjusting  for  suspiciously  wide  ranges 
by  applying  statistical  methods  such  as  the  inter-quartile  range,  but  rather  simply 
proposes  "further  analysis.  "  Moreover,  while  US  regulations  provide  that  controlled 
transactions  that  fall  without  the  arm's-length  range  will  ordinarily  be  adjusted  to  the 
midpoint  of  the  range,  OECD  Guidelines  simply  note  that  there  are  arguments  both 
for  adjusting  to  the  midpoint  and  for  adjusting  to  the  nearest  end  point  (OECD,  1995, 
Chap.  I,  paras.  1.45-1.48). 
Where  differences  in  the  characteristics  of  the  companies  being  compared  have  a 
material  effect  on  the  net  margins  being  used,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  apply 
TNMM  without  making  adjustments  for  such  differences.  OECD  Guidelines 
emphasize  that  the  methods  are  applied  to  "particular  controlled  transactions"  out  of 
concern  that  the  methods  might  otherwise  be  applied  on  the  basis  of  aggregate 
financial  data  of  controlled  and  uncontrolled  enterprises  without  sufficient  regard  to 
differences  that  may  exist  between  their  actual  transactions  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  III, 
paras.  3.5,3.53). 
US  IRS  transfer  pricing  regulations  suggest  that,  if  it  is  not  possible  to  make  all 
adjustments,  the  arm's-length  range  should  be  statistically  reduced  to  increase  the 
reliability  of  the  analysis.  One  method  to  statistically  reduce  the  range  that  is 
presented  in  the  regulations  involves  using  an  inter-quartile  range  (Treas.  Reg.  § 
1.482-5  (e)(2)(iii)(B)).  The  inter-quartile  range  includes  the  25th  to  the  75th  percentile 
of  the  results  derived  from  the  uncontrolled  comparables  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5 
(e)(2)(iii)(C)).  Under  this  method  of  statistical  reduction,  the  arm's  length  range  for 
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the  financial  data  of  the  comparable  companies. 
When  employing  CPM,  transfer  pricing  regulations  suggest  that  PLIs  should  be 
derived  from  data  covering  a  sufficient  period  of  time  (multiple-year  data)  "to 
reasonably  measure  returns"  to  those  parties  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5  (B)(4)).  The  time 
period  generally  recommended  is  at  least  three  years,  including  the  taxable  year  at 
issue.  The  use  of  multiple-year  data  may  help  to  adjust  for  the  effect  of  short-term 
variations  unrelated  to  transfer  prices  that  may  affect  a  company's  operating 
profitability. 
Following  OECD,  US  IRS  and  practitioner  guidelines,  full  ranges  and  quartile  ranges 
were  developed  for  this  research  sample  (detailed  in  Chapter  6).  In  addition,  five 
different  PLIs,  recommended  by  OECD  Guidelines  and  the  US  IRS,  were  selected 
(detailed  in  5.4.4). 
5.4.3  Performing  a  Functional  Analysis  and  Identifying  Comparables 
The  first  step  in  applying  TNMM  and  CPM  is  to  analyze  the  functions  performed  by 
the  affiliate  in  question  and  the  risks  borne  by  that  affiliate,  and  to  determine  whether 
the  affiliate  owns  valuable  intangible  property.  The  second  step  is  to  identify 
potentially  comparable  transactions  or  companies.  OECD  Guidelines  recommend 
using  internal  comparables,  which  are  uncontrolled  transactions  in  which  the  affiliate 
participates.  Transactions  in  which  the  taxpayer  is  not  involved  should  be  used  only  if 
there  are  no  internal  comparable  transactions.  The  OECD  Guideline's  approach  is 
consistent  with  Section  482  of  US  IRS  regulations.  Companies  have  much  more 
detailed  information  about  transactions  in  which  they  participate  than  unrelated 
transactions  in  which  they  do  not  participate.  As  a  result,  the  comparability  of  the 
transactions  can  be  evaluated  with  more  accuracy  than  when  data  is  limited  to 
publicly  available  information  from  third-party  transactions.  For  the  purpose  of  this 
research,  all  data  was  gathered  from  publicly  available  sources  due  to  the  restrictive 
nature  of  internal  data. 
A  function  and  risk  assessment  should  be  performed  once  the  comparables  have  been 
identified,  whether  the  comparables  are  internally  generated  or  the  company  is  relying 
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for  external  comparables  than  for  analysis  of  the  affiliated  party.  Since  the  goal  is  to 
obtain  the  "correct"  arm's-length  answer,  great  care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  all 
differences  that  can  affect  profitability  are  identified  and  accounted  for  through 
adjustments  to  the  comparables. 
OECD  Guidelines  do  not  discuss  adjustments  for  differences  in  function  and  risk  in 
much  detail.  Instead,  they  emphasize  the  need  to  carefully  choose  comparables  that 
are  as  similar  in  function  and  product  as  is  possible.  "Where  differences  in 
characteristics  of  the  enterprises  being  compared  have  a  material  effect  on  the  net 
margins  being  used,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  apply  the  transactional  net  margin 
method  without  making  adjustments  for  such  differences"  (OECD,  1995,  B.  3.53). 
In  applying  CPM,  the  selection  of  broadly  similar  companies  does  not  require 
function  and  risk  differences  to  be  accounted  for  prior  to  determining  the  arm's-length 
range.  CPM  and  TNMM  are  identical  from  the  standpoint  of  adjustments  to  account 
for  function  and  risk  differences.  In  this  case,  US  regulations  require  the  use  of  the 
inter-quartile  range  for  setting  transfer  prices.  Function  and  risk  adjustments  are 
viewed  as  mandatory  if  a  true  arm's-length  range  is  to  be  determined. 
Due  to  the  absence  of  a  tested  party  and  the  lack  of  defined  information,  this  research 
uses  four-digit  SIC  codes  and  qualitative  descriptions  of  the  companies  in  order  to 
control  for  functions  of  the  companies  in  the  comparable  datasets. 
5.4.4  Choosing,  Profit-Level  Indicators  (Profit  Measures) 
After  deciding  which  comparables  are  to  be  used,  and  whether  to  make  adjustments 
for  differences  in  functions  and  risks,  it  is  necessary  to  choose  a  particular  measure  of 
profitability  in  applying  TNMM  and  CPM.  OECD  Guidelines  are  not  very  specific 
regarding  the  profit  measures  that  can  be  employed.  In  general,  it  is  a  good  idea  to 
employ  more  than  one  profitability  measure,  using  one  to  test  the  reasonableness  of 
the  others.  Using  this  additional  measure  to  test  the  selected  method  provides 
additional  assurance  that  the  transfer  pricing  is  reasonable,  assuming,  of  course,  that 
the  other  method  yields  a  result  consistent  with  the  original  method  chosen.  The 
choice  among  profit  level  indicators  generally  depends  on  the  nature  of  activities  of 
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level  indicators  produce  a  reliable  measure  of  an  arms'  length  result  (Treas.  Reg.  § 
1.482-5  (b)(4)).  All  the  profit-level  measures  used  in  TNMM  are  based  on  operating 
income,  which  is  gross  profit  less  operating  expenses.  Typically,  return  on  assets 
(operating  income/assets)  or  return  on  sales  (operating  income/net  sales)  are  the  two 
profit-level  measures  analyzed  to  determine  transfer  prices. 
OECD  Guidelines  state  that  "net  margins  are  less  affected  by  transactional  differences 
than  is  the  case  with  price,  as  used  in  the  CUP  method.  "  The  Guidelines  further  state, 
"The  net  margins  also  may  be  more  tolerant  to  some  functional  differences  between 
the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions  than  gross  profit  margins"  (OECD,  1995, 
B.  3.27).  In  addition,  the  net  margin  may  be  less  sensitive  to  differences  in  generally 
accepted  accounting  practices  across  countries  and  by  companies  within  a  country. 
OECD  Guidelines  list  several  considerations  to  take  into  account  when  deciding 
which  profit  measure  to  use,  including  "how  well  the  value  of  assets  employed  in  the 
calculations  is  measured"  (e.  g.,  to  what  extent  there  is  intangible  property,  the  value 
of  which  is  not  realized  on  the  books),  and  "the  factors  affecting  whether  specific 
costs  should  be  passed  through,  marked  up,  or  excluded  entirely  from  the  calculation" 
(OECD,  1995,  B.  3.41).  The  language  does  not  provide  much  guidance  as  to  the 
choice  of  a  profitability  measure,  with  the  measure  chosen  possibly  having  a 
significant  impact  on  the  validity  of  the  transfer  prices.  Profit  margin  might  be  a  good 
measure  when  evaluating  a  distributor  (or  other  type  of  selling  company)  and  can  be 
justified  to  use  for  other  similar  activities  in  determining  an  arm's  length  profit  range. 
To  establish  an  arm's-length  range  of  operating  profitability,  CPM  examines  the  PLIs 
achieved  by  companies  whose  function  and  risk  are  broadly  similar  to  those  of  the 
tested  party.  These  comparisons  are  typically  performed  on  a  period-weighted  average 
basis,  using  multiple-year  data  for  both  the  broadly  comparable  companies  and  the 
tested  party  during  the  same  time  period. 
CPM  presents  specific  examples  of  PLIs  that  may  provide  a  reliable  basis  for 
comparing  operating  profits  of  the  tested  party  and  uncontrolled  comparables  in  the 
transfer  pricing  regulations.  These  measures  are  the  return  on  capital  employed,  the 
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Transfer  pricing  regulations  also  allow  the  use  of  other  PLIs  appropriate  to  the  facts 
and  circumstances  of  the  controlled  company  and  its  inter-company  transactions. 
Specifically,  transfer  pricing  regulations  permit  the  use  of  other  PLIs  if  such  measures 
reliably  indicate  the  income  that  the  tested  party  would  have  earned  had  it  dealt  with 
companies  at  arm's  length  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5  (b)(4)(iii)).  Under  this  provision, 
any  measure  of  profit  based  on  objective  measures  of  profitability,  derived  from 
uncontrolled  comparables  that  engage  in  sufficiently  similar  business  activities  under 
similar  risks  and  circumstances,  may  be  employed. 
Transfer  pricing  regulations  do  not  express  a  strong  preference  for  choosing  among 
PLIs.  However,  consistent  with  selecting  the  best  method  of  analysis  under  the 
regulations,  a  critical  factor  to  consider  in  selecting  an  appropriate  PLI  is  the  extent  to 
which  that  PLI  is  likely  to  produce  a  reliable  measure  of  an  arm's-length  result.  This 
may  be  determined  based  on  the  criteria  described  under  the  best  method  rule  for 
CPM  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5  (C)(2)).  Factors  that  may  affect  the  reliability  of  the 
results  achieved  may  include  the  functions  performed  by  the  tested  party  and  the  reli- 
ability  of  the  available  tested  party  data  relative  to  the  data  of  the  uncontrolled 
comparables  (Treas.  Reg.  §  1.482-5  (C)). 
Several  profit-level  indicators  can  be  used,  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  the  tested  party.  Common  profit-level  indicators  include  rate  of  return  on  assets  and 
financial  ratios  such  as  operating  profits,  sales  or  gross  profits,  operating  expenses, 
and  others.  The  taxpayer  must  decide  which  profit-level  indicator  is  most  appropriate, 
or  if  a  combination  of  profit-level  indicators  should  be  used.  If  a  combination  is  used, 
the  taxpayer  must  then  determine  the  weights  given  to  the  various  indicators.  For  the 
purpose  of  this  research,  five  different  profit  measures  (PLIs)  based  on 
recommendations  by  OECD  Guidelines  and  the  US  IRS  and  used  by  practitioners 
were  obtained  (Tyrrall  et  al,  1999).  The  rationale  for  selecting  multiple  PLIs  being  to 
provide  a  more  in-depth  analysis  to  demonstrate  how  the  five  PLIs  perform  within 
each  comparable  set  (detailed  PLI  descriptions  and  formulas  provided  in  5.4.4.1-5) 
103 5.4.4.1  Profit  margin 
Profit  margin  %,  calculated  as  follows: 
Average  3-year  (1998-2000)  profit  before  tax  /Average  3  year  (1998-2000)  turnover 
Profit  before  tax  =  Turnover  -  Total  expenses  +other  income  -  Interest  paid  +/_  Exceptional  Items 
5.4.4.2  Profit  margin  on  sales 
Profit  margin  on  sales  %,  calculated  as  follows: 
Average  3  -year  (1998-2000)  operating  profit/Average  3  -year  (1998-2000)  turnover 
Operating  profit  a  Turnover-  Cost  of  Sales 
5.4.4.3  Net  margin 
Net  margin  (%),  calculated  as  follows: 
Average  3  -year  (1998-2000)  operating  profit/Average  3  -year  (1998-2000)  total  cost 
Operating  profit  -  Turnover  -  Cost  of  Sales 
Total  Cost  -  Cost  of  Sales  +  Other  Expenses 
5.4.4.4  Berry  ratio 
Berry  ratio  (%),  calculated  as  follows: 
Gross  profit  average  (1998-2000)  /  Cost  of  sales  average  (1998-2000) 
Gross  profit  -  Turnover  -  Cost  of  sales  average 
5.4.4.5  Return  on  assets 
Return  on  assets,  calculated  as  follows: 
Profit  before  tax  average  (1998-2000)  /Assets  3  -year  average  (1998-2000) 
Profit  before  tax  -Turnover  -Total  expenses  +other  income  -Interest  paid  +/  Exceptional  Items 
5.4.5  Determining  the  Appropriate  Time  Period  for  Analysis 
Once  the  profit  measure  or  measures  have  been  chosen,  they  must  be  computed  for 
each  of  the  comparables  and  for  the  controlled  transaction.  The  number  of  years  of 
financial  data  that  should  be  considered  is  open  to  question.  OECD  Guidelines 
provide  no  specific  advice,  merely  stating,  "Multiple  year  data  should  be  considered 
to  take  into  account  the  effects  on  profits  of  product  life  cycles  and  short-term 
economic  conditions"  (OECD,  1995,  B.  3.44).  For  the  purpose  of  this  study  the  most 
recent  and  comprehensive  data  was  used  covering  the  years  1998,1999,  and  2000. 
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Multiple-year  data  provide  many  advantages.  Businesses  are  subject  to  one-time 
events  that  create  an  abnormal  change  in  company  profits.  The  use  of  multiple  years 
evens  out  the  results  and  in  general  eliminates  the  short-run  issues  that  may  lead 
taxpayers  or  tax  collectors  to  reach  inappropriate  conclusions  regarding  the  adequacy 
of  transfer  pricing  policies. 
Another  advantage  of  using  multiple  years  concerns  companies  that  use  market 
penetration  strategies.  During  the  market  penetration  period,  profits  of  a  company  will 
be  lower  than  normal.  Ordinarily,  it  is  expected  that  a  company  engaged  in  a  market 
penetration  strategy  will  earn  above-normal  profits  after  the  market  penetration  period 
to  provide  a  return  on  its  investment,  that  is,  the  below  normal  profits  it  earned  during 
the  penetration  period.  However,  sometimes  the  market  penetration  is  merely  market 
maintenance  and  is  pursued  to  allow  the  company  to  remain  in  business  in  the  face  of 
intense  competition.  In  such  cases,  no  return  to  the  investment  accrues  to  the  company 
because  the  market  conditions  do  not  allow  it.  In  these  cases,  a  multiple-year  analysis 
may  be  required  to  adequately  assess  the  company's  transfer  pricing  policies.  These 
advantages  are  factored  in  the  design  of  this  research  and  averages  are  developed  for 
the  selected  period.  In  addition,  a  more  in-depth  analysis  of  low  profitability  (average 
operating  losses)  companies  will  be  provided  in  Section  3  of  Chapters  6  and  7  due  to 
the  large  number  of  companies  with  operating  losses  identified. 
(B)  Determining  the  Average  or  the  Range 
An  average  can  be  computed  in  several  ways  using  multiple-year  data.  Margins  can 
be  computed  for  each  company,  across  time,  with  a  simple  average  being  calculated. 
Alternatively,  margins  can  be  computed  using  a  weighted  average,  so  that  years  with 
higher  sales  will  have  more  weight.  By  contrast,  a  yearly  average  of  all  comparables 
(either  simple  or  weighted)  could  be  computed,  with  these  averages  then  averaged 
across  time.  The  method  of  averaging  depends,  to  some  degree,  on  the  reasons  for 
using  multiple-year  data.  If  the  overall  business  cycle  is  considered,  averaging  the 
individual  results  for  each  year  may  be  the  preferred  method.  In  this  case,  company- 
to-company  differences  within  a  year  are  suppressed,  so  that  the  overall  pattern  of 
profitability  across  time  becomes  clearer. 
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within  an  industry  is  highly  affected  by  the  product  life  cycle  and  different  companies 
are  in  different  portions  of  the  product  life  cycle  in  any  given  year.  The  two 
techniques  will  give  the  same  answer  if  simple  averages  are  employed.  For  the 
purpose  of  this  research,  a  simple  three-year  (1998-2000)  average  has  been  calculated 
using  the  yearly  data  from  the  companies'  annual  accounts. 
5.4.6  Selecting  the  Appropriate  Data  Source 
The  effect  of  selecting  TNMM  or  CPM  is  usually  driven  largely  by  the  nature  of  the 
data  available.  Both  TNMM  and  CPM  require  the  availability  of  a  great  deal  of  data 
on  a  wide  range  of  private  and  public  companies  in  addition  to  a  high  level  of 
disclosure  and  detailed  data.  In  the  US,  gross  margin  data  is  quite  likely  to  be 
available  in  both  public  and  private  companies  but  not  at  a  transactional  level,  nor 
even  by  product  line  or  business  segment.  The  UK  recognizes  the  US  position  (and 
the  OECD's  concern)  that  small  differences  in  product  or  level  of  the  market  are  likely 
to  have  a  greater  effect  on  prices  and  gross  margins  than  they  have  on  operating 
margins.  Operating  profits,  defined  as  turnover  less  cost  of  sales,  for  suitably 
comparable  companies  may  well  be  the  most  reliable  data  a  taxpayer  has  available. 
Two  factors  distinguish  the  UK  (OECD)  position  from  the  US  (IRS)  position.  First,  in 
the  absence  of  the  level  of  detail  available  in  the  US  it  is  often  impossible  to  apply 
TNMM  in  quite  the  precise  way  the  OECD  seems  to  envisage  in  its  Guidelines.  Of 
necessity,  then,  the  mechanism  by  which  TNMM  is  applied  looks  very  similar  to  the 
US  application  of  CPM.  Specifically,  the  operating  profits  of  a  number  of  companies 
are  reviewed  and  a  range  of  results  is  determined  which  is  then  used  to  set  prices 
and/or  evaluate  the  effects  of  transfer  prices  set. 
The  second  factor  is  one  that  renders  the  result  of  this  process,  similar  to  CPM,  closer 
to  the  OECD's  explanation  of  TNMM.  Since  there  is  a  great  deal  of  data  available  on 
the  profitability  of  private  as  well  as  public  companies  it  is  possible  to  ensure  that  the 
companies  being  used  for  the  purposes  of  comparison  are  not  the  larger  and  more 
diverse  businesses  which  are  generally  quoted  on  a  stock  market  exchange.  In  practice 
then,  it  is  likely  that  the  use  of  private  company  data  in  the  UK  means  that  the 
application  of  this  process  does  indeed  conform  to  the  narrower  profitability  analysis 
106 which  the  OECD  recommends  (Casley,  1999). 
The  use  of  private  company  data  is  not  without  its  problems.  There  is,  for  example,  a 
risk  that  results  will  be  affected  by  non-arm's  length  transactions  with  shareholders. 
These  non-arm's  length  transactions  may  take  the  form  of  inter-company  transactions 
or  appropriations  in  the  form  of  salaries.  This  factor  is  common  to  all  countries  where 
private  company  data  is  available  but  in  the  UK  at  least,  accounting  standards  are 
tightening  up  in  this  area  requiring  greater  disclosure  of  such  transactions.  In  addition, 
the  risk  is  greatest  in  relation  to  small  and  mid-size  companies  that  have  turnover  less 
than  £11.2m;  balance  sheet  total  less  than  £5.6m;  and,  less  than  250  employees.  For 
this  study,  these  smaller  and  mid-size  companies  have  been  excluded  from  the 
comparables  analysis. 
Because  MNEs  need  to  provide  documentation  on  the  property  being  transferred,  as 
well  as  on  the  economic  and  market  conditions  surrounding  the  controlled  versus 
uncontrolled  transactions  and  the  contractual  terms  that  have  been  agreed  upon,  the 
use  of  databases  has  become  noticeably  more  important  in  the  search  for  comparables 
by  MNEs.  Databases  are  useful  tools  since  they  contain  information  from  public 
disclosures  on  a  large  number  of  sectors  and  companies.  In  addition,  the  dependent 
and  independent  transactions  need  to  be  evaluated  in  terms  of  the  functions 
performed,  risks  assumed  and  intangibles  held  by  the  parties  involved  (Cools,  1999). 
Searching  databases  for  comparables  usually  starts  on  very  general  terms  with  an 
initially  broad  sector  definition  resulting  in  a  large  number  of  potentially  comparable 
companies.  More  specific  industry  codes  can  then  be  used  to  gradually  refine  the 
delineation  of  the  sector  and  to  eliminate  all  companies  which  are  not  concentrated  in 
the  defined  activity.  A  number  of  suggested  criteria  (Cools,  1999;  Tyrrall  et  al,  1999) 
were  used  by  this  study  to  filter  a  small  selection  of  the  most  similar  companies.  First, 
companies  engaged  in  a  variety  of  different  activities  are  excluded  from  the 
comparables  group.  Second,  companies  lacking  important  financial  data  can  be  elimi- 
nated.  The  similarity  of  the  products  transferred  by  the  comparable  company  is 
another  factor  to  evaluate,  as  is  the  maturity  of  the  comparable  company,  its  size  (in 
terms  of  sales  volume,  earnings  levels  or  number  of  employees),  growth  prospects  and 
competitive  position. 
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risks  undertaken  by  the  relevant  parties)  of  the  remaining  companies  should  be 
incorporated  explicitly  in  the  documentation  which  is  maintained  for  the  tax 
authorities.  The  final  aspect  of  the  search  for  comparables  often  consists  of  a  review 
of  the  annual  reports  (Must  be  consistent  with  UK  GAAP)  of  the  potential 
comparables.  The  resulting  selection  should  consist  of  companies  engaged  in 
activities  which  approximate  as  much  as  possible  the  activity  which  is  the  subject  of 
the  search.  Available  prices  and  margins  will  be  used  as  comparables.  Based  on  all 
relevant  evaluation  points,  necessary  adjustments  can  be  made  to  the  comparable  sets 
and  ratios  in  order  to  construct  an  arm's  length  range. 
"In  the  context  of  comparables  and  functional  analysis,  the  information 
elements  included  in  a  database  are  very  important.  While  some  databases 
focus  on  annual  reports,  others  offer  descriptive  business  information  or 
provide  shareholder  links.  The  presentation  of  financial  statements  varies 
significantly  from  database  to  database.  Complete  accounts  are  sometimes 
reported,  along  with  precalculated  financial  ratios,  while  other  databases 
report  only  abstracts  from  annual  accounts.  Consolidated  and  separate  income 
statements  per  company  product  line  are  sometimes  provided.  "  (Cools,  1999, 
pg.  169). 
When  developing  comparables  for  this  research,  the  search  for  an  appropriate 
database  was  conducted  in  order  to  obtain  independent  private  and  public  companies 
that  fulfilled  the  minimum  requirements:  annual  financial  statements  for  the  years 
ended  1998-2000;  description  of  business  activity;  standard  industrial  classification 
(SIC)  code;  unconsolidated  accounts;  and,  other  qualitative  and  quantitative 
information. 
There  are  several  sources  of  third  party  comparable  data  available  for  developing 
comparables  in  the  UK.  By  way  of  comparison  it  is  worth  noting  that  whilst  a  typical 
US  database  would  contain  data  on  roughly  15,000  companies,  the  principal  databases 
used  in  the  United  Kingdom  contain  data  on  over  200,000  (Casley,  1999).  Thus,  the 
large  number  of  companies  available  offers  the  answer  to  the  problem  of  detailed 
disclosure.  Examining  TNMM  and  CPM  on  UK  data  provides  a  comprehensive 
analysis  as  it  ensures  coverage  of  large  numbers  of  companies.  It  is  necessary  to 
obtain  a  sufficiently  large  sample  to  ensure  that  the  resulting  range  is  not  materially 
distorted  by  a  few  companies  which  are  not  truly  comparable. 
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carefully  applied,  are  not  so  far  apart  in  the  UK  as  might  be  the  case  in  other 
jurisdictions.  As  a  result,  TNMM  is  increasingly  used  by  taxpayers  to  set  or 
evaluate  transfer  prices.  Inland  Revenue  is  not  permitted  to  disclose  data 
obtained  from  other  taxpayers  meaning  that  they  could  not  use  it  in  tax  court 
proceedings.  The  practical  effect  of  this  is  that  "secret  comparables"  are  not 
used  in  the  UK  although  IR  is  quite  adept  at  transferring  the  experience  it 
gains  in  dealing  with  one  taxpayer  to  its  investigation  of  the  next.  "  (Casley, 
1999,  pg.  6) 
If  the  distinction  between  CPM  and  TNMM  is  that  a  TNMM  analysis  is  performed  on 
a  narrower  income  statement,  then  it  would  appear  that  the  nature  of  the  data  available 
in  the  UK  goes  a  long  way  towards  ensuring  that  the  main  concerns  of  the  OECD  are 
largely  met.  Whether  it  is  called  CPM  or  TNMM,  any  method  which  selects  a  suitable 
profit  level  indicator  and  establishes  a  range  of  results  from  a  reasonably  sized  sample 
of  companies  is,  in  fact,  an  acceptable  method. 
5.5  Summary 
The  transactional  net  margin  method  endorsed  in  OECD  Guidelines  and  the 
comparables  profit  method  used  by  the  IRS  are  conceptually  the  same  method  of 
determining  transfer  prices.  The  differences  between  the  two  methods  lie  in  the 
nuances  of  their  application,  particularly  the  priority  in  applying  these  methods  (best 
method  rule  vs.  last  resort)  and  the  US  IRS  emphasis  on  the  inter-quartile  range  and 
adjustment  to  the  midpoint.  Several  factors  must  be  carefully  considered  when 
applying  TNMM  and  CPM.  Many  of  the  same  factors  must  be  considered  in  applying 
any  transfer  pricing  method. 
In  theory,  comparables  face  tension  which  would  suggest  that  MNEs  have  a 
competitive  advantage  whereas  the  regulations  reinforce  that  they  should  be 
equivalents.  Given  this  theoretical  tension,  the  comparable  should  include  function 
and  risk  of  indigenous  company  and  data.  The  conceptual  implication  of  examining 
different  methods  of  creating  comparables  should  relate  to  the  function  and  risk 
profile.  That  raises  the  question  whether  different  methods  of  creating  comparables 
comply  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  to  function  and  risk? 
By  more  closely  inspecting  comparable  ranges  by  differing  regulations  among 
109 different  industries,  testing  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  (profit  and 
taxes),  and  examining  the  loss  making  companies  which  are  ignored  under  the  new 
profit  methods,  this  study  helps  to  answer  whether  the  new  methods  curb  MNE 
discretion.  Even  if  discretion  is  safeguarded,  the  regulations  may  change  MNE 
behavior  in  respect  of  taxes.  Thus,  contemporaneous  documentation  may  cause 
existing  methods  to  be  re-evaluated. 
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Research  Method  and  Methodology 6.1  Introduction 
One  of  the  main  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  different  regulatory  frameworks  adopted  by 
different  countries  as  discussed  in  Chapters  Four  and  Five  is  that  different  countries 
are  subject  to  different  rules,  regulations,  and  recommendations  from  their  tax 
authorities  and  governments.  The  exercise  of  discretion  may  be  country  based  and  can 
be  possible  by  methods  chosen.  The  importance  of  comparables  and  comparables  data 
is  strengthened  through  the  adoption  of  profit  based  methods. 
The  lack  of  experience  with  the  application  of  transactional  profit  methods  across  a 
representative  number  of  OECD  member  countries  makes  it  difficult  to  precisely  fix 
all  the  limitations  on  the  use  of  these  methods.  Transactional  profit  methods  are  being 
recognized  as  methods  that  assist  in  determining  cases  of  last  resort  whether  transfer 
pricing  complies  with  the  arm's  length  principle.  In  addition,  testing  profit-based 
methods  will  illuminate  the  quality  of  the  recommended  documentation  including 
comparables  that  companies  are  required  to  prepare  under  the  new  UK  requirements 
corporation  tax  self-assessment.  This  chapter  addresses  the  methodology  adopted 
throughout  this  research  and  provides  a  detailed  description  of  each  of  the  four 
sections  of  this  research  including  the  related  hypotheses  for  each  individual  section, 
and  an  explanation  of  each  of  the  relevant  statistical  tests  used. 
6.2  Research  Methodology 
This  research  adopts  a  more  positivist  methodological  paradigm.  It  is  structured  upon 
the  ontological  position  that  reality  is  external  and  objective  (Easterby  et  al,  1996), 
and  that  the  patterns  and  regularities  that  are  exhibited  in  society  are  not  simply 
random  (Rose  &  Sullivan,  1996).  This  study  is  primarily  faced  with  the  task  of 
identifying  the  causal  explanations  and  the  fundamental  laws  that  underlie  these 
regularities  in  human  social  behavior.  Nearer  to  the  objectivist  end  of  the  subjective- 
objective  continuum  put  forward  by  Morgan  and  Smircich  (1980),  this  research  takes 
on  a  methodological  approach  that  is  principally  based  on  the  ontological  assumption 
that  the  social  world  is  an  evolving  process,  concrete  in  nature,  but  ever-changing  in 
detailed  form.  Everything  is  seen  as  interacting  with  everything  else,  making  as  such 
the  endeavor  to  find  determinate  causal  relationships  between  constituent  processes  an 
extremely  difficult  task. 
112 Within  this  ontological  context,  human  beings  are  seen  as  existing  in  an  ongoing 
interactive  relationship  with  their  contextual  world,  influencing  and  being  influenced 
by  it.  The  process  of  exchange  that  operates  between  the  individual  and  the 
environment  is  essentially  a  competitive  one;  the  individual  is  seen  as  seeking  to 
interpret  and  exploit  the  environment  to  satisfy  important  needs,  and  hence  survive. 
Following  classic  empirical  social  sciences  research,  and  on  the  premises  of  the 
theory-testing,  hypothetico-deductive  approach,  this  study  begins  with  theory  -  seen 
as  a  form  of  selective  focusing,  a  means  of  separating  out  from  a  complex,  confusing 
world  those  elements  of  social  reality  that  warrant  special  attention and  investigation, 
and  then  aims,  on  the  basis  of  the  selected  theory,  to  deduce  and  further  test 
hypotheses  about  relationships  which  ought  to  exist  if  the  theory  is  correct.  It  is 
specifically  within  this  positivist  methodological  context  of  theory  statement,  concept 
operationalization,  and  hypothesis  testing  via  prediction  and  empirical  observation, 
that  the  present  research  endeavour  progresses  (Figure  6-1). 
This  study  seeks  to  investigate  the  phenomenon  of  comparables  of  the  profit-based 
method  of  ITP,  profits  and  losses  of  foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US- 
owned)  compared  to  domestic  owned  companies  in  the  UK  and,  tax  payments  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese  and  US-owned)  compare  to  domestic  companies 
in  the  UK  through  the  use  of  the  secondary  data  source  FAME  database.  In  the 
course  of  this  study,  and  within  the  selected  methodological  path: 
1.  An  initial  research  problem  has  been  identified. 
2.  The  theoretical  concepts  that  form  the  propositions  have  been  initially 
clarified  (operational  definitions  of  the  concepts  involved,  each  conceptual 
proposition  of  the  previous  stage  has  been  usefully  restated  in  testable 
terms  in  order  to  develop  a  set  of  research  hypotheses). 
3.  On  the  basis  of  the  concept  operationalization,  and  by  means  of 
observation,  relevant  data  have  been  collected,  processed  and  analysed  in 
an  attempt  to  falsify  the  stated  hypotheses,  that  is,  in  an  attempt  to  reach  a 
conclusion  about  whether  or  not  (and  to  what  extent)  the  results  obtained 
lend  support  to  the  hypotheses. 
113 4.  Finally,  an  effort  has  been  made,  so  that  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the 
findings,  as  well  as  any  further  insights  gained  in  the  overall  process  of  the 
study,  are  brought  to  bear  on  the  initial  research  problem. 
In  addition  to  the  main  research  method,  this  study  conducted  interviews  to  check  the 
validity  of  the  findings.  As  defined  by  Denzin  (1970)  triangulation  is  the  combination 
of  methodologies  in  study  of  the  same  phenomenon.  Denzin  argues  multiple  and 
independent  methods,  especially  if  investigating  the  same  problem  and  reaching  the 
same  conclusion,  have  greater  validity  and  reliability  than  a  single  methodological 
approach  to  a  problem. 
Figure  6-1:  The  process  of  deduction 
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Source:  (Gill,  J.  -  Johnson  2002,  Pg.  39) 
While  the  methodological  core  of  this  research  for  Section  1  is  limited  to  the  rules  and 
recommendations  of  OECD  and  US  IRS  regulations,  the  remaining  three  sections  are 
based  on  the  shortcomings  of  previous  empirical  studies.  Data  was  collected  by 
means  of  electronic  database  (FAME)  and  was  designed  to  obtain  measurements  of. 
-  Profit  ranges  (PLIs); 
-  Size; 
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-  Profit  ranges  (PLIs); 
-  Size; 
114 -  Operating  performance, 
-  Ownership;  and, 
-  Taxation. 
The  research  design  only  considers  null  hypotheses.  Alternative  hypotheses  such  as 
Japanese  subsidiaries  reporting  lower  profits  than  their  UK  counterparts  could  not  be 
adequately  tested  by  this  research  at  this  time  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Most 
empirical  evidence  is  US-based  with  a  limited  number  of  UK-based  studies.  In 
addition,  very  few  empirical  studies  (Munday  &  Peel,  1997)  were  conducted  based  on 
1993-1994  data  (before  the  introduction  of  profit  based  methods),  while  others 
(Oyelere  and  Emmanuel)  did  not  focus  on  comparables.  US  evidence  was  monitored 
under  different  tax  systems  than  the  UK  and  was  subject  to  substantial  changes  i.  e. 
IRS  1986  Changes. 
This  research  tests  comparables  based  on  PLIs  suggested  by  profit  methods. 
Alternative  hypotheses  might  require  different  profit  measures  than  the  ones  used  by 
comparable  methods.  It  is  entirely  possible  that  other  elements  such  as  government 
policy  could  influence  whether  higher  or  lower  profits  were  reported  overseas  or  at 
home.  As  noted  from  Chapter  Three,  empirical  studies  are  limited  in  testing  MNEs' 
discretion.  Although  alternative  hypotheses  have  been  recognized,  there  is  no 
foundation  either  theoretically  or  empirically  to  test  them  in  UK  settings. 
The  FAME  database  was  chosen  as  the  most  suitable  method  given  the  particular 
characteristics  and  ends  of  the  research  endeavour.  One  strong  argument  for  the 
employment  of  a  database  with  annual  accounts  data  is  to  test  the  profit-based 
methods  TNMM  and  CPM,  which  requires  data  on  a  wide  range  of  private  and  public 
companies  in  addition  to  a  high  level  of  disclosure  and  detailed  data.  Financial 
information  is  necessary  to  examine  comparables  and  the  performance  of  foreign. 
owned  companies. 
From  a  methodological  point  of  view,  the  use  of  secondary  data  (financial  statements) 
carries  a  number  of  advantages.  Because  it  is  formalized  and  published,  secondary 
data  often  comes  to  be  attributed  with  an  exaggerated  status  of  'truth'.  Its  objectivity 
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publication  in  which  it  appears.  Thus  greater  integrity  is  accorded  to  information  from 
a  recognized  and  accepted  source  such  as  the  FAME  database  which  obtain  the  data 
from  records  filed  at  Companies  House,  consistent  with  UK  GAAP,  accepted  by  the 
IR,  and  used  by  practitioners. 
According  to  Thietart  et  al,  (2001),  formalization  of  data  in  a  ready  to  use  format  can 
lead  researchers  to  take  the  validity  of  this  data,  which  they  are  manipulating,  for 
granted.  Similarly  received  ideas  exist  about  the  impact  secondary  data  has  on  the 
research's  internal  validity.  The  apparently  strict  organization  of  available  data  can 
suggest  that  it  would  be  easier  to  control  the  internal  validity  of  research  based  on  it. 
However,  internal  validity  should  be  demonstrated  through  the  validity  of  the 
constructs  it  uses,  that  is,  by  clarifying  and  justifying  the  connections  between  the 
construct  and  the  operational  procedure  through  which  it  is  manipulated  (Stablein, 
1996).  Podsakoff  and  Dalton  (1987)  found  that  only  4.48  percent  of  authors  provided 
proof  of  the  validity  of  their  constructs  in  the  published  articles  they  examined.  The 
formalization  of  secondary  data  can  thus  be  wrongly  assimilated  to  an  intrinsic 
soundness.  This  last  received  idea  leads  researchers  to  believe  their  research  will 
somehow  be  made  secure  by  the  use  of  secondary  data.  But,  by  attributing  an  a  priori 
degree  of  confidence  to  the  secondary  data  they  manipulate,  researchers  are  in  fact 
simply  externalizing  (by  passing  this  responsibility  to  others)  the  risks  connected  to 
the  internal  validity  of  their  work  (Thietart  et  al,  2001). 
The  same  shortcomings  apply  to  the  use  of  secondary  data  to  increase  the  validity  of 
results  and  their  generalization.  External  validity  is  also  conditioned,  by  the  validity  of 
the  work  the  secondary  data  has  been  drawn  from. 
"The  greater  accessibility  of  secondary  data  is  another  disputable  received 
idea.  Such  a  belief  can  give  researchers  an  impression  of  the  completeness  of 
their  research,  convinced  they  have  had  access  to  all  available  data.  The 
apparent  ease  of  accessing  secondary  data  can  lead  researchers  either  to  be 
quickly  inundated  with  too  much  data,  or  to  be  too  confident  that  they  have 
'gone  over  the  whole  question"  (Thietart  et  al,  2001,  pg.  75). 
Parallel  to  the  common  acceptance  that  secondary  data  is  fairly  inflexible  (thus 
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believe  that  secondary  data  must  be  more  reliable  than  primary  data.  This  is,  however, 
a  naive  belief  as  the  fact  that  secondary  data  is  fixed  and  formalized  does  not  in  any 
way  signify  that  the  phenomena  it  describes  are  similarly  fixed  and  formalized.  As 
shown  previously  in  Chapter  Five,  developing  comparables  and  obtaining  data  on 
different  group  of  companies  is  complicated  and  involves  researcher  judgment.  In 
other  words,  the  use  of  secondary  data  such  as  databases  can  bring  with  it  greater 
exposure  to  a  maturation  effect. 
To  increase  the  study's  ecological  validity,  this  research  collected  data  from  a  primary 
source  by  the  mean  of  series  of  interviews  that  could  enrich  and  provide  triangulation 
for  and  authentication  of  the  findings  that  emerged  from  the  use  of  the  database.  The 
participants  were  mainly  consultants  and  tax  and  ITP  experts. 
6.3  Research  Design 
The  research  design  consists  of  four  different  sections:  a  comparison  of  the  OECD'S 
TNMM  and  the  US  IRS'  CPM;  a  comparative  analysis  of  foreign-owned  vs.  UK- 
owned  companies;  an  analysis  of  operating  losses,  and,  a  tax  analysis.  Figure  6-2 
outlines  the  main  research  questions,  identifies  the  sequence  of  the  research 
questions,  states  the  data  obtained  and  the  matching  criteria  for  each  research 
question,  and  presents  the  linkage  between  the  research  questions  and  the  findings. 
The  first  section  provides  an  investigation  of  comparable  companies  in  the  UK.  By 
applying  profit-based  methods  of  transfer  pricing  (TNMM  and  CPM),  Section  1 
highlights  OECD  profit  ranges  and  compares  them  to  US  IRS  profit  ratios  using  the 
same  data  sets.  It  also  presents  the  variation  between  these  two  methods  in  practice 
and  offers  comparisons  between  profit  measures  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
comparable  ranges.  Finally,  Section  1  provides  analysis  of  the  PLIs  for  each  of  the 
sample  industries  in  an  attempt  to  draw  a  conclusion  on  TNMM  and  CPM  in  terms  of 
the  alternatives  they  provide  for  MNEs'  compliance. 
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118 The  second  section  extends  previous  research  by  presenting  a  comparative  analysis 
between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of  foreign-owned  companies  (US- 
and  Japanese-owned)  against  the  performance  of  domestic  UK-owned  companies.  In 
addition,  Section  2  attempts  to  highlight  the  importance  of  the  form  of  the  investment 
represented  by  joint  ventures  on  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies. 
The  third  section  of  this  research  endeavors  to  provide  some  lessons  by  comparing 
foreign-owned  companies  (US-owned  and  Japanese-owned)  with  negative  operating 
profits  to  UK-owned  companies.  Section  3  attempts  to  provide  some  evidence  on  the 
existence  of  large  number  of  loss  making  foreign  companies  since  non-profitable 
companies  cannot  remain  perpetually  active. 
The  fourth  section  focuses  on  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing  regulations  introduced  in 
1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment  and  its  impact  on  the  behavior  of  both  foreign- 
owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  By  comparing  the  amount  of  tax  expense  reported 
by  foreign-owned  companies  (US-  and  Japanese-owned)  and  UK-owned  companies 
prior  and  subsequent  to  the  latest  UK  1998  regulations,  Section  4  provides  an 
overview  of  the  ramifications  of  the  contemporaneous  documentation. 
Finally,  a  number  of  interviews  were  conducted  with  ITP  specialists  in  order  to 
validate  the  findings  in  the  prior  four  sections  as  well  as  to  obtain  an  update  on  ITP 
developments  on  both  theoretical  and  practical  matters. 
6.3.1  Section  1:  OECD  (TNMM)  vs.  US  IRS  (CPM) 
As  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  5,  TNMM  shares  several  common  principles  with 
the  CPM.  For  example,  both  CPM  and  TNMM  indicate  the  use  of  a  range  of 
operating  profitability  measures  to  test  whether  a  transfer  price  is  consistent  with  an 
arm's  length  standard,  allow  for  the  use  of  multiple-year  data,  require  adjustments  for 
differences  between  the  tested  party  and  uncontrolled  comparables  that  would  affect 
price,  emphasize  functional  comparability  in  selecting  uncontrolled  comparables,  and 
require  examination  of  data  from  only  one  side  of  the  transaction.  OECD  Guidelines 
state,  "it  is  important  to  take  into  account  a  range  of  results  when  using  TNMM 
(OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.45).  The  use  of  a  range  of  adjusted  results  controls  for 
unique  business  circumstances  among  the  comparable  companies  and  the  tested  party. 
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companies  identified,  once  appropriate  adjustments  have  been  incorporated.  CPM 
discussion  in  the  transfer  pricing  regulations  recommends  the  statistical  reduction  of 
the  range  of  observations  of  the  comparables  if  it  is  not  possible  to  make  all 
adjustments,  and  provides  the  inter-quartile  range  as  an  example  of  a  statistical 
reduction  method.  TNMM  also  does  not  prescribe  a  specific  method  for  narrowing  the 
range  of  comparables  identified.  OECD  Guidelines  acknowledge  "because  transfer 
pricing  is  not  an  exact  science,  there  may  be  many  occasions  when  the  application  of 
the  most  appropriate  method  or  methods  produces  a  range  of  figures  which  are 
relatively  reliable.  "  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  I,  para.  1.45). 
OECD  Guidelines,  similar  to  US  IRS  transfer  pricing  regulations,  suggest  that 
multiple-year  average  data  be  examined  for  both  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled 
parties  to  the  extent  that  operating  profitability  is  compared  using  a  profit-based 
method  such  as  TNMM  or  CPM  (OECD,  1995,  Chap.  III,  paras.  3.44).  Use  of 
multiple-year  data  provides  information  about  relevant  business  or  product  cycles  that 
may  have  a  material  effect  on  transfer  pricing  conditions  assessed  in  determining 
comparability.  TNMM,  similar  to  CPM,  is  more  tolerant  of  functional  differences 
than  transaction  based  methods  because  "differences  in  functions  performed  between 
enterprises  are  often  reflected  in  variations  in  operating  expenses.  "  (OECD,  1995, 
Chap.  III,  para.  3.27).  Therefore,  a  set  of  independent  companies  may  display  wide 
disparities  in  PLIs  but  similar  levels  of  operating  profits. 
TNMM  also  recommends  the  use  of  several  financial  ratios  in  establishing  an  arm's- 
length  range.  The  financial  ratios  presented  in  the  TNMM  discussion  in  OECD 
Guidelines  include  the  return  on  capital  employed  (referred  to  as  the  "return  on 
assets"),  operating  income  to  sales  (which  is  equivalent  to  the  net  margin  described  in 
the  CPM  discussion),  and  other  possible  measures  of  net  profit  (OECD,  1995,  Chap. 
III,  para.  3.27). 
Similar  to  CPM,  under  TNMM,  the  choice  of  financial  ratios  is  based  on  available 
financial  data.  For  example,  the  extent  to  which  the  value  of  the  assets  employed  in 
the  business  activities  may  be  measured  is  essential  to  the  application  of  the  return  on 
assets.  If  the  income,  costs,  and  assets  of  the  relevant  business  activity  and  the  other 
120 activities  cannot  be  isolated,  OECD  Guidelines  state  that: 
The  principal  distinctions  between  TNMM  and  CPM  are  the  application  of  method 
(TNMM  (last  resort)  vs.  CPM  (best  method))  and  their  approach  to  aggregation  of 
financial  data  concerning  controlled  and  uncontrolled  transactions.  CPM  requires  that 
the  analysis  be  based  on  the  "most  narrowly  identifiable  business  activity"  for  which 
financial  data  is  available.  By  contrast,  OECD  Guidelines  begin  on  the  presumption 
that  transactions  are  ideally  analyzed  individually  and  that  each  level  of  aggregation 
must  be  justified.  "Aside  from  the  issue  of  when  it  is  appropriate  to  use,  a  careful 
application  of  CPM  is  fully  consistent  with  the  TNMM  rules  of  the  OECD 
Guidelines"  (Cole,  pg,  9-35).  Critics  of  CPM  in  some  OECD  countries  are  concerned 
that  "the  most  narrowly  identifiable  business  activity"  may  exceed  the  degree  of 
aggregation  that  would  be  acceptable  under  the  Guidelines  (Taly,  1996). 
6.3.1.1  Hypotheses  -  Section  1 
UK  based  Companies  that  incurred  3-yr.  (1998-2000)  average  operating  losses,  or 
maintained  consolidated  accounts  (in  the  case  of  a  group  of  companies  with  a 
common  parent  company)  were  eliminated  from  this  test. 
Hypothesis  1:  Full  Profit  Range  vs.  Inter-Quartile  Profit  Range 
The  two  methods  of  regulating  transfer  price  are  the  OECD's  TNMM  and  the  US 
IRS's  CPM.  The  OECD  describes  TNMM  as  computing  the  appropriate  net  profit  on 
particular  transactions  or  groups  of  transactions.  TNMM  is  usually  applied  when 
comparing  the  net  margin  resulting  from  a  group  of  related  party  transactions  with  the 
net  profit  margins  of  independent  companies  that  are  engaged  in  broadly  comparable 
transactions.  Under  CPM,  the  profitability  of  the  user  affiliate's  closest  competitor 
(operating  in  the  same  or  similar  market  as  the  user  affiliate  but  without  the 
intangible)  is  used  to  compute  a  "normal"  profit  for  the  user  affiliate.  The  user 
affiliate's  profitability  net  of  royalty  payment  must  be  equal  to  the  profitability  of  its 
closest  competitor  which  does  not  have  the  intangible.  Essentially  the  principle 
underlying  this  arm's  length  return  concept  is  that  a  user  affiliate  may  earn  the  same 
return  (or  profitability)  as  a  competitor  who  does  not  have  the  intangible. 
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adoption  of  TNMM  and  the  US  IRS'  adoption  of  CPM  including,  whether  there  are, 
in  fact,  substantial  differences  between  TNMM  and  CPM;  how  TNMM  and  CPM  is 
applied  in  practical  situations;  the  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  TNMM  and 
CPM.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  whether  OECD  and  US  IRS  international  transfer 
pricing  (ITP)  regulations  as  represented  by  TNMM  and  CPM,  where  applied,  are  able 
to  determine  the  arm's  length  price?  To  help  answer  this  research  question,  a  null 
hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Hol:  There  are  no  differences  between  OECD  profit  ranges  (represented  by  a  full 
range)  and  IRS  profit  ranges  (represented  by  inter-auartile  ranges). 
Hypothesis  2:  Profit  Level  Indicators  (PLIs)  in  All  Industries  Combined 
After  deciding  which  comparables  are  to  be  used,  and  whether  to  make  adjustments 
for  differences  in  functions  and  risks,  it  is  necessary  to  select  a  particular  measure  of 
profitability  in  applying  TNMM  and  CPM.  OECD  Guidelines  are  not  very  specific 
regarding  the  profit  measures  that  can  be  employed.  In  general,  it  is  feasible  to 
employ  more  than  one  PLI  or  profitability  measure.  Using  this  additional  measure  to 
test  the  selected  method  provides  additional  assurance  that  the  profit  range  is 
reasonable,  assuming,  of  course,  that  the  other  method  yields  a  result  consistent  with 
the  original  method  chosen. 
Several  profit-level  indicators  can  be  used,  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  the  tested  party.  The  taxpayer  must  decide  which  profit-level  indicator  is  most 
appropriate,  or  if  a  combination  of  profit-level  indicators  should  be  used.  If  a 
combination  is  used,  the  taxpayer  must  then  determine  the  weights  given  to  the 
various  indicators.  For  the  purpose  of  this  research,  five  different  PLIs  were  obtained 
from  recommendations  by  OECD  Guidelines  and  the  US  IRS  as  follows:  profit 
margin;  profit  margin  on  sales;  net  margin;  Berry  ratio;  and,  return  on  assets.  The 
underlying  principle  for  selecting  multiple  PLIs  being  to  provide  a  more  in-depth 
analysis  to  demonstrate  how  the  five  PLIs  perform  within  each  comparable  set 
(detailed  PLI  descriptions  and  formulas  provided  in  5.4.4.1-5.4.4.5).  The  argument 
that  can  be  put  forward  is  whether  there  is  any  difference  in  using  one  PLI  over 
another?  Additionally,  do  different  PLIs  result  in  different  profit  ranges  and, 
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hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho2:  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  in  different  industries. 
Hypothesis  3:  Profit  Level  Indicators  (PLIs)  in  Individual  Industries 
Lall  (1979)  suggested  that  transfer  pricing  problems  differ  greatly  in  scope  and 
intensity  amongst  different  industries.  Potential  manipulation  of  transfer  pricing  is 
greater  in  industries  where  there  is  advanced  technology  and  products  are  highly 
specialized  as  open  market  prices  are  either  unavailable  or  difficult  to  determine.  To 
evaluate  the  comparable  data  sets  across  individual  industries  and  to  examine 
different  PLIs  at  the  individual  SIC  level,  the  main  question  is  whether  comparables 
for  individual  industries  provide  profit  ranges  that  result  in  an  arm's  length  price?  To 
answer  this  question,  a  null  hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho3:  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  when  providing  a 
comparable  range. 
6.3.1.2  Data  Sample  -  Section  1 
Due  to  the  importance  of  both  regulatory  frameworks  for  MNEs  worldwide,  this 
research  focuses  on  the  OECD's  TNMM  and  the  US  IRS's  CPM  by  applying  the  two 
methods  using  the  same  data  in  order  to  uncover  the  practical  variation.  The  sample 
consists  of  UK  based  companies  that  are  used  to  obtain  profit  measures  that  might  be 
used  in  their  internal  pricing.  This  can  be  done  through  consulting  firms  that  provide 
client  companies  with  profit  measures  that  can  be  used  when  pricing  internal 
transfers.  For  the  purpose  of  this  research,  quantitative  data  and  non-quantitative  data 
used,  including  financial  data  and  key  profit  level  indicators  for  the  UK-based 
companies,  were  obtained  from  Jordan's  FAME  database. 
The  information  on  Jordan's  FAME  database  has  been  compiled  from  records  filed  at 
Companies  House  in  Cardiff,  London  and  Edinburgh.  Companies  House  provides 
both  the  legal  framework  within  which  all  companies  operate  and  the  means  by  which 
those  companies  are  formally  registered  (incorporated)  and  dissolved.  Jordans  has  put 
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companies.  Its  financial  database  of  the  Major  Public  and  Private  British  Companies 
is  contained  on  the  Fame  database.  The  database  has  been  compiled  from  records  filed 
at  Companies  House  and  supplemented  with  information  taken  from  the  London  and 
Edinburgh  Gazettes.  The  information  included  on  the  Fame  database  has  been 
carefully  checked  by  the  financial  analysts  at  Jordans. 
As  suggested  by  Lall  (1979),  an  effective  investigation  of  transfer  pricing  should 
focus  on  large  public  and  private  companies  as  they  account  for  a  substantial 
proportion  of  intra-firm  trade.  The  data  obtained  to  develop  the  comparables  sets 
excluded  all  small  and  medium  size  companies  and  included  companies  which 
satisfied  two  of  the  following  three  criteria: 
1.  Turnover  more  than  £11,200,000; 
2.  Balance  sheet  total  exceeding  £5,600,000;  and, 
3.  Number  of  employees  exceeding  250. 
This  research  initially  used  the  database  to  eliminate  small  and  medium  size 
companies  in  the  UK  within  the  randomly  selected  12  manufacturing  and  6 
wholesaling  industries.  Manufacturing  and  wholesaling  industries  were  chosen  to  be 
consistent  with  previous  research  undertaken  in  the  US  (Collin  et  al,  1997; 
Tworkowski,  1999).  US  Congress  concerns  of  abuses  associated  with  tax  haven 
manufacturing  using  US  developed  intangibles  had  led  the  Congress  to  amend  Section 
482  in  1986  with  respect  to  intangibles  (H.  R.  Rep.  No.  99-426,  at  420,1985  (as 
reported  by  Cole,  1999,  pg.  1-6))  and  the  perception  in  US  Congress  of  abuses  in  the 
transfer  prices  of  foreign  manufacturers  selling  to  their  US  subsidiaries  resulted  in  a 
congressional  suggestion  in  the  1986  legislative  history  that  Treasury  reviewed  its 
transfer  pricing  Regulations  generally  (H.  R.  Conf.  No.  99-841,  vol.  II,  at  11637,1986 
(as  reported  by  Cole,  1999,  pg.  1-6)).  This  research  furthers  previous  studies  by 
examining  whether  transfer  pricing  abuses  are  also  prevalent  in  the  UK  within  the 
manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries. 
Since  large  companies  are  more  likely  to  involve  transfer  pricing  practices  in  their 
operations  and  are  usually  not  owner-managed  businesses,  this  research  used  large 
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selected.  The  database  was  consequently  used  to  obtain  comparable  companies  and 
profit  measures  for  UK  companies. 
The  application  of  TNMM  and  CPM  involves  a  search  for  independent  UK-based 
companies  with  a  key  requirement  being  that  these  UK-based  companies  were 
functionally  similar.  In  developing  comparables,  this  research  ensured  that 
companies: 
1.  had  active  business  operations; 
2.  had  not  been  newly  formed  (active  for  a  minimum  of  four  years)  ; 
3.  were  independent; 
4.  had  not  been  acquired  in  the  period; 
5.  did  not  license  products  to  third  parties; 
6.  did  not  have  another  company  as  shareholder; 
7.  had  sufficient  accounts  for  a  range  of  years; 
8.  had  no  average  3-yr.  (1998-2000)  after  tax  losses;  and, 
9.  had  activities  similar  to  their  four-digit  SIC  classifications. 
After  locating  comparable  companies  through  the  FAME  database,  the  second  stage 
grouped  comparable  companies  within  the  selected  12  manufacturing  and  6  wholesale 
industries  based  on  qualitative  and  quantitative  criteria  to  obtain  relevant  PLIs 
(Comparables  set  for  SIC  2416  -  Manufacture  of  plastic  in  primary  forms  in  Table  5 
in  Appendices). 
For  this  research,  averages  for  the  three-year  period  1998-2000  were  calculated 
following  OECD  guidelines  and  US  IRS  regulations.  Full  ranges  and  quartile  ranges 
were  then  developed  for  the  sample.  Five  different  PLIs  recommended  by  OECD 
Guidelines  and  the  US  IRS  were  developed  as  mentioned  earlier.  Through  the 
acquisition  of  the  full  OECD  profit  ranges  and  US  IRS  inter-quartile  profit  ranges, 
this  research  intends  to  evaluate  OECD  Guidelines  as  well  as  US  IRS  regulations  on 
profit-based  methods  to  determine  the  level  of  discretion  they  provide  in  terms  of 
assessing  the  arm's  length  price. 
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There  have  been  a  number  of  studies  concerning  the  economic  impact  of  Japanese 
FDI  in  the  UK.  For  example,  previous  research  has  examined  the  spatial  distribution 
of  Japanese  investment  in  the  UK  (Taylor,  1993),  trends  in  subsidiary  growth  (Morris 
et  al.,  1993),  and  the  impact  of  increased  competition  from  Japanese  subsidiaries  on 
domestic  firms  (Brech  and  Sharp,  1984;  Strange,  1993).  Studies  have  also 
investigated  the  contribution  of  Japanese  FDI  to  both  regional  and  national 
development  for  example,  in  terms  of  job  creation,  skill  development  and  technology 
transfer  (Trevor,  1985;  Dillow,  1989;  Munday  et  al.,  1995;  Morris,  1988;  Strange, 
1993). 
Research  on  the  relative  performance  of  Japanese  enterprises  in  the  UK  has  proceeded 
in  several  directions.  A  number  of  studies  have  examined  the  general  productivity  of 
Japanese  plants  in  the  UK  in  comparison  to  plants  located  in  Japan  (Dunning,  1986; 
Strange,  1993).  A  further  line  of  research  has  investigated  the  financial  characteristics 
and  marketing  performance  of  Japanese  subsidiaries  located  in  the  UK.  For  example, 
using  UK  cross-sectional  data,  Doyle  et  al.  (1992)  examined  the  characteristics  of 
matched  samples  of  90  US,  Japanese  and  indigenous  subsidiaries  in  the  consumer 
goods,  industrial  goods  and  financial  services  sectors. 
Doyle  et  al.  also  reported  that  the  increased  commitment  of  Japanese  firms  to  long- 
term  performance  objectives  created  greater  support  and  confidence  in  employees 
within  their  subsidiaries.  The  managers  of  UK  and  US  firms  tended  to  view  cost- 
cutting  as  a  means  of  improving  productivity,  whereas  Japanese  managers  perceived 
increases  in  market  share  as  a  key  strategy  to  reduce  costs  and  increase  productivity. 
Further  evidence  of  the  commitment  of  Japanese  firms  in  the  UK  to  longer-term 
strategic  objectives  comes  from  the  research  of  Bromwich  and  Inoue  (1994),  who  in  a 
1991  interview  survey  of  Japanese  subsidiary  managing/finance  directors  reported 
that  the  most  important  strategic  objectives  in  their  sample  firms  were  return  on  sales 
and  increasing  market  share.  The  study  also  reported  that  in  terms  of  the  achievement 
of  stated  objectives,  the  managers  interviewed  were  most  satisfied  with  their  sales 
growth,  and  least  satisfied  with  earnings  growth  and  return  on  investment.  On  a 
similar  theme,  the  KPMG  (1996)  survey  of  the  managers  of  70  of  the  'top'  Japanese 
manufacturing  subsidiaries  operating  in  the  UK  reported  that  53%  of  respondents 
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considering  their  company's  profitability  to  be  'high'. 
In  summary,  a  number  of  research  approaches  have  been  used  to  examine  the 
performances  of  foreign-owned  companies  in  the  UK:  macro-level  and  regional 
studies,  comparisons  at  the  company  and  micro-level  (plant  level)  studies  using 
primary  data  drawn  from  questionnaires  and/or  case  studies.  This  research  extends 
previous  research,  by  examining  the  comparative  performance  of  Japanese-owned, 
US-owned  companies  and  UK  domestic  companies  within  manufacturing  and 
wholesale  industries  with  reference  to  a  wide  range  of  profit  level  indicators.  UK- 
owned  companies  and  US-owned  companies  were  selected  in  an  effort  to  obtain  a 
better  comparable  basis  as  UK-owned  companies  would  provide  a  suitable  match  for 
home-based  companies,  while  US-owned  companies  would  provide  a  suitable  match 
for  foreign-based  companies. 
This  section  focuses  on  performance  as  measured  by  the  same  five  PLIs  used  in 
Section  1  on  individually  matched  foreign-owned  (Japanese-  and  US-owned) 
companies  and  UK  companies. 
63.2.1  Hypotheses  -  Section  2 
Hypothesis  4:  Performance  (PLIs)  of  Foreign-owned  Companies  (Japanese  and  US) 
vs.  UK  Companies 
Most  of  the  MNE  theories  reviewed  in  Chapter  2  and  others  such  as  Hymer,  1960; 
Vernon,  1971;  Buckley  and  Casson,  1976,1991;  Magee,  1977  suggest  that  the  main 
pre-condition  for  the  propagation  of  FDIs  is  the  ability  of  a  company  to  internalize 
certain  advantage(s),  transport  them  across  national  boundaries  and  translate  them 
into  returns  that  are  over  and  above  what  an  indigenous  company  in  the  host  country 
can  make.  This  higher  return  is  necessary  to  compensate  the  foreign  MNE  for 
developing,  internalizing  and  transporting  the  advantage(s).  The  theory  therefore 
supports  a  superior  level  of  performance  by  foreign-owned  companies.  Available 
empirical  evidence  however  points  in  the  opposite  direction.  Wheeler  (1988,1990) 
was  able  to  show  that  indigenous  companies  in  the  US  outperform  their  foreign- 
owned  counterparts  six  times  over  in  terms  of  return  on  assets.  Munday  and  Peel 
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owned  companies  with  the  suggestion  that  research  could  be  extended  in  future 
studies  to  cover  foreign-owned  companies  of  other  nationalities  and  for  periods 
extending  beyond  one  year.  The  main  concern  is  whether  UK-owned  companies 
substantially  out-perform  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US  owned)  companies.  Are 
the  reported  profits  of  large  UK-owned  companies  significantly  and  consistently 
greater  than  those  of  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US)  companies  of  similar  size  and 
industry?  To  answer  the  above  questions,  a  null  hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho4:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese  and  US)  and  their  domestic  counterparts. 
Hypothesis  5:  Performance  (PLIs)  of  Joint  venture  (Japanese/UK  and  US/UK) 
companies  vs.  UK/Other  Companies 
The  form  of  investment  in  the  host  countries  has  been  considered  in  the  literature  as 
one  of  the  organizational  factors  influencing  MNEs  transfer  pricing  policies.  Several 
empirical  studies  (Kim  and  Miller,  1979;  Tang  and  Chan,  1979:  Tang,  1981)  rank  the 
interests  of  local  partners  of  a  foreign  subsidiary  as  an  important  variable  in  the  abuse 
of  transfer  pricing.  A  local  partner  in  a  joint  venture  plays  a  monitoring  role  which 
restricts  the  latitude  of  transfer  pricing  strategy  practiced  by  the  foreign  investor 
(Lecraw,  1985;  Emmanuel  and  Mehafdi,  1994). 
The  influence  of  a  local  partner  as  a  factor  on  transfer  pricing  decisions  is  however, 
not  conclusive  and  is  difficult  to  generalize,  depending  on  the  management  role  of  a 
local  partner  in  the  joint  venture.  The  presence  of  local  partners  may  motivate  foreign 
investors  to  use  transfer  pricing  to  reduce  the  abuse  in  reported  profits  of  the  joint 
venture,  which  partially  accrue  to  the  local  partners  (Lall,  1973;  Lyn  et  al.,  1993; 
Emmanuel  and  Mehafdi,  1994).  Another  effect  of  having  local  partners  is  that  they 
may  have  political  influence  to  shield  the  joint  venture  from  tax  audits.  As  found  by 
Chan  and  Chow  (1997),  absence  of  the  local  partner  is  one  of  the  factors  that  most 
triggers  tax  audits. 
As  mentioned  earlier  in  Chapter  Four  Section  4.4.4,  time  and  resource  constraints  did 
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and  powers  within  the  joint  venture.  This  research  defined  foreign-owned  Japanese 
joint  venture  as  a  Japanese  company  with  at  least  one  British  company  as  shareholder 
(Japanese/UK)  and  foreign-owned  US  joint  venture  as  a  US  company  with  at  least 
one  British  company  as  shareholder  (US/UK).  A  joint  venture  UK  company  is 
defined  as  a  UK  company  with  at  least  one  foreign  (not  Japanese  or  US)  company  as 
shareholder  (UK/Other). 
A  major  concern  is  whether  foreign-owned  joint  venture  (Japanese  and  US) 
companies  with  at  least  one  British  company  as  shareholder  substantially  under- 
perform  UK  joint  ventures  companies  with  at  least  one  foreign  company  shareholder 
(UK/other).  Thus,  are  the  reported  profits  of  large  UK  joint  ventures  companies 
significantly  and  consistently  greater  than  those  of  foreign-owned  joint  ventures 
(Japanese-  and  US-owned)  of  similar  size  and  industry?  To  answer,  a  null  hypothesis 
is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho5:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of 
joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK-owned) 
and  the  performances  of  UK/other-owned  companies. 
6.3.2.2  Data  Sample  -  Section  2 
Of  the  1602  Japanese-owned  companies  listed,  1309  were  active.  From  the  1309 
active  companies,  512  were  selected  based  on  their  size  as  measured  by  turnover  in 
addition  to  the  availability  of  data.  These  512  companies  were  then  grouped 
according  to  1992  four-digit  SIC  codes.  These  512  companies  were  classified  by 
four-digit  SIC  codes  based  on  their  primary  activity  in  order  to  obtain  the  best 
possible  match  of  companies'  functions.  It  can  be  noted  that  the  top  Japanese 
companies  were  disproportionately  represented  within  the  SIC  code  classification. 
This  research  focused  on  developing  comparisons  of  the  performance  as  measured  by 
profits  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  used  in  developing  comparables  in  Section  1. 
Twelve  manufacturing  and  six  wholesale  industries  were  selected  due  to  the  large 
presence  of  Japanese-owned  companies  within  these  industries.  Of  the  Japanese- 
owned  companies,  512  were  represented  within  the  44  selected  industrial  sectors. 
Through  further  elimination  based  on  whether  a  company  had:  active  business 
129 operations;  not  been  acquired  in  the  period;  not  been  newly  formed;  not  licensed 
products  to  third  parties;  independent  ventures;  sufficient  accounts  for  a  range  of 
years;  no  3-yr.  Average  (1998-2000)  after-tax  losses;  and,  activities  similar  to  their 
SIC  classifications,  76  Japanese-owned  companies  and  58  Japanese  joint  ventures 
(companies  that  have  at  least  one  UK  company  as  a  shareholder)  were  represented  in 
eighteen  industries  (see  Table  6-1). 
Tab 
No. 
le  6-1:  Classification  o 
SIC  92  UK  UK-Other 
2416  46  8 
f  the  Sam  le  Corn  anies 
JPN  JPN-UK  USA  USA-UK  Total  Without  Loss  Making 
2216  65  51 
2  24  66  99  13  3  3  4  6  48  42 
3  2524  29  5  2  3  9  6  54  44 
4  2862  22  1  0  4  1  7  35  24 
5  2875  44  15  2  2  11  21  95  72 
6  3002  27  4  6  4  15  3  59  39 
7  3162  39  10  10  8  17  20  104  75 
8  3210  33  10  12  4  12  8  79  51 
9  3220  22  14  3  0  3  4  46  31 
10  3230  8  5  4  3  2  3  25  15 
ll  3320  40  6  2  1  13  13  75  58 
12  3410  15  10  2  1  2  7  37  24 
13  5142  45  8  3  1  5  2  64  38 
14  5143  45  7  10  13  9  10  94  70 
15  5146  33  14  3  3  4  6  63  45 
16  5155  88  11  3  3  4  1  40  32 
17  5164  20  3  4  1  3  5  36  27 
18  5165  10  3  5  2  5  3  28  21 
Total  515  147  76  58  120  131  1047  759 
The  FAME  database  was  consequently  used  to  obtain  companies  comparable  for  the 
Japanese-owned  companies.  UK-owned  companies  and  US-owned  companies  were 
selected  in  an  effort  to  obtain  a  better  comparable  basis  as  UK-owned  companies 
would  provide  a  suitable  match  for  home-based  companies,  while  US-owned 
companies  would  provide  a  suitable  match  for  the  foreign-based  companies. 
Unlike  some  of  the  previous  studies  which  used  unmatched  companies  to  compare  the 
performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  domestic-owned  companies,  this 
130 section  of  the  research  evaluates  the  performance  of  MNEs  using  three  different 
matching  methods  as  follows: 
1.  Individually  matched  by  growth  in  turnover  (+,  -  2.5%)  over  the  3-yr 
period  1998-2000,  factoring  in  similar  strategies,  product  cycles,  etc; 
2.  Individually  matched  by  operating  profit  over  the  3-yr  average  1998-2000 
(+,  -  10%),  factoring  in  similar  profitability  levels,  cost  of  goods  sold, 
ability  to  make  profit,  etc;  and, 
3.  Individually  matched  by  turnover  (similar  to  Munday  and  Peel,  1997)  over 
the  3-yr  average  period  1998-2000  (+,  -  10%),  factoring  in  similar  size  of 
operations,  market,  share,  etc. 
The  basis  for  choosing  matching  criteria  to  compare  the  performance  of  foreign- 
owned  (Japanese  and  US)  companies  to  UK-owned  companies  being  that  each  of  the 
matching  criteria  had  its  limitations  and  through  the  use  of  multiple  matching  factors 
the  quality  of  the  sets  would  increase  (a  sample  of  the  matched  companies  in  Table  6 
in  Appendices). 
6.3.3  Section  3:  Analysis  of  QRerating  Losses 
One  of  the  main  theoretical  arguments  that  explain  growth,  is  the  ability  of  a  company 
to  internalize  certain  advantage(s),  carry  them  overseas  and  convert  them  into  superior 
returns.  Figure  6-3  illustrates  foreign-owned  companies  in  the  UK  as  represented  in 
this  research  by  Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies  with  average  operating  losses. 
The  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  Japanese-owned  companies  with  operating 
losses  over  the  total  number  of  active  Japanese-owned  companies  in  the  UK  is  the 
highest  compare  to  the  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  US-owned  companies  with 
operating  losses  over  the  total  number  of  active  US-owned  companies  and  the 
percentage  of  the  total  UK  companies  with  operating  losses  over  the  total  number  of 
active  UK  companies.  The  ratios  of  loss  making  companies  for  the  years  1998-2000 
raised  concerns  regarding  the  low  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies, 
especially  Japanese-owned  companies. 
As  comparables  are  the  main  focus  of  this  research  and  loss-making  companies 
cannot  be  used  as  a  part  of  comparable  set  to  obtain  profit  ranges,  this  section 
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profits  to  UK-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profits.  By  examining  loss- 
making  companies  not  included  in  previous  studies  (Kim  and  Lyn,  1990;  Gideon, 
1990;  Crain  and  Stills,  1994;  Wheeler,  1988,1990;  and,  Munday  and  Peel,  1997)  this 
study  opens  an  important  avenue  when  testing  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US) 
companies  compared  to  their  domestic  UK  counterparts. 
Figure  6-3:  Companies  with  Operating  Losses  (Japanese- 
owned,  US-owned,  and  UK  companies) 
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0%  1  1998  1999  2000 
   Japanese-Owned  29%  32%  34% 
Companies 
   US-Owned  Companies  17%  21%  26% 
0  UK  Companies  15%  17%  19%71 
*  Source:  FAME  DATABASE,  June  2003 
Companies  cannot  continuously  lower  their  profitability  or  increase  their  costs  under 
market  penetration  strategies.  Therefore  for  this  research  it  was  assumed  that  the 
companies  included  in  the  sample  did  not  implement  the  market  penetration  strategy 
since  during  the  market  penetration  period  companies'  profits  are  lower  than  normal 
although  it  is  expected  that  they  would  earn  higher  than  normal  profits  after  the 
market  penetration  period.  These  higher  than  and  lower  than  normal  profits  should  be 
phased  out  through  the  use  of  the  multiple  year  averages  1998-2000. 
"Business  strategies  also  could  include  market  penetration  schemes.  A 
taxpayer  seeking  to  penetrate  a  market  or  to  increase  its  market  share  might 
temporarily  charge  a  price  for  its  product  that  is  lower  than  the  price  charged 
for  otherwise  comparable  products  in  the  same  market.  Furthermore,  a 
taxpayer  seeking  to  enter  a  new  market  or  expand  (or  defend)  its  market  share 
might  temporarily  incur  higher  costs  (e.  g.  due  to  start-up  costs  or  increased 
132 marketing  efforts)  and  hence  achieve  lower  profit  levels  than  other  taxpayers 
operating  in  the  same  market"  (OECD,  1995,  Chap,  I,  para.  1.32). 
As  found  by  Chan  and  Chow  (1997),  persistent  losses  are  one  of  the  factors  that  most 
triggers  tax  audits.  A  possible  explanation  for  companies  with  average  operating 
losses  is  that  these  companies  remain  in  business  because  of  the  benefits  they  provide 
to  their  international  group  of  companies  (ITP  policy)  and  make  use  of  the  flexibility 
provided  by  regulatory  bodies  such  as  the  OECD,  US  IRS,  or  UK  regulations. 
By  comparing  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US)  companies  with  negative  operating 
profits  to  UK-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profits,  this  section  of  the 
research  highlights  the  extent  of  the  use  of  certain  permissible  practices  allowed  by 
the  regulatory  bodies  such  as  the  business  strategies  "market  penetration  strategy"  to 
purposely  lower  the  profitability  of  the  companies  since  non-profitable  companies 
cannot  remain  perpetually  active.  By  comparing  the  performances  of  joint  ventures 
(Japanese-  or  US-owned  companies  with  at  least  one  UK  shareholder  to  UK-owned 
companies  with  at  least  one  foreign  shareholder)  this  section  also  highlights  the 
effects  of  the  form  of  the  investment  in  relation  to  foreign-owned  companies' 
performance. 
In  the  opposite  direction,  TNMM  guarantees  that  a  transaction  will  always  be 
profitable  to  one  of  the  participants.  This  does  not  always  occur  in  arm's-length 
relationships  between  unrelated  parties.  Neither  cost  plus,  resale  price,  or  the  CUP 
methods  guarantee  net  profits  to  any  participant  in  a  given  transaction.  The  OECD 
Guidelines  make  this  point  more  generally  "There  is  no  justification  under  the  arm's 
length  principle  for  imposing  additional  tax  on  enterprises  that  are  less  successful  than 
the  average  when  the  reason  for  the  lack  of  success  is  attributable  to  commercial 
factors"  (OECD,  1995,  B.  3.4). 
"Foreign  governments  objected  to  the  use  of  US  IRS  CPM  in  cases  where  the 
multinational  group  overall  had  a  loss  on  a  product  being  distributed  in  the 
United  States.  They  argued  that  if  there  was  an  overall  loss,  it  was  wrong  to 
require  a  US  distribution  subsidiary  to  report  a  typical  distributor's  profit" 
(Cole,  1999  p.  9-31). 
By  focusing  on  companies  with  operating  losses,  this  research  provides  analysis  of 
companies  that  are  not  able  be  included  in  any  comparable  set  and  have  been 
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6.3.3.1  Hypotheses  -  Section  3 
Hypothesis  6:  Performance  (PLIs)  of  Foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US)  companies 
with  operating  losses  vs.  UK  companies  with  operating  losses 
As  mentioned  earlier  in  Chapter  2  and  Hypothesis  4  of  this  chapter,  MNE  theories 
suggest  that  a  MNE's  superior  performance  can  be  achieved  due  to  the  internalization 
of  certain  advantage.  Evidence  from  the  literature  and  data  collection,  however, 
points  in  the  opposite  direction  as  data  obtained  from  the  FAME  database  as 
presented  in  Figure  6-3.  The  main  question  is  whether  loss-making  companies  of 
different  countries  of  ownership  (Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies)  display 
different  patterns  of  performance  as  measured  by  a  wide  range  of  profit  level 
indicators?  To  answer  the  above  question,  a  null  hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho6:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  measures)  of 
foreign-owned  companies  with  average  negative  operating  profit  (Japanese- 
and  US-owned)  and  UK-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profit. 
Hypothesis  7:  Performance  (PLIs)  of  Foreign-owned  Joint  ventures  (Japanese/UK  and 
US/UK)  with  operating  losses  vs.  UK/other  companies  with  operating  losses 
As  mentioned  earlier  in  hypothesis  5,  The  importance  of  joint  venture  investments  in 
ITP  is  due  to  the  form  of  the  investment  influencing  the  tax  audits  of  transfer  pricing. 
Thus,  the  main  question  is  whether  loss-making  companies  of  different  countries  of 
ownership  (Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies  with  at  least  one  British  company  as 
shareholder)  display  different  patterns  of  performance  as  measured  by  a  wide  range  of 
profit  level  indicator?  To  answer  this  question,  Hypothesis  7  is  as  follows: 
Ho7"  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  measures)  of 
joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies  with  average  negative  operatingpro  it 
(Jananese/UK-  and  US/UK  owned)  and  UK/other-owned  companies  with 
negative  operating  profit. 
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From  this  section  of  the  research  the  data  sample  consisted  of  all  Japanese-owned 
companies,  US-owned  companies  and  UK  domestic  companies  with  three-year 
average  (1998-2000)  operating  losses  obtained  from  the  previous  sections  (see  Table 
6-1)  in  the  same  twelve  manufacturing  and  six  wholesale  industries  without  matching 
methods  due  to  the  limited  number  of  companies  with  average  operating  losses. 
6.3.4  Section  4:  Tax  Analysis 
Transfer  pricing  affects  many  aspects  of  a  MNE's  business.  The  enormous  increase  in 
global  commerce  with  the  significant  portion  of  worldwide  commerce  occurring 
between  related  businesses,  transfer  pricing  has  increased  in  importance 
(Tworkowski,  1999).  A  review  of  the  literature  found  no  studies  that  address  the 
effects  of  the  latest  transfer  pricing  regulations  introduced  in  the  1998  corporation  tax 
self-assessment.  This  study  adds  to  the  body  of  knowledge  in  this  area. 
As  explained  in  detail  in  Chapter  4,  there  has  been  transfer  pricing  provisions  in  the 
UK  tax  code  for  more  than  50  years.  Transfer  pricing  changes  were  overhauled  in 
1998,  as  the  1998  Finance  Act  introduced  a  comprehensive  modernization  of  the  UK's 
transfer  pricing  legislation.  These  changes  were  part  of  a  wider  reform  of  the 
Corporation  Tax  regime,  which  included  the  introduction  of  self-assessment  for 
companies. 
For  accounting  periods  ending  on  or  after  July  1,1999,  and  years  of  assessment 
1999/2000  et  seq.,  sections  770  to  773  of  the  Income  and  Corporation  Taxes  Act 
(ICTA)  1988  have  been  replaced  by  sections  108-111  and  Schedule  16  FA  98.  The 
full  text  of  the  basic  rule  now  appears  as  Schedule  28AA  ICTA  1988  and  can  be 
accessed  through  the  internet  at  www.  inlandrevenue.  gov.  uk. 
No  penalties  could  ordinarily  be  attached  to  the  tax  on  pricing  increases  made  by 
Inland  Revenue  since  there  was  no  statutory  requirement  to  return  profits  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  arm's  length  standard.  The  transfer  pricing  regime  remained 
totally  reactive  for  50  years.  Everything  has  changed  for  accounting  periods  ending  on 
or  after  July  1,1999,  for  which  Schedule  28AA  ICTA  1988  is  now  in  effect  (detailed 
previously  in  Chapter  3). 
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reported  more  or  less  taxes  as  reported  in  their  annual  profit  and  loss  accounts  than 
UK-owned  companies;  and  (b)  if  there  were  any  significant  changes  as  a  result  of  the 
1998  UK  tax  revisions. 
Because  of  the  differences  in  financial  characteristics  of  various  industries,  it  is 
important  to  compare  companies  on  an  industrial  basis.  For  instance,  companies 
classified  in  the  wholesale  trade  industry  generally  report  large  amounts  of  sales 
compared  to  their  end-of-year  assets.  It  is  also  very  important  when  comparing  the 
performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  domestic  UK  companies  that  these 
companies  are  individually  matched.  Whereas  previous  studies,  for  the  most  part, 
ignored  matching  procedures,  this  research  matched  individual  companies  of  gross 
profit,  defined  as  turnover  less  cost  of  sales.  The  main  reason  for  selecting  gross 
profit  to  be  used  as  a  matching  method  is  to  be  consistent  with  previous  sections  of 
this  study  which  focused  on  companies'  profitability.  Exact  matching  on  the  basis  of 
gross  profit  proved  difficult,  hence  matching  was  conducted  on  the  basis  of  gross 
profit  range  of  plus  or  minus  10%. 
6.3.4.1  Hypotheses  -  Section  4 
Hypothesis  8:  Performance  (reported  taxes)  of  Foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US) 
Companies  vs.  UK  Companies 
Since  it  is  generally  not  possible  for  researchers  to  observe  the  actual  transfer  price, 
understanding  more  about  the  objectives  of  the  transfer  pricing  method  alleviates  the 
need  to  consider  the  specific  direction  of  the  effect  of  the  transfer  price  (Cravens  and 
Shearon,  1996).  As  taxation  is  one  of  the  several  considerations  that  influence  a 
company  organization's  decisions  (Abdallah,  1989),  this  study  examines  the  tax 
expense  figures  as  they  appeared  on  the  companies'  annual  accounts.  Grubert  et  al. 
(1993)  documented  that  foreign-controlled  subsidiaries  in  the  U.  S.  "report  strikingly 
less  taxable  income  than  do  their  domestically  controlled  counterparts"  (p.  269).  Crain 
and  Stitts  (1994)  and  Kim  and  Lyn  (1990)  also  provide  supporting  evidence  that 
foreign-owned  companies  report  lower  profits. 
Clearly  a  significant  problem  exists  even  given  UK  or  the  US  tax  regulations 
prohibiting  manipulation.  Transfer  pricing  manipulations  are  not  exclusive  to  foreign- 
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the  manipulation  of  transfer  prices  solely  to  avoid  taxation.  Also,  from  an 
international  perspective,  taxation  issues  may  include  tariffs  levied  by  customs 
authorities  on  the  entry  or  exit  of  goods  into  a  country.  Companies  may  employ 
transfer  pricing  to  alter  the  value  of  the  goods  transferred.  Transfers  to  affiliates  in 
countries  with  high  import  duties  may  be  accomplished  with  a  lower  transfer  price  to 
avoid  inflating  the  value  of  the  goods  being  imported. 
The  financial  distributions  that  companies  make  after  the  declaration  of  profits  or 
losses  are  expected  to  be  a  function  of  their  recent  financial  performance.  Reported 
tax  is  an  important  variable  and  is  expected  to  be  a  fair  reflection  of  performance.  Tax 
has  long  been  recognized  as  a  key  variable  in  the  decision  making  process  of  MNEs 
(Belkaoui,  1994;  Emmanuel  and  Mehafdi,  1994)  especially  in  relation  to  the  location 
of  their  subsidiaries.  In  the  US,  empirical  evidence  suggesting  the  use  of  ITP  for 
shifting  income  out  of  high  tax  or  tax-inefficient  locations  has  been  widely  reported. 
Some  of  the  studies  mentioned  earlier  in  this  section  reveal  that  foreign-owned 
companies'  taxes  are  drastically  below  those  of  their  domestically  owned  counterparts. 
This  position  is  yet  to  be  empirically  explored  within  the  UK  context. 
Although  foreign-owned  company  have  always  been  accused  of  using  ITP  to  shift 
income  from  the  UK,  little  empirical  evidence  is  available  in  the  literature.  An 
empirical  comparison  of  the  reported  tax  expense  by  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US 
owned  companies)  operating  in  the  UK  with  those  of  their  UK-owned  counterparts 
needs  to  be  undertaken.  Are  there  substantial  differences  between  the  two  groups?  Do 
companies  of  different  countries  of  ownership  report  different  amounts  of  tax?  To 
examine  this  question,  Hypothesis  8  is  as  follows: 
Ho8"  There  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  expense  by  foreign-owned 
companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  compared  to  the  amount  of  reported  tax 
expense  by  domestic  companies. 
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Corporation  Tax  Self-Assessment  on  Foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US  Companies 
and  Domestic  UK  Companies 
Although  alignment  of  transfer  pricing  with  Corporation  Tax  Self-Assessment 
(CTSA)  was  cited  as  the  impetus  behind  the  changes,  the  1998  legislation  was  clearly 
designed  to  protect  the  tax  base  from  further  erosion  in  an  environment  where  other 
fiscal  authorities  were  aggressively  policing  compliance  with  their  own  domestic 
transfer  pricing  rules. 
The  economic  theory  of  noncompliance  attributable  to  the  model  of  Allingham  and 
Sandmo  (1972)  and  Srinivasan  (1973)  suggests  that  taxpayers  analyze  the  economic 
benefits  and  costs  of  noncompliance  and  that  income  levels,  tax  rates,  audit  rates, 
penalty  rates  and  risk  attitudes  are  the  primary  determinants  of  noncompliance.  The 
purpose  of  this  section  is  to  examine  whether  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing 
regulations  affects  compliance  by  foreign-owned  (Japanese  and  US)  companies  and 
domestic  UK  companies.  In  other  words,  are  there  any  effects  of  the  latest  UK 
transfer  pricing  rules  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self  -assessment  on  the 
patterns  of  reported  tax  by  companies  of  different  ownership?  To  answer  this 
question,  a  null  hypothesis  is  stated  as  follows: 
Ho9:  There  are  no  differences  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  by  foreign-owned 
companies  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing  regulation 
introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment  compared  to  domestic 
companies. 
6.3.4.2  Data  Sample  -  Section  4 
Using  the  FAME  database,  the  data  for  this  section  was  obtained  to  answer  the 
research  question  regarding  the  implications  of  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing 
regulation  using  a  sample  of  UK-based  companies  (Japanese-,  US-,  and  UK-owned) 
during  two  selected  time  periods.  An  event  history  analysis,  as  suggested  by 
Shackleford  (1993),  was  used  employing  a  comparison  of  the  years  prior  and 
subsequent  to  the  1998  UK  regulations  which  was  effective  for  accounting  periods 
ending  on  or  after  July  1,1999.  The  data  consisted  of  companies'  tax  liability,  gross 
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periods,  fiscal  years  ended  1996-1997  and  fiscal  years  ended  1999-2000.  The  time 
periods  were  chosen  so  that  the  intervening  years  would  cover  the  period  when  the 
changes  in  the  tax  and  transfer  pricing  regulations  in  the  UK,  including  the  latest  1998 
regulations,  occurred  and  were  being  widely  discussed.  The  rationale  for  choosing 
US-owned  and  Japanese-owned  companies  was  to  be  consistent  with  previous 
sections  of  this  research. 
Since  the  number  of  Japanese-owned  companies  represented  is  smaller  compared  to 
US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies,  Japanese-owned  companies  provide  the  basis 
for  which  the  other  companies  are  matched.  To  avoid  the  tax  credits  which  may 
distort  the  data  sets,  this  research  included  only  companies  with  positive  tax  figure. 
Previous  research  randomly  selected  groups  of  foreign  and  domestic  companies  and 
compared  their  reported  tax,  regardless  of  their  activities,  size,  or  profitability.  In 
addition  and  unlike  some  of  the  previous  studies,  this  research  uses  the  same  set  of 
sample  companies  when  comparing  periods  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  latest  UK 
transfer  pricing  regulations. 
6.3.5  Interviews  with  ITP  Specialists 
This  study  conducted  a  number  of  interviews  to  authenticate  the  findings  of  the 
different  parts  of  this  research.  It  was  the  intention  of  this  research  to  use  a  sample  of 
carefully  selected  (non  random)  interviews  with  academics,  consultants  and  ITP 
experts.  Each  interview  was  recorded  and  transcribed  and  lasted  (on  average)  an  hour 
each.  The  interviewees  were  identified  based  on  their  academic  achievement, 
employment,  published  works  and,  above  all,  their  ITP  experience. 
6.4  Data  Measurement  and  Statistical  Tests 
The  four  data  sets  collected  for  the  first  four  different  sections  of  this  research  were 
ratio  scaled.  As  the  distances  between  the  values  of  the  data  sample  are  meaningful,  a 
ratio  scale  measurement  demonstrates  how  much  larger  or  smaller  one  value  is 
compared  to  another.  In  order  to  disprove  the  null  hypotheses,  this  study  selected  the 
most  appropriate  statistical  test  as  determined  by  the  following  issues: 
1.  The  research  questions; 
2.  The  nature  of  the  data;  and, 
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The  research  question  relates  to  the  type  of  relationship  being  investigated,  whether 
the  nature  of  data  establishes  the  level  of  measurement  of  the  observations  in  the  data 
set.  Finally,  the  research  design  is  concerned  with  the  number  and  type  of  sample(s) 
and  whether  they  are  related  or  independent.  A  particular  statistical  test  is  most 
appropriate  for  each  separate  combination  of  these  three  key  issues.  For  this  research, 
the  choice  of  the  statistical  tests  was  limited  to  the  tests  for  the  differences  with  a  brief 
description  of  the  selected  statistical  tests  as  follows: 
1.  T-Test 
T-tests  are  most  commonly  used  to  examine  whether  the  means  of  two  groups  of  data 
are  significantly  different  from  one  another.  With  a  t-test,  the  independent  variable  is 
nominal  or  categorical  and  the  dependent  variable  is  measured  at  an  interval  or  ratio 
scale  of  measurement.  The  populations  from  which  the  two  groups  are  drawn  can  be 
independent  (unrelated)  or  matched  (related).  T-tests  indicate  the  sample  differences 
by  using  means  and  the  distribution  of  sample  scores  around  the  mean.  The  t-test 
assumes  that  the  distribution  of  average  difference  is  approximately  normal  and  can 
be  used  for  large  sample  sizes  and  for  all  samples  from  a  normal  population. 
There  are  two  main  t-tests.  The  first  type  of  t-test  is  used  with  unmatched  data  and  is 
known  under  a  number  of  names  including:  independent  samples  t-test,  t-test  for  two 
independent  means,  independent  t-test,  and  t-test  for  unrelated  samples.  Regardless  of 
the  name,  with  this  type  of  t-test  there  are  two  distinct  categories  for  the  independent 
variable  and  one  dependent  variable  measured  at  the  interval  or  ratio  level.  The 
independent  samples  t-test  examines  whether  the  mean  of  the  dependent  variable  for 
each  group  defined  by  the  independent  variable  is  significantly  different. 
The  second  t-test  is  used  with  matched  data  and  is  also  known  under  a  number  of 
names  including:  paired  samples  t-test,  t-test  for  related  measures,  related  t-test,  and 
correlated  t-test.  This  test  can  be  used  in  a  number  of  circumstances  where  the 
question  calls  for  the  repeated  measurement  of  responses  from  the  same  respondent. 
The  paired-samples  t-test  will  be  testing  whether  the  means  of  each  of  the  paired  or 
'before/after'  variables  are  significantly  different  or  not. 
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variables,  this  research  uses  various  types  of  Wests  to  examine  Hol-Ho8. 
2.  Sig  Test 
This  test  is  normally  used  when  the  sample  size  is  small  and  the  distribution  of  values 
is  far  from  normal  or,  if  the  data  might  have  outliers.  This  test  is  a  nonparametric 
alternative  to  the  paired  t-test.  The  null  hypothesis  for  the  sign  test  signifies  that  the 
median  difference  between  the  two  members  of  a  pair  is  0.  There  is  no  need  to  make 
any  assumptions  about  the  shape  of  the  distributions  from  which  the  data  is  obtained. 
The  only  requirement  is  that  the  different  pairs  of  observations  are  selected 
independently  and  the  values  can  be  ordered  from  smallest  to  largest  as  the  test  is 
based  on  seeing  which  of  a  pair  of  values  is  larger. 
3.  Wilcoxon  Test 
This  sign  test  looks  at  which  of  the  two  numbers  for  a  pair  is  larger  while  ignoring  the 
magnitude  of  the  difference.  The  Wilcoxon  matched-pairs  signed-rank  test  uses  the 
information  about  the  size  of  the  difference  between  the  two  members  of  a  pair, 
thereby  making  it  more  likely  to  detect  true  differences  when  they  exist.  However, 
the  Wilcoxon  test  requires  that  the  differences  be  a  sample  from  a  symmetric 
distribution,  a  less  stringent  assumption  than  requiring  normality,  since  there  are 
many  other  distributions  besides  the  normal  distribution  that  are  symmetric. 
As  the  non-parametric  alternative  to  the  paired  t-test,  the  sign  and  Wilcoxon  tests 
were  selected  for  Hol  and  Hot  for  Section  1  of  this  research  given  that  the  number  of 
profit  level  indicators  is  small  and  the  data  presented  in  matched  pairs  (OECD  full 
range  vs.  US  IRS  inter-quartile  range). 
4.  Pearson  Correlation 
The  Pearson  correlation  is  a  measure  of  the  linear  relationship  between  variables.  It 
examines  the  relationship  that  exists  between  two  or  more  variables.  There  are  a 
number  of  ways  in  which  these  variables  are  related: 
a.  The  variables  are  positively  related,  when  one  variable  moves  in  one 
direction  the  other  variable  moves  in  the  same  direction; 
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regardless  of  the  movement  of  the  other  variable;  and, 
c.  The  variables  are  negatively  related,  when  one  variable  moves  in  one 
direction  the  other  variable  moves  to  the  opposite  direction. 
The  Pearson  correlation  test  proves  appropriate  for  Ho3  to  examine  the  linear 
relationship  between  the  PLIs,  which  is  essential  when  explaining  the  movements  of 
different  profit  measures. 
5.  One  Way  ANOVA 
This  statistical  technique,  called  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA),  examines  the 
variability  of  the  sample  values.  It  looks  at  how  much  the  observations  within  each 
group  vary  as  well  as  how  much  the  group  mean  vary.  Based  on  these  two  estimates 
of  variability,  the  conclusions  about  the  population  means  can  be  drawn.  If  the  sample 
means  vary  more  than  expected  based  on  the  variability  of  the  observations  in  the 
groups,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  population  means  are  not  all  equal.  It  is  a  one-way 
analysis  of  variance  because  cases  are  assigned  to  different  groups  based  on  their 
values  for  one  variable.  Analysis  of  variance  requires  the  following  assumptions: 
"  Independent  random  samples  have  been  taken  from  each  population; 
9  The  populations  are  normal;  and, 
The  population  variances  are  all  equal. 
The  One  Way  ANOVA  test  was  selected  for  Ho9  to  compare  the  reported  tax  means 
prior  and  subsequent  to  the  1998  UK  regulations. 
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.5 
Summary 
This  chapter  detailed  the  major  four  sections  of  this  study.  In  Section  1  of  this 
research,  averages  were  developed  for  all  data  obtained,  five  different  PLIs  were  used, 
quantitative  and  non-quantitative  data  was  used  to  develop  comparables,  and  industry 
classifications  were  considered.  Section  2  used  three-way  matching  criteria  to 
compare  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  domestic  companies. 
Section  3  illustrated  the  role  of  companies  with  negative  operating  profits  in  ITP 
applications.  Section  4  used  the  same  set  of  sample  companies  when  comparing 
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self-assessment,  matching  criteria  for  company  sets,  and  industrial  classifications 
codes. 
This  chapter  provides  justification  for  each  of  the  four  relevant  sections  in  order  to 
develop  comparables  and  detect  the  ownership  effects  on  both  profitability  and  taxes 
and  test  the  level  of  discretion  that  can  be  exercised  by  MNEs  under  different 
regulations.  In  addition,  this  chapter  provides  details  of  the  regress  procedures 
conducted  in  developing  comparables  and  testing  comparable  companies' 
performance  as  measured  by  both  profits  and  taxes.  This  research  is  designed  to 
eliminate  the  limitations  of  previous  research  as  well  as  satisfy  the  comparables  test. 
143 Chapter  7 
Analysis  and  Results 7.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  presents  the  data  analysis  for  this  research  in  order  to  answer  the  research 
question  whether  OECD  TNMM  and  US  IRS  CPM  methods,  where  applied,  can 
determine  transfer  pricing  while  maintaining  the  arm's  length  principle  and,  whether 
feasible  comparables  are  available  to  justify  the  arms  length  principle.  In  addition,  the 
data  analysis  addresses  the  question  of  whether  companies  of  different  countries  of 
ownership  display  different  patterns  of  performance  as  measured  by  a  range  of  PLIs, 
operating  losses,  and  reported  taxes.  Table  7-1  provides  a  synopsis  of  the  hypothesis, 
data  and  sample  used  for  the  four  sections  with  a  detailed  analysis  to  follow. 
7.2  Data  Analysis 
7.2.1  Section  1:  OECD  (TNMM)  vs.  US  IRS  (CPM) 
The  objective  for  this  section  was  to  test  whether  there  were  any  differences  between 
the  OECD's  TNMM  and  the  US  IRS'  CPM.  In  addition,  this  section  examined  the 
accountability  of  the  different  PLIs  (profit  measures)  for  the  total  sample  18 
manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries  combined  as  presented  in  the  following  null 
hypotheses: 
Hol:  There  are  no  differences  between  OECD  profit  ranges  (represented  by  a  full 
range)  and  IRS  profit  ranges  (represented  by  inter-quartile  ranges). 
Ho2"  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  in  different  industries. 
The  initial  investigation  of  the  difference  between  the  OECD  TNMM  full  ranges  and 
the  US  IRS  CPM  inter-quartile  ranges  was  conducted  using  the  paired  sample  t-test. 
In  the  t-test  for  each  profit  measure,  the  difference  was  calculated  between  the  lower 
and  upper  point  of  the  full  range  (OECD  full  gap)  and  compared  with  the  difference 
between  the  lower  quartile  and  upper  quartile  range  (IRS  inter-quartile  gap)  across  all 
18  manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries.  The  paired  sample  t-test  was  used  to 
assess  whether  or  not  the  means  of  each  paired  or  'full  range/quartile  range'  was 
significantly  different.  The  test  was  done  in  two  stages.  The  first  stage  included  all 
comparable  companies,  while  the  second  stage  excluded  companies  with  average 
operating  losses.  This  was  done  to  determine  whether  excluding  the  loss  making 
companies  would  have  any  effect  on  the  profit  ranges  for  these  industries. 
(Appendices,  Tables  1  and  2). 
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x  x The  paired  t-test  revealed  that  there  were  significant  differences  at  the  5%  level 
between  the  OECD  full  range  and  the  US  IRS  quartile  ranges  for  the  profit  margin, 
return  on  assets,  net  margin  and  Berry  ratio.  Conducting  the  same  test  excluding  the 
loss  making  companies  showed  that  there  were  significant  differences  between  the 
OECD  full  range  and  US  IRS  inter-quartile  range  at  the  5%  level  for  the  profit 
margin,  profit  margin  on  sales,  Berry  ratio,  and  return  on  assets. 
Wilcoxon  and  Sign  tests  were  also  used  to  investigate  whether  there  was  a  difference 
between  the  OECD  TNMM  full  ranges  and  the  US  IRS  CPM  inter-quartile  ranges.  In 
the  Wilcoxon  and  Sign  tests,  for  each  profit  measure  the  difference  was  calculated 
between  the  lower  and  upper  point  of  the  full  range  (OECD  full  gap)  then  compared 
with  the  difference  between  the  lower  quartile  and  upper  quartile  range  (IRS  inter- 
quartile  gap)  across  all  18  manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries.  The  Wilcoxon 
and  Sign  tests  were  used  to  confirm  the  results  obtained  from  the  paired  t-test.  Similar 
to  the  paired  t-test,  the  Wilcoxon  and  Sign  tests  were  done  in  two  stages.  The  first 
stage  included  all  comparable  companies  (Appendices,  Table  3A,  3B,  3C,  and  3D), 
while  the  second  stage  excluded  companies  with  average  operating  losses. 
(Appendices,  Table  4A,  4B,  4C,  and  4D) 
The  Wilcoxon  and  Sign  tests  revealed  that  there  were  significant  differences  between 
the  OECD  full  range  and  the  US  IRS  inter-quartile  ranges  for  the  profit  margin,  profit 
margin  on  sales,  net  margin,  Berry  ratio,  and  return  on  assets.  Conducting  the  same 
test  excluding  the  loss  making  companies  showed  that  there  were  significant 
differences  between  the  OECD  full  range  and  US  IRS  inter-quartile  range  for  profit 
margin,  profit  margin  on  sales,  net  margin,  Berry  ratio,  and  return  on  assets. 
To  further  investigate  whether  there  was  a  difference  between  the  OECD  TNMM  full 
range  (OECD  full  gap)  and  the  US  IRS  CPM  inter-quartile  range  (IRS  inter-quartile 
gap),  a  ratio  analysis  was  conducted  for  the  individual  industries  as  shown  in  Table  7- 
2.  The  ratio  analysis  revealed  that  the  ratios  of  inter-quartile  ranges  over  the  full  range 
varied  notably  from  one  industry  to  another.  Although  both  SIC  5164  (Wholesale  of 
Office  Machinery  and  Equipment)  and  SIC  5155  (Wholesale  of  Chemical  Products) 
are  wholesale  industries,  SIC  5164  reports  the  highest  ratio  (the  least  distance  from 
the  full  range  and  more  logical  distribution  as  it  is  close  to  the  50th  percentile)  while 
148 SIC  5155  reports  the  lowest  ratio  (the  widest  distance  as  it  is  8  `h  percentile).  These 
ratio  distributions  illustrate  how  industries  vary  in  terms  of  their  comparable  profits. 
Table  7- 
Industry 
2:  Ratio 
OECD 
Lower 
Prof  it 
Analysis  of  Pull  vs.  In 
OECD  IRS  Lower 
Upper  Quartile 
Profit  Profit 
ter-Quartile  Kanes  (Sect 
IRS  Upper 
Quartile  Distance 
PProfit  Margin  Full 
ion  1-H 
Inter- 
Quartile 
othesIs  1) 
Ratio 
Quartile/Full 
2416  -11.2  31.03  3.2  8.75  42.23  5.55  13% 
3002  -6.8  21.77  3.16  9.72  28.57  6.56  23% 
2875  -12.1  27.92  2.5  10.7  40.02  8.2  20% 
2862  -2.54  18.82  2.49  8.45  21.36  5.96  28% 
2524  -7.21  26.46  2.34  11.27  33.67  8.93  27% 
2466  -25.03  21.2  0.81  10.87  46.23  10.06  22% 
3162  -4.89  43.56  3.76  15.16  48.45  11.4  24% 
3210  -3.01  42.74  1.69  12.09  45.75  10.4  23% 
5142  -3.03  17.2  1.56  8.41  20.23  6.85  34% 
3410  -5.6  7.99  1.17  3.83  13.59  2.66  20% 
3320  -1.09  43.79  4.25  13.13  44.88  8.88  20% 
3230  -1.47  14.41  0.25  6.04  15.88  5.79  36% 
3220  -3.24  36.3  3.08  13.42  39.54  10.34  26% 
5143  -1.18  41.01  2.04  6.11  42.19  4.07  10% 
5146  0.13  26.67  2.28  9.84  26.54  7.56  28% 
5164  0.36  25.98  1.76  14.17  25.62  12.41  48% 
5155  -2.53  28.46  1.51  3.84  30.99  2.33  8% 
5165  0.89  51.01  5.47  13.15  50.12  7.68  15% 
Based  on  the  findings  in  Section  1,  this  research  rejects  both  the  first  null  hypothesis 
that  there  are  no  differences  between  the  OECD  full  range  and  IRS  quartile  range  for 
all  the  profit  ranges  used  and  the  second  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no  differences 
between  profit  measures  for  the  18  total  sample  manufacturing  and  wholesale 
industries.  TNMM  endorsed  in  OECD  Guidelines  and  CPM  endorsed  by  the  US  IRS 
are  conceptually  the  same  method  of  determining  transfer  prices.  Differences 
between  the  two  methods  lie  in  the  nuances  of  their  application,  particularly  the  US 
IRS'  emphasis  on  the  inter-quartile  range  and  adjustment  to  the  midpoint.  This 
research  shows  that  the  application  of  different  regulations  affords  MNEs  differing 
degrees  of  discretion  in  terms  of  compliance.  Whereas  the  US  IRS  limits  a 
company's  ability  by  restricting  the  profit  ranges  to  inter-quartile  profit  ranges  as 
opposed  to  the  full  range  used  by  the  OECD,  the  OECD  allows  a  wider  range  but 
emphasizes  comparison  on  function  and  risk.  The  US  IRS  emphasizes  less  control  for 
function  and  risk  through  the  use  of  inter-quartile  ranges  thus  moving  towards 
industry  standards. 
149 The  US  IRS  view  is  that  when  inter-quartile  ranges  are  used,  no  precise  adjustment 
for  function  and  risk  is  necessary.  This  finding  supports  the  US  IRS  argument  that  the 
range  must  be  adjusted  through  the  application  of  a  valid  statistical  method,  if 
possible,  to  increase  the  reliability  of  the  analysis.  US  IRS  regulations  state  that 
reliability  is  satisfied  if  statistical  methods  are  applied  to  establish  a  range  of  results  in 
which  the  limits  of  the  range  will  be  determined  such  that  there  is  a  75%  probability 
of  a  result  falling  below  the  upper  end  of  the  range.  The  inter-quartile  range  will  thus 
satisfy  the  reliability  portion  of  the  test. 
These  findings  also  suggest  that  larger  sets  of  comparable  companies  can  be  obtained 
when  companies  with  operating  losses  are  included.  In  addition,  the  results  presented 
the  effects  of  loss  making  companies  on  the  PLIs  (Appendices,  Table  1  and  Table  2). 
As  the  use  of  the  inter-quartile  range  limits  PLI  ranges  to  the  middle  50`h  percentile, 
the  main  argument  that  can  be  put  forward  is  that  due  to  the  OECD's  awareness  of  the 
level  of  assurance  that  TNMM  can  provide,  the  OECD  recognizes  TNMM  as  method 
of  last  resort  while  the  US  includes  CPM  as  part  of  the  best  method  rule. 
The  importance  of  this  finding  is  that  companies  that  use  CPM  to  test  the  arm's-length 
nature  of  their  transfer  pricing  therefore  face  the  possibility  that  European  tax  au- 
thorities  may  reject  an  analysis  developed  using  profit-based  methods  since  many 
European  tax  authorities  view  CPM  as  inconsistent  with  OECD  Guidelines.  An 
example  of  a  comparables  set,  SIC  2416  (Manufacturing  of  Plastic  in  Primary  Forms) 
is  shown  in  Table  5  (Appendices). 
Ho3"  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  when  providing  a 
comparable  range. 
To  validate  Ho3  related  to  the  measurement  of  different  PLIs,  this  study  tested  each  of 
the  18  industries  separately.  After  excluding  companies  with  3-yr.  (1998-2000) 
average  operating  losses,  this  research  individually  developed  descriptives  and 
Pearson  correlations  for  each  of  the  18  industries  with  the  analysis  focusing  on  the 
differences  and  relationship  between  the  PLIs.  The  descriptive  statistics  for  each  of 
the  18  industries  showed  the  minimum  and  the  maximum  values  for  each  of  the  profit 
measures  and  the  mean  value  of  each  of  the  PLIs. 
150 The  Pearson  correlation  presented  the  relationship  between  the  different  PLIs  was 
based  on  individual  industries  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  PLIs  were  different 
from  each  other  and  providing  alternatives  for  companies  when  selecting  the  preferred 
PLI.  The  correlation  examined  whether  the  relationship  between  different  PLIs  was 
significantly  different  from  positive  correlation.  Specifically,  the  Pearson  correlation 
tested  whether  the  correlation  coefficient  differed  significantly  from  +1.  As  the 
coefficient  could  not  be  above  +1  (perfect  positive  correlation)  a  one  tailed  test  was 
used.  The  results  of  each  individual  industry  are  summarized  in  Table  7-3. 
Table  7 
No. 
1 
-3:  Ana 
SIC 
1992 
2416 
lysis  of  i 
Sample 
Size 
51 
ndividual  in 
Statistical 
Test 
dustries  (Section  1-  Hypo 
No.  of  PLIs  Significance  at 
0.01  or  0.05  level 
9 
thesis  3) 
*Table 
7B 
2  2466  42  9  8B 
3  2524  44  6  9B 
4  2862  24  7  lOB 
5  2875  72  8  II  B 
6  3002  39  9  12B 
7  3162  75  7  13B 
8  3210  51  7  14B 
9  3220  31  7  15B 
10  3230  15  4  16B 
11  3320  58  9  17B 
12  3410  24  8  18B 
13  5142  38  0.  7  19B 
14  5143  70  7  20B 
15  5146  45  7  21B 
16  5155  32  4  22B 
17  51  4  -  27  7  23B 
18  5165  21  5  24B 
*All  1  ables  in  Appenaices. 
Through  the  statistical  test  of  the  individual  industries  it  can  be  concluded  that 
different  PLIs  provide  different  profit  ranges  and  are  statistically  significant  from 
each  other  in  providing  a  comparable  profit  range.  Therefore,  this  research  can 
confidently  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no  differences  between  profit 
measures  in  providing  a  comparable  range.  The  number  of  comparables  differed 
between  industries  (some  industries  might  have  a  limited  number  of  companies). 
Significant  gaps  existed  within  the  comparable  results  despite  attempts  to  control  for 
differences  in  functions  and  risks.  The  significance  of  this  finding  is  that  companies 
have  the  ability  not  only  to  adjust  their  profit  level  within  a  range,  they  may  also 
decide  which  PLI  or  profit  measure  to  use. 
151 In  the  absence  of  detailed  instructions  in  the  application  of  TNMM  or  CPM,  a  series 
of  choices  should  address  the  following, 
1.  Which  independent  companies  should  be  considered  comparable  to  the  tested 
party; 
2.  Which  profit  level  indicator  should  be  used; 
3.  Over  what  time  period  can  financial  data  be  averaged; 
4.  How  can  the  results  be  adjusted  to  accommodate  differences  vis  a  vis  the 
tested  party; 
5.  How  can  the  arm's  length  range  of  results  be  determined;  and, 
6.  What  happens  when  the  tested  party's  profit  falls  outside  the  arm's  length 
range. 
These  significant  results  might  be  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  ranges  of  profitability  are 
affected  by  a  multitude  of  factors:  competitive  position,  management efficiency, 
business  cycles  in  the  industry  and  on  a  global  basis,  currency  fluctuation,  age  of  plant 
and  equipment,  intangible  property,  research  and  development,  cost  of  capital,  and 
marketing  efficiency  which  can  not  be  easily  accounted  for.  This  finding  illustrates 
that  the  discretion  of  profit  indicators  is  enhanced  as  the  measures  themselves  give 
differing  degrees  of  profitability  within  each  industry.  Industries  offer  a  vast  number 
of  comparable  companies  in  which  comparable  sets  can  be  obtained  and  a  great 
number  of  PLIs  can  be  selected,  thereby  allowing  companies  not  only  to  adjust  their 
profit  level  within  a  range,  but  also  leeway  to  decide  which  PLI  or  profit  measure  to 
use.  Companies  may  opt  to  use  any  PLI  and  any  point  within  their  respective 
comparable  industry  range  to  their  optimum  benefit. 
72  Section  2:  Foreign-owned  vs.  Domestic-owned  Companies 
This  section  sheds  light  on  the  performance,  as  measured  by  PLIs,  of  foreign-owned 
and  domestic-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  assess 
whether  the  means  of  each  of  the  PLIs  between  the  groups  were  significantly  different 
or  not.  This  section  tests  the  following  null  hypothesis: 
Ho4"  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  and  their  domestic  UK 
count  e  S" 
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represented  by  US-  and  Japanese-owned  companies,  a  three-way  match  was  used  to 
minimize  the  limitation  of  using  individual  matching  criteria.  The  matching  methods 
used  were  as  follows: 
Individually  matched  by  growth  in  turnover  (+,  -  2.5%)  over  the  3-yr 
period  1998-2000,  factoring  in  similar  strategies,  product  cycles,  etc; 
2.  Individually  matched  by  operating  profit  over  the  3-yr  average  period 
1998-2000  (+,  -  10%),  factoring  in  similar  profitability  levels,  cost  of 
goods  sold,  ability  to  make  profit,  etc;  and, 
3.  Individually  matched  by  turnover  over  the  3-yr  average  1998-2000  (+,  - 
10%),  factoring  in  similar  size  of  operations,  market,  share,  etc. 
For  each  of  the  matching  methods,  a  group  of  Japanese-owned  companies  was 
individually  matched  with  a  group  of  UK-owned  companies  and  a  group  of  US- 
owned  companies  was  individually  matched  with  a  group  of  UK-owned  companies. 
The  investigation  of  the  differences  between  the  groups  conducted  using  the 
independent  sample  t-test.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  assess  whether 
the  means  of  each  of  the  PLIs  was  different  for  the  foreign-owned  companies 
compared  to  the  domestic  UK  companies.  Table  7-4  shows  a  summary  of  the  matched 
data,  matching  method,  the  number  of  matched  companies,  and  the  table  number. 
Tah1P  7-4  Data  and  Matching  (Section  2-  Hvnothesis  4) 
Data 
Japanese-owned  vs.  UK-owned 
Matching  methods 
Growth  in  Turnover 
A'mither  of  Pain; 
52 
Tahle 
25  A&B 
Japanese-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Operating  profit  26  26  A&B 
Japanese-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Turnover  42  27  A&B 
US-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Growth  in  Turnover  88  28  A&B 
US-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Operating  profit  53  29  A&B 
US-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Turnover  68  30  A&B 
*All  Tables  in  Appendices. 
Javanese-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  the  Japanese-owned  companies  and  their  UK 
counterparts  the  growth  of  the  turnover  was  used.  The  first  step  was  the  calculation  of 
the  growth,  done  by  looking  at  the  growth  of  the  sales  between  the  year  ended  1998 
and  the  year  ended  2000  for  all  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  classified 
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industries  and  6  wholesale  industries).  The  second  step  was  to  individually  match 
Japanese-owned  companies  with  UK-owned  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit 
code  and  with  similar  growth  (+,  -  2.5%).  The  result  of  this  method  was  52  paired 
matches  of  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was 
used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of 
the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of  all  PLIs  were  lower  for  Japanese- 
owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies.  In  addition,  the 
return  on  assets  ratio  was  statistically  significantly  lower  for  the  Japanese-owned 
companies  compared  to  the  UK  sets  (Table  25  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  second  method  used  to  match  individual  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned 
companies  was  operating  profit  matching  criteria.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with 
similar  operating  profit  figures  (+,  -  10%)  for  all  the  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned 
companies  classified  under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12 
manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale  industries),  this  research  identified  26  pairs 
of  individually  matched  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies  within  each  SIC  four- 
digit  code  and  with  similar  operating  profit.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was  used 
to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of 
the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of  all  PLIs  were  lower  for  the  Japanese- 
owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies  with  no  statistically 
significant  results  found  (Table  26  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  last  method  used  to  match  individual  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies 
was  by  turnover.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar  turnover  figure  (+,  -  10%) 
for  all  the  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  classified  under  the  same 
industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale 
industries),  this  research  identified  42  pairs  of  individually  matched  Japanese-owned 
companies  with  UK-owned  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with 
similar  turnover.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of 
both  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI 
showed  that  the  means  of  the  PLIs  were  lower  for  the  Japanese-owned  companies 
compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies.  Berry  ratio  was  statistically 
154 significantly  lower  for  the  Japanese-owned  companies  (Table  27  A&B  in 
Appendices). 
US-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  the  US-owned  companies  and  their  UK 
counterparts,  the  growth  of  the  turnover  was  used.  The  first  step  was  the  calculation  of 
the  growth,  done  by  looking  at  the  growth  of  the  sales  between  the  year  ended  1998 
and  the  year  ended  2000  for  all  the  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  classified 
under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6 
wholesale  industries).  The  second  step  was  to  individually  match  US-owned 
companies  with  UK-owned  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with 
similar  growth  (+,  -  2.5%).  The  result  of  this  method  was  88  matched  pairs  of  US-  and 
UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs 
of  both  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  means  of  four  PLIs 
were  lower  for  the  US-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned 
companies.  Profit  margin  on  sales  ratio  was  statistically  lower  for  the  US-owned 
companies  compared  to  the  UK-owned  sets  (Table  28  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  second  method  used  to  match  individual  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies 
was  through  operating  profit  matching  criteria.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with 
similar  operating  profit  figures  (+,  -  10%)  for  all  the  US-owned  and  UK-owned 
companies  classified  under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12 
manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale  industries),  this  method  identified  53  pairs 
of  individually  matched  US-  and  UK-owned  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit 
code  and  with  similar  operating  profit.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was  used  to 
examine  the  PLIs  of  both  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of  the 
mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  mean  of  four  PLIs  was  higher  for  the  US-owned 
companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies  with  no  statistically 
significant  results  found  (Table  29  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  last  method  used  to  match  individual  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  was 
by  turnover.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar  turnover  figures  (+,  -  10%)  for 
all  the  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  classified  under  the  same  industrial 
codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale  industries),  this 
155 research  identified  68  pairs  of  individually  matched  US-  and  UK-owned  companies 
within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with  similar  turnover.  The  independent  sample  t 
test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The 
t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of  four  of  the  PLIs  were  lower 
for  the  US-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies  with  net 
margin  being  statistically  significant  (Table  30  A&B  in  Appendices). 
Based  on  the  results  of  the  statistical  tests  of  the  different  matching  methods,  it  can  be 
concluded  that  differences  between  the  performance  as  measured  by  PLI  of  foreign- 
owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  exist.  This  research  used  the  two  PLIs 
for  the  Japanese-owned  companies  and  the  two  PLIs  for  the  US-owned  companies  to 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  and  can  be  confident  that  evidence  of  lower  profitability  by 
foreign-owned  companies  was  presented.  Even  after  accounting  for  matching 
individual  companies  based  on  turnover,  operating  profit,  and  growth  of  turnover, 
Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies  reported  lower  profits  than  UK-owned 
companies. 
Ho5:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of 
joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK-owned 
and  the  verformances  of  UK/other-owned  companies. 
To  validate  the  hypothesis  related  to  the  comparison  of  the  performance  of  jointly 
owned  foreign  companies  (with  at  least  one  British  company  in  the  shareholders)  with 
UK  partners  represented  by  US/UK-  and  Japanese/UK-owned  companies,  the  same 
three  matching  methods  were  obtained  to  ensure  the  limitation  of  using  individual 
matching  criteria.  The  matching  methods  were  as  follows: 
1.  Individually  matched  by  growth  in  turnover  (+,  -  2.5%)  over  the  3-yr  period 
1998-2000,  factoring  in  similar  strategies,  product  cycles,  etc; 
2.  Individually  matched  by  operating  profit  over  the  3-yr  average  period  1998- 
2000  (+,  -  10%),  factoring  in  similar  profitability  levels,  cost  of  goods  sold, 
ability  to  make  profit,  etc;  and, 
3.  Individually  matched  by  turnover  over  the  3-yr  average  1998-2000  (+,  -  10%), 
factoring  in  similar  size  of  operations,  market,  share,  etc. 
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were  individually  matched  with  a  group  of  UK/other-owned  companies.  In  addition, 
a  group  of  US/UK  jointly  owned  companies  were  individually  matched  with  a  group 
of  UK-owned  companies.  Table  7-5  shows  a  summary  of  the  matched  data,  matching 
method,  the  number  of  matched  companies  and  the  table  number. 
Table  7-5:  Data  and  Matching  (Section  2-  Hypothesis  5) 
' 
vs.  UK/other-Owned  Japanese/UK-Owned  Growth  in  Turnover  21  31  A&B 
Japanese/UK-Owned  vs.  UK/other-Owned  Operating  profit  9  32  A&B 
Japanese/UK-Owned  vs.  UKlother-Owned  Turnover  11  33  A&B 
US/UK-Owned  vs.  UK/Other-Owned  Growth  in  Turnover  46  34  A&B 
US/UK-Owned  vs.  UK/Other-Owned  Operating  profit  26  35  A&B 
US/UK-Owned  vs.  UK/Other-Owned  Turnover  33  36  A&B 
*All  Tables  in  Appendices. 
Japanese/UK-Owned  Companie  vs.  UK/Other-Owned  Companies 
To  compare  the  performance  of  the  Japanese/UK-owned  companies  with  their 
UK/Other  counterparts  the  growth  of  the  turnover  was  used.  The  first  step  was  the 
calculation  of  growth,  done  by  looking  at  growth  of  the  sales  between  the  year  ended 
1998  and  the  year  ended  2000  for  all  Japanese/UK-owned  and  UK/other  companies 
classified  under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing 
industries  and  6  wholesale  industries).  The  second  step  was  to  individually  match 
Japanese/UK-owned  companies  with  UK/other  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit 
code  and  with  similar  growth  (+,  -  2.5%).  The  result  of  this  method  was  21  matched 
pairs  of  Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was 
used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test 
of  the  means  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of  all  PLIs  were  lower  for  the 
Japanese/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK/other  companies  with  no 
statistically  significant  results  (Table  31  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  second  method  used  to  match  individual  Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other  companies 
was  operating  profit  matching  criteria.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar 
operating  profit  figures  (+,  -  10%)  for  all  the  Japanese-owned  and  UK  companies 
classified  under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing 
industries  and  6  wholesale  industries),  this  research  matched  9  pairs  of  Japanese/UK- 
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similar  operating  profit.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs 
of  both  Japanese/UK  and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI 
showed  that  the  means  of  all  PLIs  were  lower  for  the  Japanese/UK-owned  companies 
compared  to  that  of  the  UK/other  companies  with  no  statistically  significant  results 
(Table  32  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  last  method  used  to  match  individual  Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other  companies  was 
matching  by  turnover.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar  turnover  figures  (+,  - 
10%)  for  all  the  Japanese-owned  and  UK/other  companies  classified  under  the  same 
industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale 
industries),  this  research  identified  11  matched  Japanese/UK-owned  companies  with 
UK/other  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with  similar  turnover.  The 
independent  sample  t  -test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  Japanese/UK-  and 
UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of  the 
PLIs  were  lower  for  the  Japanese/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the 
UK/other  companies  with  no  statistically  significant  results  found  (Table  33  A&B  in 
Appendices). 
US/UK-Owned  Companies  vs.  UK/Other-Owned  Companies 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  the  US/UK-owned  companies  with  their 
UK/other  counterparts  the  growth  of  the  turnover  was  used.  The  first  step  was 
calculation  of  growth,  done  by  looking  at  the  growth  of  sales  between  the  year  ended 
1998  and  the  year  ended  2000  for  all  the  US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies  classified 
under  the  same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6 
wholesale  industries).  The  second  step  was  to  individually  match  US/UK  companies 
with  UK/other  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with  similar  growth  (+, 
-  2.5%).  The  result  of  this  method  was  46  matched  pairs  of  US/UK-  and  UK/other 
companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both 
US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  all  PLIs  was  higher  for 
the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK/other  companies.  In 
addition,  net  margin  (operating  margin)  ratio  was,  statistically,  significantly  higher  for 
the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  the  UK/other-owned  sets  (Table  34  A&B 
in  Appendices). 
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operating  profit  matching  criteria.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar  operating 
profit  figures  (+,  -  10%)  for  all  US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies  classified  under  the 
same  industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale 
industries),  this  research  matched  26  pairs  of  US/UK-owned  companies  with 
UK/other  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with  similar  operating 
profit.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  US/UK- 
and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the  means  of 
all  PLIs  were  higher  for  the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the 
UK/other  companies.  Profit  margin  on  sales  and  net  margin  (operating  margin)  ratios 
were,  statistically,  significantly  higher  for  the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to 
the  UK/other  sets  (Table  35  A&B  in  Appendices). 
The  last  method  used  to  match  individual  US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies  was 
matching  by  turnover.  By  looking  at  the  companies  with  similar  turnover  figure  (+,  - 
10%)  for  all  the  US-owned  and  UK/other  companies  classified  under  the  same 
industrial  codes  used  in  Section  1  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale 
industries),  this  research  identified  33  pairs  of  individually  matched  US/UK-owned 
companies  with  UK/other  companies  within  each  SIC  four-digit  code  and  with  similar 
turnover.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both 
US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  each  PLI  showed  that  the 
mean  of  three  PLIs  was  lower  for  the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of 
the  UK/other  companies  with  no  statistically  significant  results  (Table  36  A&B  in 
Appendices). 
From  the  statistical  test  of  the  different  joint  ventures  groups  using  different  matching 
methods,  it  is  visible  that  the  form  of  the  investment  represented  by  joint  ventures  or  a 
domestic  partner  has  an  effect  on  the  performance  as  measured  by  PLIs  of  the  MNEs. 
These  effects  seem  to  change  according  to  differences  in  the  ownership  of  MNEs. 
Japanese-owned  companies  having  a  domestic  partner  reduced  the  gaps  in  profits 
between  Japanese-  and  UK/other  companies  given  that  the  results  indicated  no 
significant  differences.  In  the  opposite  direction,  the  joint  venture  form  of  investments 
had  positive  effects  on  PLIs  of  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  their  UK/other 
counterparts.  Two  PLIs  were  statistically  significantly  higher  for  the  US/UK-owned 
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ownership,  this  research  can  not  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no 
differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  measures)  of  joint  venture 
foreign-owned  companies  (US-  and  Japanese-owned)  from  the  performances  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (US-  and  Japanese-owned). 
7.2.3  Section  3:  Analysis  of  Qperating  Losses 
This  section  is  similar  to  Section  2  in  highlighting  the  performance  of  foreign-owned 
and  domestic-owned  companies  and  focusing  on  companies  with  average  operating 
losses.  The  investigation  of  the  differences  between  the  groups  was  conducted  using 
the  independent  sample  t  -test.  The  basis  for  using  the  independent  sample  t-test  was 
to  assess  whether  the  means  of  each  of  the  PLIs  was  different  for  the  foreign-owned 
companies  compared  to  the  UK-owned  companies.  This  section  tests  the  following 
null  hypothesis: 
Ho6:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  measures)  of 
foreign-owned  companies  with  average  negative  operating  profit  (Japanese- 
and  US-owned)  and  UK-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profit. 
Japanese-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  Japanese-owned  companies  with  operating 
losses  with  their  UK-owned  counterparts,  averages  of  the  PLIs  were  used  for  both 
groups  for  the  years  1998-2000  for  all  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies  classified 
under  the  18  industrial  codes  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale 
industries).  The  sample  consisted  of  27  Japanese-owned  companies  and  115  UK- 
owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of 
both  Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  the  PLIs 
showed  that  the  mean  of  all  PLIs  was  lower  for  the  Japanese  companies  compared  to 
that  of  the  UK  companies.  Profit  margin,  profit  margin  on  sales,  net  margin  (operating 
margin),  and  Berry  ratio  PLIs  were  statistically  significantly  lower  for  the  Japanese- 
owned  companies  compared  to  the  UK  sets  (Table  37  A&B  in  Appendices). 
160 US-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies 
To  compare  the  performance  of  the  US-owned  companies  with  operating  losses  to 
their  UK-owned  counterparts,  averages  of  the  PLIs  were  used  for  both  groups  for  the 
years  1998-2000  for  all  the  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies  classified  under  18 
industrial  codes  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale  industries).  The  sample 
consisted  of  36  US-owned  companies  and  115  UK-owned  companies.  The 
independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  US-owned  and  UK- 
owned  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  means  of  the  PLIs  showed  that  the  mean  of  four 
PLIs  were  lower  for  the  US  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK-owned  companies. 
The  profit  margin  ratio  was  statistically  significantly  lower  for  the  US-owned 
companies  compared  with  the  UK-owned  companies  (Table  38  A&B  in  Appendices). 
Although  this  section  did  not  use  precise  matching  methods  due  to  the  limited  number 
of  companies  with  3-yr  average  (1998-2000)  operating  losses,  it  appeares  from  the 
statistical  tests  that  the  profitability  of  MNEs  differed  based  on  country  of  ownership. 
For  the  Japanese-owned  companies,  the  result  revealed  that  four  of  the  PLIs  were 
statistically  significantly  lower  than  the  UK-owned  companies  indicating  that  for  the 
companies  with  Japanese  citizenship  the  null  hypothesis  could  only  be  rejected  if  the 
tests  were  conducted  on  only  the  Japanese  companies.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
statistical  results  found  one  profit  level  indicator  significantly  different  for  the  US- 
owned  companies  compared  to  the  UK-owned  companies.  Therefore,  this  study 
neither  rejects  nor  accepts  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no  differences  between 
the  performance  (PLIs)  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profit 
and  UK-owned  companies.  Similar  to  previous  portions  of  this  research,  this  finding 
further  confirms  that  Japanese-owned  companies  have  consistently  lower  profitability 
unlike  the  US-owned  companies,  presumably  due  to  country  of  ownership 
Hol:  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  measures)  of 
joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies  with  average  negative  operating  profit 
(Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK  owned)  and  UK/other-owned  companies  with 
negative  operating  profit. 
161 Japan/UK-owned  companies  vs.  UK/other  companies 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  the  Japanese/UK-owned  companies  with 
operating  losses  to  their  UK/other  counterparts,  averages  of  the  PLIs  were  used  for 
both  groups  for  the  years  1998-2000  for  all  the  Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other 
companies  classified  under  18  industrial  codes  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6 
wholesale  industries).  The  sample  consisted  of  18  Japanese-owned  companies  and  47 
UK  companies.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both 
Japanese/UK-  and  UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  mean  of  the  PLIs  showed 
that  the  means  of  three  PLIs  were  lower  for  Japanese/UK-owned  companies 
compared  to  that  of  the  UK/other  companies  with  no  statistically  significantly  results 
(Table  39  A&B  in  Appendices). 
US/UK-owned  companies  vs.  UK/other  companies 
To  compare  the  performance  of  the  US/UK-owned  companies  with  operating  losses 
and  their  UK-owned  counterparts,  averages  of  the  PLIs  were  used  for  both  groups  for 
the  years  1998-2000  for  all  the  US/UK-  and  UK/other  companies  classified  under  the 
18  industrial  codes  (12  manufacturing  industries  and  6  wholesale  industries).  The 
sample  consisted  of  42  US-owned  companies  and  47  UK  companies.  The 
independent  sample  t-test  was  used  to  examine  the  PLIs  of  both  US/UK-owned  and 
UK/other  companies.  The  t-test  of  the  means  of  the  PLIs  showed  that  the  means  of  all 
PLIs  were  lower  for  the  US/UK-owned  companies  compared  to  that  of  the  UK/other 
companies.  In  addition,  the  profit  margin  ratio  was  statistically  significant  (Table  40 
A&B  in  Appendices). 
It  can  be  concluded  from  the  statistical  tests  that  the  form  of  the  investment 
represented  by  Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK-owned  companies  with  3-yr  (1998-2000) 
average  operating  losses  affected  the  performance  as  measured  by  PLIs  of  the  MNEs. 
This  was  a  repeated  occurrence  for  these  and  previous  samples  as  the  role  of  the 
domestic  UK  partner  in  the  joint  venture  minimized  gaps  in  the  PLIs.  As  there  was 
one  significant  ratio  between  the  two  groups  (Japan/UK-  vs.  UK/other  and  US/UK- 
vs.  UK/other),  this  research  can  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no 
differences  between  the  performance  (PLIs)  of  joint  venture  foreign-owned 
companies  with  negative  operating  profit  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  explanation 
being  that  by  having  a  local  partner  in  a  joint  venture  management,  differences 
162 between  the  performance  of  foreign  and  domestic-owned  companies  are  eliminated. 
7.2.4  Section  4:  Analysis  of  Tax 
This  section  sheds  light  on  the  impact  of  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing  regulations 
introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment  reform  and  its  influence  on 
performance  as  measured  by  tax  payment  of  both  foreign-owned  and  domestic-owned 
companies  in  the  UK.  The  time  periods  examined  are  fiscal  years  1996-1997  and 
fiscal  years  1999-2000.  These  fiscal  years  cover  the  period  prior  and  subsequent  to 
the  1998  transfer  pricing  regulations  in  the  UK.  The  rationale  for  choosing  US-owned 
and  Japanese-owned  companies  was  to  be  consistent  with  previous  sections  of  this 
research  and  to  follow  the  evidence  in  previous  literature  that  has  led  to  the  suggestion 
that  Japanese-owned  companies  tend  to  improperly  use  transfer  pricing  tax  laws  to 
reallocate  income  from  their  overseas  operations  to  Japan. 
Unlike  previous  research  which  randomly  selected  groups  of  foreign  and  domestic 
companies  and  compared  their  tax  payments  regardless  of  their  activities,  size, 
profitability,  or  used  the  same  set  of  companies  when  comparing  periods  prior  and 
subsequent  to  the  new  regulations,  this  study  eliminated  the  differences  in  financial 
characteristics  of  various  industries  and  compared  companies  on  an  industrial  basis. 
The  sample  for  this  section  was  obtained  using  the  FAME  database  covering  the  fiscal 
years  1996,1997,1999,  and  2000.  Table  7-6  shows  a  summary  of  the  matched  data, 
matching  method,  and  the  number  of  matched  companies. 
Table  7-6:  Data  and  iviatcnin  k3ecnon'+) 
Japanese-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Manufacturing  47  41  A  &B 
US-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Manufacturing  202  42  A  &B 
Japanese-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Wholesale  41  43  A  &B 
US-owned  vs.  UK-owned  Wholesale  80  44  A  &B 
*A11  'Fables  in  Appenaices. 
This  section  tested  the  following  null  hypothesis: 
Ho8:  There  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  expense  by  foreign-owned 
companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  compared  to  the  amount  of  reported  tax 
expense  by  domestic  companies. 
163 Japanese-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
In  order  to  compare  the  tax  payment  of  the  foreign-owned  companies  and  their  UK 
counterparts,  this  research  matched  individual  foreign-owned  companies  by  both  SIC 
two-digit  codes  (rather  than  the  SIC  four-digit  code  used  in  the  previous  section  to 
allow  for  a  greater  number  of  individually  matched  companies)  and  gross  profit  (+,  - 
10%)  located  in  all  manufacturing  industries.  The  result  of  this  matching  method  was 
47  pairs  of  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was 
used  to  examine  the  tax  payment  (net  tax  liability  paid  to  Inland  Revenue)  of  both 
Japanese-owned  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t-test  for  the  four  financial  years 
tested  suggested  that  the  tax  paid  by  Japanese  companies  to  the  UK  government  was 
lower  than  the  mean  of  the  tax  payment  paid  by  the  matched  UK  companies.  The 
results  for  the  years  1999,1997,  and  1996  were,  statistically,  significantly  lower  for 
Japanese  companies  (Table  41  A&B  in  Appendices). 
US-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
To  compare  the  tax  payment  of  the  US-owned  companies  and  their  UK-owned 
counterparts,  a  match  of  individual  foreign-owned  companies  by  both  SIC  two-digit 
codes  (rather  than  the  SIC  four-digit  code  used  in  the  previous  section  to  allow  for  a 
greater  number  of  individually  matched  companies)  and  gross  profit  (+,  -  10%) 
located  in  all  manufacturing  industries  was  used.  The  result  of  this  matching  method 
was  202  pairs  of  US-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was 
applied  to  examine  the  tax  payment  of  both  US-owned  and  UK-owned  companies. 
The  t-test  for  the  four  financial  years  tested  suggested  that  the  mean  of  the  tax  paid  by 
US-owned  companies  to  the  UK  government  was  lower  than  the  tax  payment  paid  by 
the  matched  UK-owned  companies  for  three  financial  years.  The  result  for  the  year 
1999  was  statistically  significantly  lower  for  US-owned  companies  (Table  42  A&B  in 
Appendices). 
Japanese-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
To  evaluate  the  tax  payment  of  the  foreign-owned  companies  and  their  UK 
counterparts,  this  research  matched  individual  foreign-owned  companies  by  both  SIC 
two-digit  codes  (rather  than  the  SIC  four-digit  code  used  in  the  previous  section  to 
allow  for  a  greater  number  of  individually  matched  companies)  and  gross  profit  (+,  - 
10%)  located  in  all  wholesale  industries.  The  result  of  this  matching  method  was  41 
164 pairs  of  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t-test  was 
used  to  examine  the  tax  payment  of  both  Japanese-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t- 
test  of  the  financial  years  tested  suggested  that  the  tax  paid  by  Japanese-owned 
companies  to  the  UK  government  was  lower  than  the  mean  of  the  tax  payment  paid 
by  the  matched  UK-owned  companies.  The  results  for  the  years  2000,1999,  and  1997 
were  statistically  significantly  lower  for  Japanese  companies  (Table  43  A&B  in 
Appendices). 
US-owned  companies  vs.  UK-owned  companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
To  assess  the  tax  payment  of  the  US-owned  companies  and  their  UK-owned 
counterparts,  a  match  of  individual  foreign-owned  companies  by  both  SIC  two-digit 
codes  (rather  than  the  SIC  four-digit  code  used  in  the  previous  section  to  allow  for  a 
greater  number  of  individually  matched  companies)  and  gross  profit  (+,  -  10%) 
located  in  all  manufacturing  industries  were  used.  The  result  of  this  matching  method 
was  80  pairs  of  US-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  independent  sample  t  -test  was 
applied  to  examine  the  tax  payments  of  both  US-  and  UK-owned  companies.  The  t- 
test  of  the  financial  years  tested  suggested  that  the  mean  of  the  taxes  paid  by  US- 
owned  companies  to  the  UK  government  was  lower  than  the  tax  payment  paid  by  the 
matched  UK-owned  companies  for  all  the  financial  years  with  no  statistically 
significantly  results  (Table  44  A&B  in  Appendices). 
As  a  result  of  the  findings  noted  above,  this  research  neither  accepts  nor  rejects  the 
null  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  tax  paid  to  the  UK 
government  from  foreign-owned  companies  within  the  manufacturing  and  wholesale 
industries  over  time  compared  to  the  amount  of  tax  paid  by  domestic  companies. 
Since  the  tests  demonstrated  one  statistically  significant  low  value  of  the  tax  payment 
for  the  US-owned  companies  and  six  statistically  significantly  low  mean  values  of  tax 
payments  for  the  Japanese-owned  companies,  the  null  hypothesis  can  be  rejected  if  it 
is  only  based  on  the  Japanese-owned  companies.  The  low  tax  payment  by  Japanese- 
owned  companies  was  evident  consistently  amongst  both  the  manufacturing  and 
wholesale  industries.  This  finding  confirms  the  results  of  previous  research  in  the 
area  as  well  as  prior  sections  that  surmised  that  Japanese-owned  companies 
underperfonms  by  both  profitability  and  tax  payments  compared  to  domestic  UK 
companies.  The  distribution  of  the  Japanese-owned  companies'  taxes  provides 
165 evidence  on  how  likely  it  is  that  manipulation  of  income  takes  place.  Persistently 
large  losses  in  relation  to  assets  or  sales  suggests  limited  tax  planning  as  the  foreign 
company  could  lower  its  worldwide  tax  bill  by  shifting  some  of  its  losses  to  other 
jurisdictions. 
Ho9:  There  are  no  differences  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  expense  by  foreign- 
owned  companies  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing 
regulation  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment  compared  to 
domestic  companies. 
To  test  the  impact  of  the  latest  UK  1998  regulation  changes  on  the  tax  and  transfer 
pricing  regulations  in  the  UK,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  the  periods  prior  and 
subsequent  to  the  tax  changes.  Fiscal  years  1996-1997  and  fiscal  years  1999-2000 
were  used  to  validate  this  null  hypothesis.  Using  data  from  manufacturing  and 
wholesale  industries,  each  of  the  Japanese-,  US-,  and  UK-owned  data  were  tested 
separately  using  the  One  Way  ANOVA  test  for  the  years  prior  and  subsequent  to  the 
UK  tax  reform.  The  One  Way  ANOVA  test  combined  the  data  prior  and  subsequent 
to  1998  in  order  to  detect  any  effects  of  the  new  law.  The  results  of  the  One  Way 
ANOVA  for  the  groups  were  as  follows: 
Japanese-owned  Companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  47  Japanese-owned  companies  in  the 
manufacturing  industry  revealed  an  increase  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of 
the  new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  45  in  Appendices). 
US-owned  Companies  fflanufacturing  industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  202  US-owned  companies  in  the 
manufacturing  industry  revealed  a  decrease  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of 
the  new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  46  in  Appendices). 
UK-owned  Companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  249  UK-owned  companies  in  the 
manufacturing  industry  revealed  an  increase  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of 
the  new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  47  in  Appendices). 
166 Japanese-owned  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  41  Japanese-owned  companies  in  the 
wholesale  industry  revealed  a  decrease  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of  the 
new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  48  in  Appendices). 
US-owned  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  80  US-owned  companies  in  the 
wholesale  industry  revealed  a  decrease  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of  the 
new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  49  in  Appendices). 
UK-owned  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
The  results  of  the  One  Way  ANOVA  for  the  121  UK-owned  companies  in  the 
wholesale  industry  revealed  a  decrease  in  tax  payments  after  the  introduction  of  the 
new  UK  self-assessment  with  no  significant  results  (Table  50  in  Appendices). 
The  statistical  results  obtained  using  the  One  Way  ANOVA  on  all  manufacturing  and 
wholesale  industries  indicated  no  significant  differences  between  the  tax  payments 
prior  and  subsequent  to  the  new  tax  reform,  thus  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no 
differences  in  the  amount  of  taxes  paid  by  foreign-owned  companies  prior  and 
subsequent  to  the  1998  UK  self-assessment  tax  compared  to  domestic  companies  can 
not  be  rejected. 
7 
.3 
Interviews  with  ITP  Specialists 
7.3.1  Consultiniz  Firms 
In  order  to  further  validate  the  research  findings,  interviews  were  conducted  with  two 
transfer  pricing  consultants.  In  addition  to  confirming  the  research  findings,  the 
consultants  provided  a  wealth  of  information  on  transfer  pricing  in  practice.  They 
noted  that  although  there  remain  theoretical  differences  between  TNMM  and  CPM,  in 
practice  the  differences  are  minimal.  OECD  Guidelines  give  companies  freedom  in 
determining  profitability  within  the  range;  profit  level  indicators  are  open  to  differing 
interpretations  with  subjectivity  involved  in  determining  comparables.  The  1998  UK 
self-assessment  tax  law  brings  greater  compliance  burdens,  awareness,  and 
requirements  to  companies  and  gives  more  authority  to  the  tax  authorities.  In  terms  of 
procedures,  the  inter-quartile  range  is  widely  used  by  consultants  and  tax  authorities 
167 within  the  UK.  Profit-based  methods  are  widely  used  to  support  companies'  ITP 
policy.  Consultants  are  aware  of  ownership  effects.  Aggregation  of  the  transactions 
is  an  accepted  mechanism  by  the  tax  authorities.  Finally,  although  the  1998  UK  self- 
assessment  has  given  Inland  Revenue  more  authority,  its  resources  are  limited  in 
comparison  to  those  of  ITP  consultants.  The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  comments 
of  the  interviewees  related  to  the  findings  of  this  study: 
Interviewee  I 
Interviewee  1  holds  a  doctorate  in  transfer  pricing  and  is  a  senior  transfer  pricing 
manager  at  an  international  accounting  firm.  The  interview  was  conducted  in  London 
in  July  2002  with  the  main  points  as  follows. 
To  avoid  the  problem  of  bigger  profit  ranges  in  practice,  consultants  use  the  US  IRS 
statistical  tool  which  eliminates  50%  of  the  results  (inter-quartile  range)  in  the  UK. 
Although  Inland  Revenue  does  not  require  companies  to  report  their  comparable 
ranges  with  any  limitations  (statistical  method),  it  is  commonly  accepted  to  eliminate 
the  outliers  by  using  the  statistical  method  (inter-quartile  ranges).  In  specific 
circumstances  consultants  use  the  full  range  depending  on  the  purpose  of  work.  For 
example,  quartile  ranges  are  used  for  planning  exercises  to  support  a  filing  position  by 
the  taxpayer.  Companies  defend  their  comparable  sets  more  ably  if  it  is  within  the 
quartile  ranges  because  top  and  bottom  25%  are  eliminated.  Tax  authorities  in  some 
cases  might  not  only  reject  the  range  but  also  the  method  used. 
With  differing  approaches  available  in  practice  as  well  as  differing  interpretations  of 
OECD  Guidelines,  the  main  issue  is  supporting  companies'  position  in  terms  of 
method  chosen  with  tax  authorities  and  ensuring  compliance  with  arm's  length.  This 
observation  supports  the  significance  of  this  research  as  comparables  remain 
important  even  when  transaction  based  methods  applied. 
The  process  in  developing  comparables  includes:  industry,  keywords  search, 
independent  websites,  and  business  description.  The  number  of  comparables  is 
usually  between  five  and  twenty  companies.  The  same  process  in  developing 
comparables  is  used  for  all  industries.  Foreign  operating  profit  measures  are  preferred 
over  the  gross  profit  measure  with  certain  industries  have  differing  priorities  in  terms 
168 of  deciding  which  profit  measures  to  use.  For  example,  distribution  industries  may 
use  operating  margin  while  trading  industries  may  use  the  Berry  ratio. 
Companies  are  more  likely  to  make  decisions  in  terms  of  profit  level  indicators  when 
preparing  their  own  documentation  to  ensure  acceptance  by  Inland  Revenue. 
Transactional  methods  are  preferred,  but  they  are  difficult  to  obtain  and  apply  since  it 
requires  adjustment  for  risks,  currency,  and  terms  of  sale.  Even  if  comparable  sets  are 
obtained,  tax  authorities  carefully  evaluate  them  and  require  companies  to  make  the 
necessary  adjustments. 
Tax  authorities  are  less  likely  to  question  profitable  companies  and  are  more  likely  to 
question  loss-making  companies.  In  practice,  consultants  might  use  loss-making 
companies  as  a  part  of  a  good  comparable  set.  Consultants  use  Jordan's  FAME 
database  to  obtain  comparables  for  UK  companies.  In  developing  comparables, 
consultants  place  more  adjustments  when  a  large  number  of  companies  are  available. 
In  developing  comparables  consultants  put  less  restrictions  when  a  smaller  number  of 
companies  is  available.  The  key  issue  is  that  companies  have  similar  function  and 
risk  rather  than  size  or  strategy.  Foreign-owned  companies  are  expected  to  earn  as 
much  as  domestic  companies  since  arm's  length  price  is  based  on  functional  risk.  In 
practice,  foreign-owned  companies  may  earn  the  same  as  a  UK  distributor,  the  key 
issue  being  to  satisfy  the  arm's  length.  The  difference  between  foreign-owned  and 
domestic-owned  profits  might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  some  of  these  companies  incur 
additional  costs  such  as  startup  costs,  foreign  exchange,  R&D,  etc.  Whereas 
according  to  this  research's  findings,  differences  in  profitability  between  the  foreign- 
owned  companies  and  their  domestic  counterparts  are,  in  all  probability,  due  to  skilled 
tax  planning  and  income  reallocation.  The  influences  of  startup  costs  and  R&D  were 
eliminated  in  this  research  when  matching  foreign-  and  domestic-owned  companies 
by  using  established  companies  (active  for  a  minimum  of  four  years)  and  by 
reviewing  the  intangibles  (without  significant  license  to  third  parties)  in  the  sample 
sets.  Due  to  time  restrictions  and  cost  issues,  transactions  are  aggregated  by  the  line 
of  business  or  type  of  transaction  with  one  set  of  comparables  obtained  for  the  group. 
Although  consultants  are  aware  of  ownership  effects,  focus  from  tax  authorities  on 
certain  nationalities  has  not  been  noticed. 
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of  ITP  specialists.  Now  many  consulting  firms  have  a  whole  department  full  of  ITP 
specialists.  The  main  reason  is  compliance  with  new  guidelines  to  support  a 
company's  position.  Greater  compliance  burden/documentation  has  resulted  in  more 
companies  meeting  with  requirements.  Taxpayers  may  take  an  active  role  in 
determining  their  comparable  sets,  possibly  leading  to  a  change  in  the  set  of 
comparable  companies  that  will  prove  satisfactory  to  both  the  consultant  and  the 
taxpayer.  As  a  result  of  the  large  number  of  comparable  companies  available  and  the 
leeway  when  choosing  PLIs,  the  previous  observation  supports  this  research's 
findings  that  companies  are  able,  to  a  certain  degree,  to  select  the  comparable  sets, 
PLIs,  and  the  profit  range  most  appropriate  to  their  ITP  policy. 
Interviewee  2 
Interviewee  2  is  also  a  senior  transfer  pricing  manager  at  an  international  accounting 
firm.  The  interview  was  conducted  in  London  in  July  2002  with  the  main  points  as 
follows. 
The  second  consultant  confirmed  the  observations  of  the  first  interviewee  regarding 
the  vast  profit  ranges  in  practice  and  the  use  of  the  inter-quartile  range.  The 
explanation  of  the  wide  profit  ranges  being  that  the  techniques  used  to  date  are  not 
sufficiently  sophisticated  to  hone  in  on  the  underlying  return  for  a  specific  function 
and  risk.  As  a  result,  the  attempts  are  to  control  for  as  much  as  possible.  Consultants 
today  are  seeing  ranges  fairly  wide  across  different  industries,  although  for  some 
industries  the  ranges  are  a  bit  narrower.  This  observation  is  further  confirmed  through 
this  research  as  seen  in  Table  7-3,  where  the  number  of  comparable  sets  varied  from 
21  to  75  companies  throughout  the  eighteen  industries.  According  to  this  consultant's 
experience,  the  number  of  reported  comparables  in  a  set  is  usually  between  five  and 
ten,  thus  confirming  this  research's  implication  that  companies  can  select  their 
preferred  sets.  Overall,  practices  are  becoming  more  sophisticated  and  consultants 
use  IR  as  a  guide  even  though  IR  today  is  a  couple  of  years  behind  the  consultants  in 
terms  of  techniques  used  and  database  analysis. 
Quartile  ranges  remain  a  good  tool  to  control  for  the  factors  that  cannot  be  controlled 
when  developing  comparables.  The  choice  of  profit  measure  (PLIs)  is  determined  by 
170 looking  at  the  most  reliable  justifiable  measure.  In  some  cases  more  than  one  profit 
measure  is  used.  Inland  Revenue  appears  to  be  particularly  interested  in  the  choice  of 
the  profit  measure.  For  example,  whether  the  manufacturing  industry  uses  return  on 
assets,  the  selling/trading  industry  uses  operating  margin,  etc.  In  some  situations  the 
choice  of  profit  indication  leads  to  a  discussion  with  IR  on  which  profit  level 
indicators  to  choose,  possibly  due  to  the  absence  of  detailed  regulations. 
When  aggregating  transactions,  the  size  of  the  transactions  and  the  profit  level 
indicator  choice  might  be  considered.  Additional  refinements  such  as  telephone 
surveys,  extra  research,  internet,  etc  are  utilized  to  reduce  the  comparable  sets  when  a 
large  number  of  comparables  are  available.  Tax  authorities  do  not  have  the  resources 
consultants  have...  "When  Revenue  comes  up  with  an  alternative  set  of  comparables 
they  are  not  doing  a  good  job  as  their  arguments  will  be  limited  against  consultants' 
comparables  sets.  "  Inland  Revenue  is  less  in  a  position  to  argue  against  a  set  of 
comparables  prepared  by  consultants  due  to  limited  resources  and  heavy  workloads. 
Although  the  interviewee  states  that  IR  might  challenge  the  comparable  sets  and 
selected  PLIs,  experienced  MNEs  and  tax  consultants  remain  in  a  position  to  use  their 
discretion  in  terms  of  compliance  with  the  arm's  length  principle. 
Transfer  pricing  guidelines  provide  some  flexibility  when  ascertaining  degree  as  no 
exact  comparables  can  be  obtained.  `Pepsi  not  comparable  to  Coke'  and  there  is 
always  an  element  of  subjectivity. 
One  of  the  explanations  of  the  differences  between  foreign-owned  and  domestic- 
owned  companies  might  be  the  value  of  intangibles,  such  as  R&D  or  research  centers 
that  might  be  located  in  the  parent  country.  For  example,  Japanese  companies  might 
be  unwilling  to  make  profits  outside  of  Japan  possibly  because  of  the  Japanese  tax 
authorities.  In  practice,  there  have  been  examples  where  Japanese  companies  were 
questioned  by  Inland  Revenue  because  they  did  not  seem  to  be  making  enough  profit 
in  the  UK.  Certain  Japanese  clients  explained  that  part  of  Japanese  culture  is  that  the 
transfer  price  is  set  in  the  home  country.  One  of  the  interviewee's  Japanese  clients 
explained,  "You  need  to  understand  the  Japanese  business  culture  in  Japan,  we  want 
to  make  our  profit  in  Japan.  "  A  business  culture  practice  such  as  this  is  usually 
backed  up  by  tax  authorities  in  Japan  who  also  believe  that  Japanese  companies 
171 should  make  their  profit  in  Japan.  This  might  follow  the  same  argument  that  IR  would 
like  UK  companies  to  have  the  profit  in  the  UK,  whereas  this  is  not  the  case  for  US 
companies  because  they  might  be  more  aware  of  the  implications  of  ITP.  While  the 
findings  of  the  tax  analysis  section  (7.2-Ho8)  of  this  research  showed  one  low  figure 
of  reported  tax  expense  for  the  US-owned  companies,  it  showed  six  low  figures  of  tax 
expenses  for  Japanese-owned  companies  confirming  the  interviewee's  previous 
comments. 
The  latest  28AAICTA  1998  UK  transfer  pricing  regulations  brings  more  awareness 
and  encourages  companies  to  do  things  properly  which  includes  choosing  the 
appropriate  comparables  and  profit  level  indicators.  This  might  have  a  direct  effect 
on  foreign-owned  companies  which  might  be  under  investigation  of  the  tax  authorities 
(more  compliance  for  foreign-owned  companies  within  the  acceptable  range), 
especially  that  the  latest  1998  UK  regulations  brings  a  compliance  burden  on  the 
taxpayers. 
This  research  supports  the  opinions  of  the  interviewee  that  the  UK  latest  transfer 
pricing  rules  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self-assessment  would  have  a  great 
impact  on  both  foreign-  and  domestic-owned  companies  as  it  contains  a  specific 
requirement  for  profits  to  be  calculated  in  accordance  with  the  arm's  length  principle. 
Previously  there  was  no  requirement  to  adhere  to  the  arm's  length  principle  in 
calculating  profits  for  inclusion  in  a  tax  return.  Instead,  IR  has  the  authority,  through 
the  use  of  some  cumbersome  processes,  including  the  issue  of  formal  directions  by  its 
Board,  to  replace  prices  on  transactions  which  has  resulted  in  the  understatement  of 
profits  in  the  UK  through  pricing  at  arm's  length.  As  there  was  no  statutory 
requirement  to  return  profits  calculated  in  accordance  with  the  arm's  length  standard 
no  penalties  could  ordinarily  be  attached  to  the  tax  on  uplifts  made  by  IR.  (Ernst  & 
Young  UK,  2000) 
The  final  comment  made  by  the  interviewee  was  that  findings  of  this  research  study 
were  consistent  with  consultants'  experience  in  practice. 
172 7.3.2  International  tax  agency 
To  authenticate  the  research  findings,  three  other  interviews  were  conducted  with  ITP 
specialists  from  the  International  Bureau  for  Fiscal  Documentation  (IBFD)  in  the 
Netherlands  in  order  to  authenticate  the  research  findings.  The  specialists  provided 
their  views  regarding  the  research  problem  in  theoretical  and  practical  bases.  The 
following  is  a  summary  of  the  comments  of  the  interviewees  which  is  related  to  the 
findings  of  this  study: 
Interviewee  3 
Interviewee  3  is  an  international  taxation  professor,  ITP  expert,  and  published  author. 
The  following  are  the  main  comments  from  the  interviewee  conducted  December 
2002  in  Amsterdam. 
Not  until  the  early  1990's  was  there  a  shift  towards  one  central  benchmark  which  is 
comparable  to  the  operating  profit  of  comparable  enterprises.  "We  cannot  assure  that 
this  is  the  number  one  method  like  in  the  US  where  data  on  operating  profit  can  be 
easily  found,  and  we  hope  that  we  do  not  go  in  the  direction  of  the  US.  "  From  the 
point  of  view  of  this  research,  the  previous  comment  made  by  the  interviewee 
supports  the  research  method  used,  based  on  UK  data,  when  comparing  TNMM  and 
CPM  since  detailed  financial  data  are  available  in  the  UK. 
From  a  theoretical  point  view,  the  focus  should  remain  on  the  use  of  traditional 
methods  because  both  TNMM  and  CPM  is  basically  returning  to  the  third  empirical 
method  approach  of  transfer  pricing  where  no  reliable  accounts  or  no  accounts  at  all 
can  be  found.  CPM  does  not  include  the  arm's  length  principle  because  it  is  based  on 
Anglo-Saxon  approach  that  develops  to  avoid  income  shifting  internationally,  such  as 
US  laws  in  1917  and  UK  1918. 
According  to  this  research  the  importance  of  comparables  is  not  only  due  in  part  to  its 
use  for  profit-based  methods  such  as  TNMM  and  CPM,  but  also  its  relevance  in  the 
documentation  which  must  include  sufficient  detail  for  the  economic  argument  as  to 
placement  within  or  outside  any  comparable  range. 
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Interviewee  4  is  a  tax  lawyer  and  ITP  consultant,  previously  employed  by  the 
Australian  tax  authorities.  The  following  are  the  main  comments  from  the  interview 
conducted  December  2002  in  Amsterdam. 
It  seems  that  getting  tighter  profit  ranges  improves  comparability  of  the  data  sets  but 
CPM  is  not  always  applied  in  practice.  In  essence,  this  research  used  similar 
procedure  as  thoes  done  by  consulting  firms  and  government  agencies. 
The  justification  of  the  lower  profitability  by  US-  and  Japanese-owned  companies  is 
because  they  are  based  on  higher  sales  volume.  This  comment  was  addressed  by  the 
research  method  through  the  use  of  turnover  as  criteria  to  match  foreign-  and 
domestic-owned  companies. 
In  closing,  in  reality,  it  might  be  the  large  number  of  companies  to  a  tested  party,  but 
these  can  only  be  used  as  supporting  documentation.  In  addition,  aggregation  of 
transactions  should  be  acceptable.  Relating  this  comment  to  this  research, 
aggregating  transactions  might  lead  to  enhanced  discretion  by  the  taxpayers  as  it 
allows  the  use  of  wider  criteria  (less  control)  in  obtaining  comparable  sets. 
Interviewee  5 
Interviewee  5  is  a  tax  lawyer.  The  following  are  the  main  comments  from  the 
interviewee  conducted  December  2002  in  Amsterdam. 
The  emphasis  was  given  to  the  justification  of  the  profit  measure  used  in  practice  and 
the  feeling  that  it  is  important  for  the  measure  to  represent  an  arm's  length  situation. 
For  example,  where  the  assets  are  not  the  driving  force,  the  profit  on  the  return  on 
assets  can't  be  used. 
The  differences  in  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  can  be  explained  by 
the  dividends  paid  to  the  parent  companies  or  funds  transfer  between  countries. 
Consideration  might  be  given  to  the  strategy  of  Japanese-owned  companies  that  can't 
be  covered  by  ITP  regulations.  It  is  possible  that  transfer  pricing  regulations  allow 
income  shifting. 
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companies  because  companies  will  look  for  the  safe  side  and  to  avoid  penalties.  This 
can  be  seen  when  the  US  introduced  their  detailed  transfer  pricing  rules  which  led  the 
OECD  to  follow  it  by  introducing  the  new  version  of  their  rules.  Countries  fear  that 
detailed  restricted  rules  in  one  country  lead  enterprises  to  seek  the  safe  side  in  that 
country  at  the  expense  of  other  countries.  This  research  supports  the  opinions  of  the 
interviewee  that  the  new  self-assessment  would  have  a  great  impact  because  of  its 
detailed  documentations  requirement  and  possible  penalties. 
The  interviewee's  final  comments  were  that  OECD  Guidelines  are  an  attempt  to  limit 
the  fear  of  European  countries  from  US  regulations. 
7.4  Summary 
This  study  provides  important  results  from  a  theoretical  and  practical  standpoint.  On  a 
the  theoretical  level,  the  results  of  the  analysis  do  not  support  FDI  theories  regarding 
the  high  quality  performance  (profit  and  taxes)  that  foreign  subsidiaries  expect  to 
achieve.  On  a  practical  level,  Section  One  provided  an  in  depth  analysis  of  the 
differences  in  practice  between  OECD  profit  ranges,  full  range,  and  US  IRS  profit 
ratios,  inter-quartile  ranges  in  addition  to  evaluating  different  PLIs  across  individual 
industries.  This  section  highlighted  the  results  of  examining  different  methods  of 
creating  comparables  which  relate  to  the  function  and  risk  profiles.  In  addition  to 
uncovering  the  effects  of  ownership  on  comparables,  Sections  Two  and  Three 
represent  a  contribution  to  the  limited  empirical  studies  in  the  UK.  By  comparing  the 
performances  of  foreign-owned  companies  to  domestic  companies,  this  study 
increased  the  strength  of  the  results  by  stressing  the  importance  of  the  use  of  matching 
between  groups  and  joint-ventures  partners.  The  final  section  illuminated  on  the 
influence  of  the  latest  transfer  pricing  regulations  and  provided  evidence  of  the  low 
amount  of  reported  tax  by  foreign-owned  companies  in  the  UK. 
The  interviews  carried  out  by  this  research  confirmed  the  findings  of  the  analysis, 
noted  the  preference  by  the  continental  European  experts  for  OECD  profit  methods 
and,  provided  a  core  understanding  of  ITP  challenges.  These  interviews  underscore 
the  importance  of  profit-based  methods  and  comparables  and  the  flexibility  of  transfer 
pricing  guidelines  in  allowing  MNEs  discretion  in  terms  of  compliance,  in  addition  to 
175 sensing  improper  practices  by  foreign-owned  companies.  This  study  opens  a 
multitude  of  new  areas  of  future  research  in  theory  and  practice  as  explained  in  the 
next  chapter. 
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Findings,  Limitations,  and  Future  research 8.1  Introduction 
The  objective  of  this  research  is  to  contribute  and  improve  understanding  of  profit 
based  methods  and  the  process  of  creating  comparables.  This  goal  can  be  achieved 
through  the  inspection  of  the  most  recent  OECD  TNMM  and  US  IRS  CPM,  the 
performance  (profit  and  tax)  of  foreign  companies,  and  the  examination  of  the  degree 
of  discretion  provided  under  these  regulations.  In  this  chapter  a  summary  of  the 
findings,  expected  implications,  the  contribution  of  this  research  to  both  FDI  theories 
and  ITP  literature,  and  an  assessment  to  the  research  method  and  methodology  is 
provided.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  identifies  strengths  and  limitations  of  this 
research,  considers  the  research  method  used,  and  suggests  directions  for  future 
research. 
8.2  Findings  and  Implications 
Table  8-1  lists  the  nine  tested  null  hypotheses  for  the  four  sections  and  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  the  results.  The  following  provides  detailed  findings  of  each 
of  the  individual  sections  of  this  research. 
The  first  section  found  differences  between  OECD  full  ranges  and  US  IRS  inter- 
quartile  ranges  for  all  the  profit  ranges  with  significant  differences  observed  between 
profit  measures  in  different  industries.  There  were  differences  between  profit 
measures  in  providing  a  comparable  range,  thus  indicating  that  the  OECD  TNMM 
and  the  US  IRS  CPM  are  conceptually  the  same  method  of  determining  transfer  prices 
(both  based  on  profit  ratios  of  a  group  of  comparable  companies)  but  with  differences 
seen  in  their  application.  In  particular,  the  US  IRS  emphasizes  the  inter-quartile  range 
and  adjustment  to  the  midpoint.  1994  US  IRS  regulations  (Section  482)  kept  CPM 
and  subjected  the  choice  of  methods  to  the  best  method  rule.  Given  that  the  IRS 
decided  to  retain  CPM  and  use  it  when  it  was  the  best  method,  OECD  Guidelines 
issued  in  1995  contained  TNMM  and  recognized  it  as  a  method  of  last  resort.  In 
practice  and  as  stated  by  Interviewee  1  (UK),  countries  such  as  the  UK  whose  transfer 
pricing  regulations  are  based  on  OECD  guidelines,  accept  US  IRS  inter-quartile 
ranges  to  limit  the  ranges  for  profit  level  indicators. 
These  findings  imply  that  companies  might  be  exposed  to  different  regulations, 
TNMM  vs.  CPM,  and  face  conflicts  in  compliance  since  the  application  of  different 
178 regulations  gives  different  profit  ranges  acceptable  to  different  fiscal  authorities. 
Different  industries  may  offer  a  different  number  of  comparable  companies,  thereby 
allowing  companies  to  select  preferable  sets.  This  finding  is  significant  because  it 
allows  companies  the  ability  not  only  to  adjust  their  profit  level  within  a  range,  they 
may  also  decide  which  PLI  or  profit  measure  to  use.  The  freedom  of  profit  indicators 
is  enhanced  as  the  measures  themselves  give  differing  degrees  of  profitability  within 
each  industry.  Companies  may  opt  to  use  any  PLI  and  any  point  within  their 
respective  comparable  industry  range  for  optimum  benefit  thus  increasing  companies 
discretion. 
Table  8-1:  11ypotheses  and  Findings 
Hypothesis  Findings 
110  1  There  are  no  differences  between  OECD  profit  ranges  (represented  Rejected 
by  a  full  range)  and  IRS  profit  ranges  (represented  by  inter- 
quartile  ranges) 
Ho2  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  in  different  Rejected 
industries 
Ho3  There  are  no  differences  between  profit  measures  when  providing  Rejected 
LL 
a  comparable  range 
Secti  on  2:  Foreign-owned  Companies  (Japanese  and  US)  m.  Domestic  U  K  Companies 
11o4  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  Rejected 
measures)  of  foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned) 
and  their  domestic  counterparts 
Ho5  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performances  (profitability  Not  Rejected 
measures)  of  joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies 
(Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK-owned)  and  the  performances  of  UK- 
owned  companies 
Sec  tion  3:  Foreign-owned  Companies  (Japanese  and  US)  wid:  Operati  ng  Losses  vs. 
Domestic  UK  Companies  with  Operating  Losses 
Hob  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  Not  Rejected 
measures)  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  average  negative 
operating  profit  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  and  UK-owned 
corn  anies  with  negative  operating  profit 
Hol  There  are  no  differences  between  the  performance  (profitability  Not  Rejected 
measures)  of  joint  venture  foreign-owned  companies  with  average 
negative  operating  profit  (Japanese/UK-  and  US/UK  owned)  and 
UK-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profit 
Section  4:  Tax  Analjsis 
Ho8  There  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  expense  by  Not  Rejected 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese-  and  US-owned)  compared  to 
the  amount  of  reported  tax  expense  by  domestic  companies. 
Hog  There  are  no  differences  in  the  amount  of  reported  tax  by  foreign-  Not  Rejected 
owned  companies  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  latest  UK  transfer 
pricing  regulation  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax  self- 
assessment  compared  to  domestic  companies. 
179 The  findings  of  Section  1  are  consistent  with  findings  by  Horst  (Cole,  1999)  which 
investigated  return  on  assets  of  US  independent  wholesalers  for  the  years  1986-1990. 
Horst  found  that  the  25`h  percentile  average  was  2.6%,  while  the  75th  percentile  was 
15.4%.  That  is  to  say,  half  of  all  independent  distributors  reported  average  return  on 
assets  between  2.6%  and  15.4%  while  the  remaining  half  were  either  above  or  below 
the  range. 
While  there  is  much  variability  in  profit  level  indicators,  a  small  random  sample  may 
by  chance  have  a  median  value  and  full  or  inter-quartile  range  that  is  quite  different 
from  the  median  value  and  the  full  or  inter-quartile  range,  respectively,  of  the 
theoretical  population  from  which  the  small  sample  was  drawn.  This  research 
therefore  concludes  that  companies  may  easily  achieve  low  or  high  ranges  of  PLIs 
directly  or  indirectly  by  imposing  artificial  selection  of  criteria. 
This  study  represents  a  step  forward  towards  a  more  credible  process  in  which  the 
identification  of  potential  comparable  parties  strives  to  be  as  objective  as  possible. 
Due  to  the  ease  in  which  criteria  for  selecting  PLIs  can  be  manipulated  to  achieve  a 
contrived  result,  TNMM  or  CPM  must  provide  more  stringent  guidelines  on  the 
selection  of  PLIs.  This  study  suggests  that  the  criteria  for  selecting  PLIs  when 
identifying  potential  comparables  should  be  clearly  stated  by  the  regulations  with 
insistence  that  reasonable  effort  be  made  in  identifying  all  companies  meeting  those 
criteria.  Criteria  that  are  economically  meaningful,  verifiable,  and  fully  disclosed 
should  be  applied. 
The  results  of  Section  2,  Chapter  8  are  in  line  with  the  findings  of  previous  income 
shifting  studies  (Wheeler,  1988;  Kim  and  Lyn,  1990;  Gideon,  1990;  Crain  and  Stiffs, 
1994;  Oyelere  and  Emmanuel,  1996;  Munday  and  Peel,  1997)  regarding  the  lower 
profitability  of  foreign-owned  companies.  Buckley  and  Hughes  (1996)  suggested  that 
the  low  profitability  of  the  Japanese  companies  was  mainly  due  to  target  costing 
system  used  by  Japanese  subsidiaries  which  allow  the  parent  company  to  "squeeze" 
margins  as  well  as  costs.  The  Japanese  overseas  company  is  not  regarded  as  a  profit 
centre  in  its  own  right  and  therefore,  there  is  no  incentive  to  increase  company  profits. 
From  the  Japanese  point  view,  profit  in  a  subsidiary  company  is  dysfunctional 
(Buckley  and  Hughes,  1996). 
180 This  study  confirms  lower  performance  by  US-owned  and  Japanese-owned 
companies  compared  to  UK  companies,  raising  a  number  of  issues.  There  is  a 
dichotomy  between  the  comparatively  high  productivity  characteristics  of  Japanese- 
owned  and  US-owned  companies  and  their  relatively  poor  profit  performance  since 
the  samples  were  matched  companies  with  similar  operating  profits,  growth,  or 
turnover.  There  is  a  definite  ownership  effect  on  the  profitability,  suggesting  profit 
management  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies  in  order  to 
maximize  global  profits.  It  is  worthwhile  for  future  studies  to  investigate  whether  UK- 
owned  companies  operating  across  national  borders  follow  similar  practices  of 
shifting  income  to  the  UK. 
The  findings  in  Section  2  also  revealed  that  differences  in  profitability  were  found 
between  US  joint  ventures  and  UK  joint  ventures  companies.  No  differences  in 
profitability  were  found  between  Japanese  joint  ventures  and  UK  companies.  The 
presence  of  monitoring  by  a  local  partner  prevents  abuse  and  therefore  confirms 
results  of  previous  studies  that  suggest  that  the  lack  of  monitoring  by  local  partners 
draws  the  attention  of  tax  authorities  for  tax  audits  (Chan  and  Chow,  1997). 
In  Section  3,  it  appeared  from  the  statistical  test  of  the  different  groups  of  MNEs  that 
the  effects  of  ownership  seem  to  change  according  to  differences  in  the  nationality  of 
MNEs.  The  Japanese-owned  companies  had,  on  average,  lower  profits  than  the  UK- 
owned  companies.  This  supports  the  findings  of  Section  2  regarding  the  questionable 
low  profits  of  the  Japanese-owned  companies  and  explains  in  part  the  high  percentage 
of  loss-making  Japanese  companies  in  the  UK.  (According  to  the  FAME  database, 
over  34%  of  Japanese-owned  companies  are  loss-making  for  the  year  2000,  a 
significantly  higher  proportion  than  the  19%  found  for  UK  companies.  ) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  results  from  the  tests  of  different  joint  venture  groups  with 
operating  losses  indicated  no  differences  between  the  performance  of  joint  venture 
foreign-owned  companies  with  negative  operating  profit  and  UK-owned  companies. 
This  is  consistent  with  previous  studies  as  well  as  the  previous  section  of  this  research 
regarding  joint  ventures  and  the  role  of  monitoring  of  the  local  partner,  thus 
eliminating  the  gaps  in  profits  between  foreign-  and  domestic-owned  companies. 
181 Finally,  Section  4  results  confirmed  the  findings  of  Sections  2  and  3  with  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  evidence  of  low  tax  expense  reported  by  Japanese-owned 
companies,  but  not  for  the  US-owned  companies,  compared  to  the  domestic 
companies  for  all  the  manufacturing  and  wholesaling  industries.  This  suggests  that 
companies  with  certain  ownership  such  as  the  Japanese-owned  companies  in  the  UK 
seem  to  aggressively  manage  their  tax  expense,  through  ITP  policy  which  might  allow 
low  profitability,  reporting  losses  and  low  tax  since  tax  rates  are  considered  highly 
significant  determinants  of  reported  profits.  Grubert  et  al  (1993)  findings  were 
similar,  noting  that  foreign  companies  pay  significantly  less  tax  than  US  companies. 
Although  Grubert  et  al  did  not  use  similarly  large  companies  for  both  groups,  they 
found  after  adjusting  for  the  age  profiles  of  foreign  and  domestic  companies  and  other 
factors  that  could  cause  legitimate  differences  in  profitability,  they  were  able  to 
account  for  part  of  the  differential  but  roughly  50%  of  the  difference  remained 
unexplained.  Their  results  imply  that  foreign  companies  attempt  to  reduce  US  taxable 
income  through  income  shifting. 
Section  4  findings  are  supported  by  the  empirical  results  presented  in  Chapter  4  as 
well  as  by  the  empirical  results  of  other  research  studies  (Piper,  1996;  Munday  and 
Peel,  1997)  that  concluded  that  Japanese  companies  in  the  UK  pay  only  a  fraction  of 
the  tax  of  their  domestic  counterparts.  Whether  the  manipulation  of  transfer  prices  in 
the  UK  reflects  a  deliberate  desire  to  minimize  tax  liability,  to  avoid  exchange  rate 
risks,  or  simply  reflects  the  culture  of  Japanese  businesses,  remains  uncertain. 
The  implication  of  these  findings  for  tax  authorities  worldwide  is  obvious.  Gaps  and 
loopholes  in  rules  and  regulations  between  and  within  national  tax  jurisdictions  need 
to  be  gradually  blocked  to  minimize  the  opportunities  to  circumvent  ITP  regulations. 
The  continuous  development  of  such  legislative  instruments  should  be  carried  out  on 
an  inter-country  basis  and  in  consultation  with  all  parties  that  are  likely  to  be  affected 
by  the  outcome,  such  as  international  organizations,  MNEs,  and  professional  bodies 
such  as  the  OECD  and  US  IRS  which  commonly  carry  out  such  consultative 
processes.  A  Trans-national  body  similar  to  the  EU  arbitration  model  might  be 
introduced  to  arbitrate  and  develop  case  laws,  although  the  likelihood  of  such  might 
be  slim  given  individual  countries'  fiscal  interests. 
182 In  the  UK,  Inland  Revenue  modernized  transfer  pricing  rules  in  1998  by 
implementing  overhauled  self-assessment  transfer  pricing  laws.  The  final  portion  of 
this  research  tested  the  impact  of  the  latest  UK  regulations  on  both  foreign-owned  and 
domestic  UK  companies  with  the  results  revealing  some  immediate  positive  effects 
such  as  increased  tax  payments  without  significant  differences  for  the  sample  group  of 
foreign-owned  and  domestic-owned  companies.  The  latest  UK  transfer  pricing 
regulation  appears  to  have  had  a  great  impact  on  both  foreign-  and  domestic-owned 
companies  as  it  contains  a  specific  requirement  for  profits  to  be  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  arm's  length  principle.  Before  the  UK  1998  transfer  pricing 
regulations,  companies  adhered  to  the  arm's  length  principle  in  calculating  profits  for 
inclusion  in  a  tax  return.  IR  assessed  a  company's  profits  and  wielded  the  authority, 
through  the  use  of  some  cumbersome  processes  including  the  issue  of  formal 
directions  by  its  Board,  to  replace  prices  on  transactions  which  had  resulted  in  the 
understatement  of  profits  in  the  UK  through  pricing  other  than  at  arm's  length  with 
the  price  that  would  have  been  agreed  had  the  parties  been  independent  and  acting  at 
arm's  length.  In  addition,  penalties,  as  well  as  the  threat  of  increased  audit,  appear  to 
be  an  effective  deterrent  to  non-compliance  of  the  regulations.  Companies  may  face 
threats  of  penalties,  aggressive  tax  audits,  and/or  double  taxation.  Over  time,  tax 
payment  differences  between  foreign  and  domestic  may  converge  to  become  less 
volatile  due  to  management  experience  in  complying  with  the  regulations.  Companies 
may  outsource  the  preparation  of  the  transfer  pricing  documentation  and  use  advance 
price  agreements  to  comply  with  the  regulations. 
Reported  tax  expenses  by  foreign-owned  companies  have  improved  via  penalties, 
contemporaneous  documentation,  and  self-assessment.  The  latter  still  allows  MNEs  a 
great  deal  of  discretion  when  selecting  comparables. 
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.3 
AssessingFDI  Theories  and  ITP  Literature 
The  theories  of  MNEs  reviewed  in  Chapter  Two  suggest  that  the  main  pre-condition 
for  the  spread  of  FDI  is  the  ability  of  a  company  to  internalize  certain  advantage(s), 
transport  them  across  national  boundaries  and  translate  them  into  returns  that  are  over 
and  above  what  indigenous  companies  in  the  host  country  can  make.  This  higher 
return  is  necessary  to  compensate  the  foreign  MNE  for  developing,  internalizing  and 
transporting  the  advantage(s).  The  theory  therefore  supports  superior  levels  of 
183 performance  by  foreign-owned  subsidiaries.  Most  of  the  findings  and  the  empirical 
evidence  of  this  research  do  not  depart  from  those  of  the  empirical  studies  mentioned 
in  Chapter  3  regarding  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies.  Wheeler  (1988, 
1990)  was  able  to  show  that  indigenous  firms  in  the  US  outperform  their  foreign- 
owned  counterparts  six  times  over  in  terms  of  return  on  assets.  Munday  and  Peel 
(1997)  and  Oyelere  and  Emmanuel  (1998)  also  reported  similar  evidence  in  the  UK. 
In  addition,  Kim  and  Lyn  (1990),  for  example,  found  that  "foreign-owned  firms 
operating  in  the  United  States  do  not  appear  to  earn  higher  profits  than  American- 
owned  firms"  (p.  51).  Gideon  (1990)  and  Crain  and  Stifts  (1994)  also  reported  similar 
results. 
Through  the  examination  of  the  hypothesis  embedded  in  these  FDI  theories,  this  study 
also  questions  the  rationale  for  advantage-based  involvement  of  companies  operating 
in  foreign  countries.  Ho4  in  Section  2  provides  evidence  of  low  profits  by  foreign- 
owned  companies  compared  to  their  domestic  UK  counterparts.  The  low  performance 
of  foreign-owned  companies  operating  in  the  UK  cannot  be  explained  by  the  number 
of  Japanese  companies  located  in  the  UK  nor  can  the  disproportionate  ratio  of 
foreign-owned  companies  (especially  Japanese-owned)  be  easily  understood.  All 
companies  in  the  sample  operate  within  UK  base  and  hence  faced  the  same  economic 
environment. 
It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  lower  reported  performance  by  foreign-owned 
companies  over  the  period  sampled  (1998-2000),  especially  since  they  are  required  to 
meet  reporting  standards  in  the  UK.  One  possible  answer  is  that  the  performances  of 
foreign-owned  companies  are  being  under-disclosed  due  to  flexible  ITP  regulations 
without  detailed  requirements,  differences  in  ITP  rules  in  different  countries,  or  low 
enforcement  of  the  regulations.  As  with  all  studies  using  publicly  available  data,  only 
indirect  inferences  can  be  made  but  the  evidence  provided  here  indicates  that  ITP 
cannot  be  eliminated  to  explain  diverse  performance  of  foreign-owned  and  UK 
companies. 
8 
.4 
Assessing  the  Research  Method  and  Methodoloev 
In  an  effort  to  provide  some  insight  to  the  logic  behind  the  methodological  choices 
made,  the  following  attempts  to  address  the  strengths  and  the  limitations  associated 
184 both  with  the  overall  research  design  and  the  particular  method  employed  in  this 
study.  Given  the  complex  nature  of  this  study,  transfer  pricing  regulations  and  the  test 
of  comparables,  concerns  regarding  the  research  might  certainly  arise.  Some  may 
criticize  the  use  of  an  electronic  database  for  data  collection,  with  the  assertion  that 
companies'  finance  directors,  consulting  firms,  and  tax  agents  may  provide  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  issues  under  investigation  in  all  of  its  proportions.  However, 
given  that  the  main  purpose  of  the  study  was  to  test  whether  the  new  regulations  on 
comparables  can  curb  MNE  discretion,  whether  ownership  effects  can  be  detected, 
and  whether  regulation  changes  can  be  shown  to  affect  tax  paid,  the  selected  data 
source  was  chosen  as  the  most  relevant.  Due  to  FAME's  content  (detailed  company 
information,  quantitative  and  qualitative  data,  10  years  of  data  for  each  company,  and 
a  listing  of  both  private  and  public  companies),  its  basis  on  UK  GAAP,  and  its  data 
collection  from  Companies  House,  it  appeared  to  best  fit  the  specific  needs  of  this 
research. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  chosen  research  method  that  has  been  employed  in  this 
study  is  regarded  as  a  faultless  data-collection  instrument.  On  the  contrary,  an 
attempt  was  made  throughout  the  thesis  to  document  all  the  potential  and  actual 
limitations  and  when  judgment  was  necessary,  controls  or  screens  were  placed  on 
samples  to  try  to  detect  patterns.  In  the  final  analysis,  however,  it  seems  safe  to 
conclude  that  all  the  previously  discussed  strengths  and  weaknesses,  concerning  both 
the  actual  method  and  the  overall  research  design  utilized  in  this  research  which 
included  some  fieldwork  authentication,  represents  a  trade-off  between  the  precision 
that  comes  from  a  high  degree  of  control  and  the  loss  of  `real-life'  richness  (Greene 
and  D'Oliveira,  1982).  Eventually,  such  choices  depend  largely  on  the  purpose  of  the 
research,  the  conclusions  which  are  expected  to  be  drawn  from  it,  and  the  conditions 
under  which  the  research  is  actually  carried  out. 
8.4.1  Internal  Validity 
All  in  all,  the  level  of  internal  validity  of  this  research  remains  high.  This  is 
fundamentally  a  study  of  a  more  positive  nature,  which  is  structured  upon 
i)  the  a  priori  construction  and  statement  of  hypotheses  that  derive  from  a 
given  theoretical  model  (FDI  and  MNE  theories  and  ITP  regulations); 
185 ii)  the  explicit  identification,  operationalization  and  measurement  were  carefully 
selected;  and, 
iii)  the  collection  of  data  through  the  use  of  a  highly  structured,  standardized 
data-collection  method  (FAME  database  and  fieldwork  of  structured 
interviews). 
It  is  this  structured  nature,  along  with  the  statistical  control  over  the  identified 
variables  in  the  stage  of  data  analysis  that  essentially  renders  this  study  with  a 
relatively  high  degree  of  confidence  that  the  conclusions  regarding  the  hypothesized 
relationships  are  warranted.  However,  the  inability  of  the  study  to  control  for  the 
possible  effect  of  other  factors  which  requires  access  to  individual  companies  may 
have  affected  the  selection  of  the  criteria  when  developing  comparables.  The  above 
constitutes  a  discrepancy  between  the  statistical  significance  and  the  substantive 
importance  of  the  results  reported. 
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4.2  External  Validity 
Traditionally  a  positive  research  study  is  endowed  with  a  high  level  of  overall 
external  validity  (generalizability)  (Abernethy  et  al.,  1999).  Secondary  data  research 
endeavours  most  usually  entail  the  careful  random  selection  of  samples  that  enable  the 
obtained  findings  to  be  generalized  to  wider  populations  with  a  high  degree  of 
confidence.  For  Section  1,  this  study  draws  data  from  randomly  selected  samples  of 
comparable  companies  within  18  different  manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries 
representative  of  the  entire  population  sample.  The  population  validity  -  that  is,  its 
ability  to  generalize  from  the  sample  of  twelve  manufacturing  and  six  wholesale 
industries  to  all  manufacturing  and  wholesale  industries  is  high  and  to  all  other 
industries  might  be  limited.  In  addition,  the  samples  for  Sections  2,3,  and  4  cover 
most  Japanese-owned  companies  and  a  large  sample  of  US-owned  and  UK  companies 
within  selected  industries  with  the  findings  being  highly  generalizable  for  the 
Japanese-  and  US-owned  companies  within  the  manufacturing  and  wholesale 
industries  in  UK  and  limited  to  other  foreign-owned  companies  in  the  UK. 
As  far  as  the  study's  ecological  validity  is  concerned  (that  is,  its  ability  to  provide 
results  that  can  be  readily  generalized  from  the  actual  social  context  in  which  the 
research  has  taken  place  to  other  contexts  and  settings  (Gill  &  Johnson,  2002)),  the 
186 high  degree  of  standardization  and  structure  of  the  instrument  used  to  collect  data  is 
likely  to  have  created  a  relative  lack  of  naturalism  that  may  have  thereby  adversely 
affected  the  study's  overall  ecological  validity. 
This  research  used  some  fieldwork  interviews  in  addition  to  the  main  data  to  gather 
data  and  authenticate  findings  from  interviewees  who  were  both  academic  and  experts 
in  the  field  acting  within  their  actual  social  context  to  provide  a  definite  advantage  in 
terms  of  ecological  validity.  These  more  qualitative  data  that  were  collected  from  the 
interviews  enriched  and  provided  triangulation  for  the  findings  that  emerged  from  the 
main  data  source.  All  things  considered,  the  overall  external  validity  of  this  research 
is  held  to  be  relatively  high. 
8.4.3  Construct  Validity 
With  regard  to  the  construct  validity  of  the  study,  the  fact  that  all  variables  were 
measured  with  instruments  drawn  from  the  ITP  regulations,  which  have  been 
previously  developed  and  extensively  tested  in  practice,  gives  some  confidence  about 
the  extent  to  which  the  constructs  of  theoretical  interest  have  been  successfully 
operationalized  and  measured  here  and  therefore,  provide  some  assurance  of  the 
overall  study's  criterion  and  construct  validity. 
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4.4  Reliability 
Lastly,  the  reliability  of  the  study  is  also  considered  to  be  fairly  high.  The  use  of  a 
highly  structured  method  for  collecting  data  in  a  form  that  is  quantitatively 
analyzable,  as  well  as  the  emphasis  on  the  statistical  control  over  the  variables 
identified  in  the  research,  provide  a  relatively  high  degree  of  confidence  about  the 
consistency  of  the  results  obtained.  Overall,  mainly  owing  to  the  high  level  of 
structure  and  rigour  maintained  in  the  data  collection  and  analysis,  the  present  study  is 
regarded  as  easily  replicable  for  similar  research  endeavours  in  the  future,  and  hence 
as  highly  reliable. 
8  .5 
Research  Strengths 
The  literature  review  in  Chapter  3  identified  many  of  the  previous  empirical  studies. 
Regarding  transfer  pricing  methods,  the  majority  of  the  previous  studies  focused  on 
either  the  selection  of  the  acceptable  methods  by  MNEs  or  the  factors  that  influenced 
187 the  selected  methods.  By  concentrating  on  how  each  of  the  acceptable  methods  of 
transfer  pricing  is  applied  and  knowing  the  inner  workings  on  how  these  methods  are 
applied  in  practice  improves  the  understanding  of  ITP  and  fill  in  the  gaps  between 
theory  and  practice.  Many  of  the  previous  studies  lack  the  focus  to  provide 
meaningful  explanations  of  ITP  practice  given  that  transfer  pricing  is  such  a  multi- 
disciplinary  area  with  numerous  competing  theories  and  many  conflicting  findings. 
To  increase  the  reliability  of  the  comparable  sets  and  the  validity  of  the  findings,  this 
research's  carefully  selected  sources  of  data  is  the  same  source  used  by  consultants 
and  accepted  by  Inland  Revenue  (Interviewee  2-UK). 
This  research  introduced  empirical  differences  between  TNMM  and  CPM,  the 
ownership  of  more  than  one  group  of  foreign  companies,  the  performance  of  loss- 
making  companies  in  relation  to  ITP,  and  finally,  the  empirical  effects  of  the  latest 
UK  transfer  pricing  rules.  Another  focal  point  of  this  study  was  the  data  analysis.  The 
data  analysis  contained  four  integrated  sections  in  addition  to  interviews  which  at 
least  in  part  verified  the  results. 
Previous  empirical  studies  have  used  unmatched  samples  (e.  g.  Norusis,  1999),  not 
distinguished  between  the  different  forms  of  investment  the  foreign-owned  companies 
represent  (Oyelere  and  Emmanuel,  1996),  or  have  drawn  conclusions  based  on  one 
year's  worth  of  data  (Munday  and  Peel,  1997).  Unlike  previous  research,  this  study 
used  three  matching  methods  to  assess  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies 
with  the  performance  of  domestic-owned  companies.  By  controlling  for  many  factors 
(strategies,  product  cycle,  growth,  profitability  and,  size  of  operation)  that  might 
affect  the  performance,  this  research  eliminated  the  disadvantages  of  using  one 
matching  method.  The  matching  process  was  also  used  to  assess  the  reported  tax 
expense  of  foreign-owned  companies  with  domestic-owned  companies. 
This  research  disaggregated  foreign-owned  companies  into  a  group  of  Japanese- 
owned  companies  and  a  group  of  US-owned  companies  in  order  to  avoid  missing  any 
cultural  tendencies  that  might  exist  within  a  certain  group  of  foreign  companies.  The 
importance  of  the  matching  methods  between  individual  companies  cannot  be  stressed 
enough  as  it  is  essential  to  any  research  that  considers  testing  the  performance  of 
188 different  groups  of  companies  as  a  representation  of  a  company's  capability. 
Continued  research  in  this  direction  will  promote  a  greater  understanding  of  the 
behavior  of  foreign  companies,  encouraging  a  transaction  level  analysis  which  may 
require  different  research  methods. 
Lastly,  this  research's  major  strength  is  the  balance  between  the  research  methods  and 
the  research  questions,  which  provided  solid  findings  of  benefit  to  MNEs,  policy 
makers,  tax  authorities,  and  consulting  firms.  To  demonstrate  the  importance  of 
comparables,  Section  1  examined  the  profit-based  methods  TNMM  and  CPM  and 
found  differences  between  OECD  and  IRS  profit  ranges  and  variations  between 
different  PLIs.  Section  2  provided  comparisons  between  foreign-owned  (Japanese 
and  US)  companies  and  discovered  low  profitability  of  Japanese-  and  US-owned 
companies  compared  to  UK  companies.  Section  3  provided  comparisons  between 
foreign-owned  companies  (Japanese  and  US)  with  operating  losses  compared  to  UK 
companies  with  operating  losses  and  found  that  a  vital  number  of  the  Japanese-owned 
companies  are  loss  making  and  that  Japanese-owned  companies  with  operating  losses 
significantly  under  perform  their  UK  counterparts.  Finally,  Section  4  tested  the 
effects  of  the  latest  UK  transfer  pricing  regulation  introduced  in  1998  corporation  tax 
self-assessment  tax  and  offered  evidence  of  the  tax  expenses  reported  by  foreign- 
owned  companies  (Japanese  and  US)  which  confirms  the  low  amount  of  reported  tax 
on  behalf  of  the  Japanese-owned  companies. 
8.6  Research  Limitations 
As  is  the  case  with  all  research  of  this  nature,  certain  limitations  may  apply.  One 
potential  limitation  is  the  necessity  of  making  assumptions  regarding  the  control  for 
functions  and  risk  when  developing  comparables  using  both  TNMM  and  CPM.  Due 
to  the  limitation  of  the  qualitative  data  available  on  each  company,  this  study  did  not 
use  rigorous  controls  for  function  and  risk  differences.  Although  the  same  controls 
were  applied  for  both  TNMM  and  CPM  when  selecting  the  comparable  sets,  this 
limitation  was  partially  overcome  through  the  strategy  of  using  individual  industry 
analysis  with  four  digit  SIC  codes,  five  different  PLIs  and,  recent  three  year  average 
data. 
The  foreign-owned  companies  used  in  the  research  sample  are  companies  with 
189 foreign  ownership  (control)  whose  activities  and  practices  may  be  largely  limited  by 
the  decisions  taken  by  their  parents  as  well  as  accounting  and  other  rules  and 
regulations  of  the  parent  home  country.  This  may,  to  some  extent  limit  the  level  of 
comparability  of  the  data  collected.  However  these  companies,  insofar  as  they  operate 
within  the  UK  and  report  to  Companies  House,  are  expected  to  meet  UK  generally 
accepted  accounting  principles. 
Exact  matching  of  individual  foreign  companies  with  domestic  companies  proved 
difficult.  Research  judgments  were  used  in  order  to  balance  the  matching  methods 
with  the  number  of  matched  samples.  More  specifically,  companies  were  matched 
based  on  a  matching  method  of  plus  or  minus  2.5%  to  10%  as  explained  in  Chapter  6 
which  is  consistent  with  previous  literature  (Munday  and  Peel,  1997). 
The  investigation  of  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  and  domestic-owned 
companies  was  based  solely  on  financial  accounting  figures,  average  profit  level 
indicators  for  Sections  2  and  3  and  tax  paid  for  Section  4,  as  reported  in  the  financial 
statements  of  sampled  companies.  Accounting  figures  alone  may  not  capture  all  the 
economic  value-based  performance  of  a  company  within  a  certain  period.  Other 
models  that  measure  differences  in  a  company's  value  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  a 
period,  for  example,  may  perhaps  provide  a  more  accurate  measure  of  performance. 
Profit  level  indicators,  as  obtained  from  the  financial  statement  of  the  companies, 
however  remain  a  globally  recognized  medium  of  communication  in  the  business 
world,  and  are  included  in  the  ITP  regulations. 
Although  this  research  conducted  five  fruitful  interviews,  none  of  the  interviewees 
represented  any  of  the  sample  companies  or  the  tax  authorities  due  to  the  sensitivity  of 
the  subject,  restricted  access,  and  time  constraints.  As  access  is  a  major  difficulty  to 
this  kind  of  fieldwork,  future  studies  might  consider  interviews  or  case  studies  with 
tax  agents  and  company  finance  directors  to  obtain  in-depth  evaluations  of 
comparables  and  ITP  profit  methods. 
A  final  limitation  is  associated  with  researcher  bias  in  interviews.  This  research 
recognized  this  possibility  and  attempted  to  address  it  in  a  number  of  ways.  The 
interviews  were  conducted  in  the  knowledge  that  the  researcher  was  an  independent 
190 academic  and  the  preliminary  findings  were  used  as  guidelines  with  an  explanation  of 
the  research  question,  research  method  and  data  samples  provided  to  each 
interviewee. 
8.7  Future  Research 
Transfer  pricing  represents  a  controversial  area  that  cannot  be  dealt  with  in  a  single  or 
few  studies  or  by  using  one  particular  methodological  approach.  Further  research  and 
other  approaches,  possibly  eliminating  some  of  the  limitations  of  this  study,  remains 
necessary.  This  research  might  influence  the  directions  for  future  research  for  ITP  in 
several  directions  in  addition  to  paving  the  road  for  new  research  questions  and 
methods. 
This  research  is  one  of  the  few  studies  that  focus  on  certain  groups'  tendencies.  Future 
studies  should  continue  breaking  samples  down  by  country  of  ownership  to  observe  if 
these  different  nationality  traits  exist  with  respect  to  ITP  practices  and  performance. 
Future  research  might  consider  comparing  matched  samples  of  foreign-owned 
companies  with  other  foreign-owned  companies  rather  than  their  domestic 
counterparts  which  due  to  time  and  resource  limitations  was  not  tested  by  this 
research. 
Japanese-owned  MNEs  present  a  key  area  for  future  research  due  to  their  unique  (in 
terms  of  profit  and  taxes)  performance  in  the  UK.  In  general,  more  in-depth 
investigation  is  required  for  the  ITP  policies  of  loss-making  companies  operating  in 
the  UK,  which  is  currently  an  under  researched  area. 
Through  the  testing  of  ITP  methods  (TNMM  and  CPM)  in  Section  1,  it  was  deduced 
that  the  wide  profit  ranges  witnessed  were  mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  detail  in  the 
regulations.  These  general  regulations  allowed  different  adjustments  on  the  part  of 
consulting  firms  and  companies  (as  mentioned  by  Interviewee  2-UK).  Further  studies 
might  consider  investigating  the  practices  of  different  consulting  groups  in  applying 
and  developing  comparable  data  sets.  In  addition,  it  might  be  worthwhile 
investigating  whether  consultants  have  a  comparative  advantage  or  do  other  factors 
outweigh  the  need  for  comparables. 
191 This  study  also  moves  one  step  forward  toward  more  tax-oriented  research  in  the  UK. 
Further  studies  are  needed  to  investigate  companies'  strategies  and  FDI  decisions. 
Because  of  the  diversity  of  the  transfer  pricing  topic,  various  aspects  cannot  be 
captured  through  one  single  work,  thus  it  is  recommended  that  future  research  is 
conducted  to  consider  the  use  of  different  research  methods  such  as  case  study,  which 
might  be  useful  to  this  type  of  study.  Comparative  case  studies  of  matched  set 
foreign-owned  companies  with  domestic-owned  companies  would  be  essential  to 
further  assess  their  performance  and  comparability.  Finally,  it  is  essential  for  future 
studies  to  test  the  performance  of  matched  foreign  parent  companies  (headquarter)  at 
their  home  country  with  the  performance  of  UK  parent  companies  to  further  explain 
whether  differences  in  the  performance  are  due  to  economical  and  environmental 
factors  or  perhaps  cultural,  national  tendencies. 
8.8  Summary 
This  research  offers  additional  insight  regarding  the  level  of  discretion  that  can  be 
provided  under  different  regulations  and  the  extent  to  which  ownership  effect  on 
profit  and  taxes  can  be  detected.  It  is  apparent  that  MNEs  attempt  to  achieve  more 
than  one  transfer  pricing  objective  through  their  transfer  pricing  decisions.  As  the 
primary  objective  of  most  MNEs  remains  profit  maximization  as  motioned  in  the 
earlier  chapters,  the  use  of  particular  acceptable  methods  by  an  MNE  is  appropriate. 
This  study  suggests  several  factors  must  be  carefully  considered  when  applying 
profit-based  methods.  Many  of  the  same  factors  must  be  considered  in  applying  any 
transfer  pricing  method.  Application  of  TNMM  and  CPM  requires  resolution  of  a 
series  of  specific  issues  that  may  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  final  result.  TNMM 
and  CPM  are  theoretically  the  same  method  of  determining  transfer  prices.  The 
differences  between  the  two  methods  lie  in  the  nuances  of  their  application.  While 
rejecting  CPM,  OECD  guidelines  include  a  similar  method,  TNMM,  with  the 
injunction  that  TNMM  be  used  only  as  the  last  resort.  The  wide  profit  ranges  and  the 
freedom  of  selecting  PLIs  in  developing  comparables  for  both  of  these  methods 
cannot  be  ignored.  In  general,  both  profit-based  TNMM  and  CPM  afford  MNEs 
differing  degrees  of  discretion  in  terms  of  compliance. 
The  review  of  the  application  of  CPM  and  TNMM  highlights  the  fact  that,  in  practice, 
192 CPM  and  TNMM  are  either  close  cousins  or  identical  methods.  However,  the  official 
position  in  most  of  the  countries  covered  more  often  reflects  the  view,  based  on  the 
theory,  that  there  is  a  difference.  In  particular,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  most 
common  reason  given  for  the  suspicion  with  which  CPM  is  often  regarded  is  that  a 
proper  analysis  is  required  of  the  functions  and  risks  of  the  companies  used  as  sources 
of  comparable  data  and  of  the  data  they  disclose.  However,  where  CPM  is  applied  in 
the  manner  in  which,  its  proponents  argue  is  intended,  such  an  analysis  is  indeed 
performed. 
Where  TNMM  is  accepted  in  preference  to  CPM  this  seems  to  be  because  the  theory 
of  TNMM  focuses  more  on  the  underlying  transactions.  CPM  is  equated  more  to  an 
industry  average  style  of  approach.  The  conclusion  is  that  in  practical  application, 
neither  of  these  two  is  really  true.  In  practice,  the  truth  might  lie  somewhere  between 
the  two. 
In  the  absence  of  reliable  internal  data  on  arm's  length  profitability,  the  application  of 
TNMM  usually  relies  on  published  financial  statements  of  independent  companies. 
Because  this  data  is  limited  as  to  detail,  rendering  the  desegregation  of  product  lines 
and  the  making  of  adjustment  all  but  impossible,  the  effect  is  that  the  practical  ap- 
plication  of  TNMM  looks  very  much  like  a  CPM  approach. 
TNMM  and  CPM  are  useful  tools  in  a  company  tax  policy,  but  neither  is  a  substitute 
for  transaction-based  methods.  CPM  is  not  recognized  by  the  regulatory  bodies  of 
some  OECD  member  countries  and  remains  questionable  to  researchers  as  it  might  be 
considered  a  departure  from  the  arm's  length  principle  (Eden,  1998).  Findings 
suggest  that  the  different  applications  of  regulations  are  questionable  in  that  widely 
different  ranges  might  occur. 
The  success  of  the  UK's  policy  of  subsidizing  and  encouraging  foreign  FDI  as  a 
means  of  promoting  regional  and  national  development  revolves  around  the  ability  of 
these  companies  to  create  real  spillover  advantages  for  the  UK  manufacturing  and 
wholesaling  industries.  This  policy  will  be  called  into  question  if  such  investors  are 
shown  to  be  performing  inadequately  relative  to  the  matched  domestic  competition. 
Low  profitability  on  part  of  US-owned  companies  and  low  profitability,  persistent 
193 losses,  lack  of  monitoring  by  local  partners,  and  low  taxes  on  the  part  of  Japanese- 
owned  companies  provides  evidence  on  how  different  nationalities  have  different 
tendencies  and  the  likelihood  that  manipulation  of  income  does  indeed  occur. 
Clearly,  further  research  into  the  performance  of  foreign-owned  companies  and 
Japanese-owned  companies  in  particular  is  needed  in  the  light  of  the  claims  made  for 
these  MNEs  in  terms  of  profit  and  tax. 
Through  the  theoretical  awareness  and  knowledge  gained  from  this  study,  it  is  certain 
that  the  transfer  pricing  topic  will  remain  one  of  the  most  challenging  areas  for  future 
research. 
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rn Table:  3A  Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranks  Test  (ALL) 
Ranks 
N  Mean  Rank  Sum  of  Ranks 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %-  Negative  Ranks  18a  9.50  171.00 
OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  %  Positive  Ranks  0b 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Ties  0c 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  Negative  Ranks  18d  9.50  171.00 
%-  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Positive  Ranks  0e 
. 
00 
. 
00 
sales  %  Ties  Of 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %-  OECD  Negative  Ranks  189  9.50  171.00 
Gap  Net  Margin  %  Positive  Ranks  0h 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Ties  0' 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %-  OECD  Negative  Ranks  18,  9.50  171.00 
Gap  Berry  Ratio  %  Positive  Ranks  0k 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Ties  01 
Total 
18 
Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %-  Negative  Ranks  18M  9.50  171.00 
OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %  Positive  Ranks  on 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Ties  00 
Total  18 
a.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
b.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
C.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
d.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
e.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
f.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
g.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
h.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
I.  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
I.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %<  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
k.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %>  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
I.  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %=  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
M.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %<  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
n.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %>  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
0.  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %=  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
197 Table  3B 
Test  Statistics' 
Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Return  on 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %-  Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap  Assets  %- 
%-  OECD  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  OECD  Gap 
Gap  Profit  Profit  Margin  -  OECD  Gap  -  OECD  Gap  Return  on 
Marin  %  on  sales  %  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  Assets  % 
Z  -3.7244  -3.724a  -3.724a  -3.724a  -3.724a 
Asymp.  Sig.  (2-tailed)  . 
000  .  000  . 
000  . 
000 
.  000 
a.  Based  on  positive  ranks. 
b.  Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranks  Test 
198 Table  3C 
Sign  tes  t-  Frequencies 
N 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Negative  DifferenceJ3,1  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Profit  Positive  Differencesf"9"  0 
Margin  %  Tiesk,  i,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Negative  Differencesa"  18 
on  Sales  %-  OECD  Gap  Positive  Differencesf"9  0 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  %  Tiesk"I,  m"n"o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  Negative  Differences3  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Net  Positive  Differencess9  0 
Margin  %  Tiesk.  I,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  Negative  DifferencesP"  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Berry  Positive  Differencess"e"  0 
Ratio  %  Tiesk"t,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total 
18 
Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Negative  Differences.  18 
Assets  %-  OECD  Gap  Positive  Differencesf"o  0 
Return  on  Assets  %  Tiesk"I,  m,  n"o  0 
Total  18 
a.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin 
b.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %<  OECD  Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
C.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
d.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %<  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
e.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %<  OECD  Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
f"  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin 
oha 
9.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %>  OECD Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
h.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
I.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %>  OECD  Gap  Berry Ratio  % 
J.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %>  OECD Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
k.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin 
I.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  %=  Quartile  Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
m.  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
n.  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %_  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
0.  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %=  Quartile  Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
199 
'A Table  3D 
Test  Statisticd' 
Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Return  on 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %-  Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap  Assets  %- 
%-  OECD  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  OECD  Gap 
Gap  Profit  Profit  Margin  -  OECD  Gap  -  OECD  Gap  Return  on 
Margin  %  on  sales  %  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  Assets  % 
Exact  Sig.  (2-tailed)  . 
000a  AOOa 
. 
0008 
. 
000a 
. 
0008 
a.  Binomial  distribution  used. 
b.  Sign  Test 
200 Table  4A:  Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranks  Test  (Ex  Losses) 
Ranks 
N  Mean  Rank  Sum  of  Ranks 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %-  OECD  Gap  Negative  Ranks  18a  9.50  171.00 
Profit  Margin  %  Positive  Ranks  0b 
.  00 
.  00 
Ties  oc 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %-  Negative  Ranks  18d  9.50  171.00 
OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  %  Positive  Ranks  0e 
.  00 
.  00 
Ties  Or 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %-  OECD  Gap  Negative  Ranks  189  9.50  171.00 
Net  Margin  %  Positive  Ranks  oh 
.  00 
. 
00 
Ties  01 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %-  OECD  Gap  Negative  Ranks  18J  9.50  171.00 
Berry  Ratio  %  Positive  Ranks  Ok 
.  00 
. 
00 
Ties  of 
Total 
18 
Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %-  OECD  Negative  Ranks  18'"  9.50  171.00 
Gap  Return  on  Assets  %  Positive  Ranks  on 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Ties  00 
Total  18 
a"  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
b.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
C.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  % 
d.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
e.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
f.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
9"  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
h.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
I.  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
J.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %<  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
k.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %>  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
I.  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %=  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
M.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %<  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
n"  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %>  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
0.  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %=  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  % 
201 Table:  4B 
Test  Statistics' 
Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Return  on 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %-  Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap  Assets  %- 
%-  OECD  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  OECD  Gap 
Gap  Profit  Profit  Margin  -  OECD  Gap  -  OECD  Gap  Return  on 
Margin  %  on  sales  %  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  Assets  % 
Z  3.724a  -3.724a  3.724a  -3.7243  -3.7243 
Asymp.  Sig.  (2-tailed) 
.  000  .  000  .  000 
. 
000 
.  000 
a.  Based  on  positive  ranks. 
b.  Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranks  Test 
202 Table  4C 
Sign  Test  -  Frequencies 
N 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Negative  Difference.  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Profit  Positive  Differenced.  9.  0 
Margin  %  Tiesk,  i,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Negative  Difference.  18 
on  Sales  %-  OECD  Gap  Positive  Differenced.  9.  0 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  %  Tiesk,  i,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  Negative  Differences  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Net  Positive  Differencesi.  a,  0 
Margin  %  Tiesk,  l,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  Negative  Difference!  P"  18 
%-  OECD  Gap  Berry  Positive  Differencest.  9  0 
Ratio  %  Tiesk,  i,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total 
18 
Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Negative  Differences  18 
Assets  %-  OECD  Gap  Positive  Differenced-9,  0 
Return  on  Assets  %  Tiesk"i,  m,  n,  o  0 
Total  18 
a.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin 
b.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %<  OECD  Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
C.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %<  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
d.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %<  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
e.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %<  OECD  Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
f.  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin 
9"  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %>  OECD  Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  sales  % 
h.  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  %>  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
I.  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %>  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
J.  Quartile  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %>  OECD  Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
k.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin 
I.  OECD  Gap  Profit  Margin  on  sales  %=  Quartile  Gap 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
m.  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %=  Quartile  Gap  Net  Margin  % 
n"  OECD  Gap  Berry  Ratio  %=  Quartile  Gap  Berry  Ratio  % 
0.  OECD  Gap  Return  on  Assets  %=  Quartile  Gap  Return 
on  Assets  % 
203 Table  4D 
Test  Statistics' 
Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap 
Quartile  Gap  Profit  Margin  Return  on 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %-  Quartile  Gap  Quartile  Gap  Assets  %- 
%-  OECD  OECD  Gap  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  OECD  Gap 
Gap  Profit  Profit  Margin  -  OECD  Gap  -  OECD  Gap  Return  on 
Marin  %  on  sales  %  Net  Margin  %  Berry  Ratio  %  Assets  % 
Exact  Sig.  (2-tailed)  . 
000a  .  000-'l  .  000a  .  000a  . 
000a 
a.  Binomial  distribution  used. 
b.  Sign  Test 
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N Table  7A:  Descriptives  SIC  2416 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  51  -11.20  31.03  6.8012  6.7171 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
51 
. 
53  31.99  7.5961  5.7598 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
51 
. 
53  47.04  8.6963  7.8515 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  47  6.27  3821.66  114.2579  552.7629 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  51  -14.87  31.95  10.9392  9  6526 
avg)  . 
Valid  N  (listwise)  47 
Table  7B: 
Correlations  -  2416 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
3  rs av  3  rs  av  avg)  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
51 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
. 
738  991 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
ý,!  51 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
-.  117 
. 
140  118  Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson  774  563  522  '  135 
avg)  Correlation 
.  . 
" 
N  t  J 
l  J  , 
4/ 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
211 Table  8A:  Descriptives  SIC  2466 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  42  -25.03  21.20  5.7798  7.7782 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
42 
. 
60  18.03  6.2898  4.5055 
(3  yrs  avg) 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
42 
. 
61  21.99  7.0352  5.2760 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  29  13.55  134.93  47.5766  29.8493 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  42  -19.26  99.20  12.3800  21.0301 
avg) 
Valid  N  (listwise)  29 
Table  8B: 
Correlations  -  2466 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%3  rs av  3  rs  av  avg)  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
42 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
995 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
42  42 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson  498 
. 
085  083  -  177 
avg)  Correlation 
" 
, 
N  t  t. 
from  +l  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
212 Table  9A:  Descriptives  SIC  2524 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  44  -7.21  26.46  7.1407  7.1852 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
44 
. 
34  27.17  8.0952  1962  6 
(3  yrs  avg)  . 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
44 
. 
34  37.31  9.3452  8.1779 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  39  8.70  140.30  46.3828  31.6358 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  44  -4.43  35.37  9.8473  8.4543 
avg) 
Valid  N  (listwise)  39 
Table  9B: 
Correlations  -  2524 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  avg) 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  941 
N 
44 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
. 
930  . 
995 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
44  44 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
621  638  3  625 
Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson  86,1  772  738 
j 
600 
avg)  Correlation  . 
N  44  44  .  sei 
from  +l  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
213 Table  IOA:  Descriptives  SIC  2862 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  23  -2.54  18.82  6.0822  5.6062 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
24 
. 
09  89.04  9.0938  17  6904  (3  yrs  avg)  . 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
24 
. 
09  812.28  39.8238  164.6289 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  16  11.82  136.43  49.5238  28.9490 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  24  -2.29  31.88  8.3179  8  0567 
avg)  . 
Valid  N  (listwise)  16 
Table  10B: 
Correlations  -  2862 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%3  rs  av  3  yrs  av  avg)  %3  rs av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  814 
N 
23 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
. 
812 
. 
971 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
23  24 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
014 
Correlation 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
. 
727  -  . 
084 
.  079 
I 
380 
avg)  Correlation 
N  Zs 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.01  (One-tailed) 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.05  (One-tailed) 
214 Table  IIA:  Descriptives  SIC  2875 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  72  -12.10  27.92  7.3243  7.1826 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
72 
. 
50  42.02  7.8561  7.1156 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
72 
. 
51  72.49  9.3214  10.6446 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  63  -.  61  164.57  36.7795  28.3746 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
72  -20.73  45.30  11.4275  10.6389 
Valid  N  (listwise)  63 
Table  11  B: 
Correlations-2875 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  av  av  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  898 
N 
72 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
982 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
72  72 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
fä28  398  249  128 
avg)  Correlation 
N  (jA 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.01  (One-tailed) 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.05  (One-tailed) 
215 Table  12A:  Descriptives  SIC  3002 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  39  -6.80  21.77  6.5338  5.1250 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
39 
. 
14  31.85  8.9333  7.2191 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
39 
. 
14  46.74  10.5726  9.9448 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  29  6.93  333.11  63.3045  76.1055 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
39  -37.24  78.78  15.2000  17.8883 
Valid  N  (listwise)  29 
Table  12B: 
Correlations  -  3002 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
39 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
994 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
39  39 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
. 
771 
. 
367 
. 
317  053 
avg)  Correlation  1 
N  t, 
' 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
216 Table  13A:  Descriptives  SIC  3162 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  75  -4.89  43.56  10.2341  8.6479 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
75 
. 
14  43.03  10.3759  8  2027  (3  yrs  avg)  . 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
75 
. 
15  75.52  12.5855  12.2539 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  69  3.39  218.61  51.8013  40.6737 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  75  -29.18  65.20  14.1977  13  3160 
avg)  . 
Valid  N  (listwise)  69 
Table  13B: 
Correlations  -  3162 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
% (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  av  av  %  (3yrs  avg) 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
934 
N 
75 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
. 
938 
. 
977 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
75  75 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
373  410  394  Correlation 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
707  657 
.  626  252 
avg)  Correlation 
N 
ificant  from  +1  at 
217 Table  14A:  Descriptives  SIC  3210 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  51  -3.01  42.74  9.8575  11.0648 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
51 
. 
22  41.05  9.2580  9.4401 
(3  yrs  avg) 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
51 
. 
22  69.64  11.6563  14.4011 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  44  2.06  396.26  44.5155  59.3625 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  51  -13.44  51.72  12.8922  13.6206 
avg) 
Valid  N  (listwise)  44 
Table  14B: 
Correlations  -  3210 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  av  avg)  %3  rs  avg) 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
877 
N 
51 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
874  989 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
51  51 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson  o 
Correlation 
" 
N  il  "1  a  t, 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson  677  598  582  Qa3 
avg)  Correlation 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.01 
Correlation  sienif"icant  from  +1  at  0.05 
218 Table  15A:  Descriptives  SIC  3220 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  31  -3.24  36.30  8.7406  8.8021 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
31 
. 
55  48.45  9.6823  10.4081 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
31 
. 
55  93.97  12.7303  18.4546 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  26  9.85  1145.05  94.1769  217.9906 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
31  -2.32  41.72  12.6606  10.9973 
Valid  N  (listwise)  26 
Table  15B: 
Correlations  -  3220 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%3  yrs  av  3  rs  av  avg)  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
931 
N 
31 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
852  977 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
N 
31  31 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
, 
329  259  1  Correlation  92 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
749  559  406  218 
avg)  Correlation  , 
N  ,S1  .5131  "0 
Correlation  significant  frone  +1 
Correlation  significant  fron  +1 
219 Table  16A:  Descriptives  SIC  3230 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  15  -1.47  14.41  3.9400  4.8637 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
15 
. 
33  11.98  4.5747  3.9089 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
15 
. 
33  13.61  4.9647  4.4417 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  15  4.06  139.21  52.3127  42.0358 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  15  -3.63  27.97  7.4807  7374  8 
avg)  . 
Valid  N (listwise)  15 
Table  16B: 
Correlations  -  3230 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%3  yrs  av  3  yrs  av  avg)  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
948 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
15 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
949  999 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
15  15 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
435 
, 
qß1  502  Correlation  I 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
929  918 
. 
917  523 
avg)  Correlation 
N  15  15  15 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
220 Table  17A:  Descriptives  3320 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  58  -1.09  43.79  9.7034  8.8866 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
58 
. 
03  32.52  8.9193  6.8117 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
58 
. 
03  48.20  10.4876  9.5214 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  51  14.04  317.15  62.1065  45.3165 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  58  -268.16  71.37  9.4309  39  8545 
avg)  . 
Valid  N  (listwise)  51 
Table  17B: 
Correlations  -  3320 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
58 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
992 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
58  58 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
353  545  572  Correlation  I 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
380  359  35S  171  Correlation  avg) 
N 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
221 Table  18A:  Descriptives  SIC  3410 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  24  -5.60  7.99  2.4733  3.2620 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
24 
. 
33  7.60  3.5617  2.1369 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
24 
. 
33  8.23  3.8400  2.2743 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  22  5.00  69.66  25.2123  17.0459 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
24  -2.09  22.49  6.1779  5.9636 
Valid  N  (listwise)  22 
Table  18B: 
Correlations  -  3410 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
24 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
989 
N 
24  24 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
Correlation 
N  22 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
. 
800 
I 
99  616 
I 
251 
avg)  Correlation 
N  24 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
222 Table  19A:  Descriptives  SIC  5142 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  38  -3.03  17.20  5.8418  5.0782 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
38 
. 
40  16.33  6.1976  4.5323 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
38 
. 
40  19.52  6.8566  5.3093 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  28  10.50  111.93  55.5546  31.4424 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
38  -2.99  48.70  12.7868  12.1726 
Valid  N  (listwise)  28 
Table  19B: 
Correlations  -  5142 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%3  yrs  av  3  yrs  av  avg)  %3  rs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  g25 
N 
38 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
928  999 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
38  38 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
45Q  551  Correlation 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
776  712  708  X59 
avg)  Correlation 
N  su  s  Ad  ,i 
from  +1  at  0.01 
from  +1  at  0.05 
223 Table  20A:  Descriptives  SIC  5143 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs avg)  70  -1.18  41.01  5.4424  6.2940 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
70 
. 
21  36.42  5.3651  5.6243 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs avg) 
70 
. 
21  57.27  6.2327  8.0684 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  63  3.75  146.82  35.6167  28.4537 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
70  -2.25  38.78  11.0453  8.7716 
Valid  N  (listwise)  63 
Table  20B: 
Correlations  -  5143 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  avg) 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
988 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
70 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
981  986 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
N 
70  70 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
710  696  705  Correlation  , 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
819  817  764  432 
avg)  Correlation 
N  /u  /0  /u  t,,  5 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.01  (One-tailed) 
Correlation  sienificant  from  +1  at  0.05  (One-tailed) 
224 Table  21A:  Descriptives  SIC  5146 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  45 
. 
13  26.67  6.9711  6.3133 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
45 
. 
13  26.72  6.9693  6.0672 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
45 
. 
13  36.47  7.9824  7.7519 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  41  3.25  137.17  31.9159  32.3259 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
45 
. 
50  56.34  13.6760  11.6517 
Valid  N  (listwise)  41 
Table  21B: 
Correlations  -  5146 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  985 
N 
45 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
981  996 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
N 
45  45 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
698 
J 
689 
I 
673  Correlation 
4 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
811 
,  775  780  .  446 
avg)  Correlation 
N  4ýj  .  lam  4:,  41 
225 Table  22A:  Descriptives  SIC  5155 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  32  -2.53  28.46  3.6609  5.4160 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
32 
. 
19  33.11  4.1606  5.8170 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
32 
. 
19  49.49  4.9772  8.6053 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  28  5.20  135.25  27.6404  27.5266 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
32  -6.96  41.98  7.4081  8.6441 
Valid  N  (listwise)  28 
Table  22B: 
Correlations  -  5155 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  a  (3  yrs a  avg)  %3  rsav 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
969 
N 
32 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
. 
944  990 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
N 
32  32 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
Correlation 
N  28  28  28 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
960 
. 
903 
. 
861  089  Correlation  avg)  . 
N  32  32  32 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.01  (One-tailed) 
Correlation  significant  from  +1  at  0.05  (One-tailed) 
226 Table  23A:  Descriptives  SIC  5164 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs  avg)  27 
. 
36  25.98  7.7426  8.4766 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
27 
. 
42  26.60  7.0337  7.7587 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
27 
. 
43  36.24  8.3893  10.0626 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  26  11.29  911.33  96.0862  193.8382 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
27  -.  27  90.69  16.3919  19.3356 
Valid  N  (listwise)  26 
Table  23B: 
Correlations  -  5164 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs avg)  (3  yrs  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
969 
N 
27 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
962  997 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
N 
27  27 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
553  508  499  Correlation 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
391  383 
I 
b  266 
avg)  Correlation 
N  21  1i  21  1o 
ificant  from  +1  at  0.01 
ificant  from  +1  at  0.05 
227 Table  24A:  Descriptives  SIC  5165 
Descriptive  Statistics 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Profit  Margin  %  (3  yrs avg)  21 
. 
89  51.01  13.1862  12.7487 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  % 
(3  yrs  avg) 
21  2.00  49.92  11.6410  11.3478 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating 
Margin  3  yrs  avg) 
21  2.04  99.67  16.1405  22.1468 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  20  14.94  86.52  46.6910  20.9199 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs 
avg) 
21  1.02  75.90  18.2767  15.8154 
Valid  N  (listwise)  20 
Table  24B: 
Correlations  -  5165 
Net  Margin  % 
Profit  Margin  (Operating 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Margin  3  yrs  Berry  Ratio 
%  (3  yrs  av  (3  yrs;  avg)  avg)  %  (3yrs  av 
Profit  Margin  on  Sales  %  Pearson 
(3  yrs  avg)  Correlation 
784 
N 
21 
Net  Margin  %  (Operating  Pearson 
Margin  3  yrs  avg)  Correlation  . 
796 
. 
984 
N 
21  21 
Berry  Ratio  %  (3yrs  avg)  Pearson 
. 
086 
( 
.  538 
I 
4  5  Correlation  .  8 
N 
Return  on  Assets  %  (3  yrs  Pearson 
. 
859 
. 
836 
. 
860  178 
avg)  Correlation 
N  21  21  21  1() 
from  +1  at  0.01_(One-taile(l) 
from  +1  at  0.05  (One-tailed) 
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N Table  45:  Japanese  Companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax  paid 
Sum  of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  1096248.596  1  1096248.6 
. 
479 
. 
490 
Within  Groups  426058284.1  186  2290635.9 
Total  427154532.7  187 
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265 Table  46:  US  Companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
ANOVA 
tax  Paid 
Sum  of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  66911658.817  1  66911658.8  1.174 
. 
279 
Within  Groups  45952763063  806  57013353.7 
Total  46019674722  807 
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266 Table  47:  UK  Companies  (Manufacturing  Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax  Paid 
Sum  of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  34777531.120  1  34777531.1  1.219 
. 
270 
Within  Groups  28361625535  994  28532822.5 
Total  28396403066  995 
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267 Table  48:  Japanese  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax  Paid 
Sum  of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  304182.738  1  304182.74 
. 
234 
. 
629 
Within  Groups  210333566  162  1298355.3 
Total  210637749  163 
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268 Table  49:  US  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax  Paid 
Sum  of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  1974275.703  1  1974275.703 
. 
195 
. 
659 
Within  Groups  3213874980  318  10106525.1 
Total  3215849256  319 
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269 Table  50:  UK  Companies  (Wholesale  Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax  Paid 
Mean 
Sum  of  Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Between  Groups  6153105.752  1  6153105.75 
. 
209 
. 
648 
Within  Groups  14178856624.6  482  29416715.0 
Total  6153105.752  483 
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